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Abstract

Dohmen, Joshua R. PhD. The University of Memphis. August 2015. Moving
Toward Interaction: Epistemic Injustice, Julia Kristeva, and Disability. Major Professors:
Pleshette DeArmitt and Deborah Tollefsen.
This dissertation argues that the discourse of epistemic injustice and Julia
Kristeva’s oeuvre offer important insights into disability oppression, and that interaction
is a promising form of resistance. “Interaction” as used here, is a term adopted from both
Kristeva and José Medina to signify a social relation in which persons or groups come
into contact while the specificity of each party is maintained. Thus, interaction is defined
in contrast to integration.
In the first chapter I argue that institutionalization, medicalization, and cultural
anxieties about mental disabilities constitute and cause epistemic injustices against
disabled subjects. I then show why epistemic interaction, an openness and responsiveness
to diverse others, is promising for resisting these injustices. I conclude with three
recommendations for avoiding epistemic injustices against severely mentally disabled
persons, but they threaten to make these lives thought meaningful only as they might be.
I then turn to Julia Kristeva’s essays on disability, reading them through her
previous works. First, I explain Kristeva’s theory of language to reveal how meaning can
be shared, even with severely mentally disabled subjects. In this way, the meaning of
severely disabled lives can be understood in the present, not as deferred. I then develop
Kristeva’s account of disability exclusion as founded in the narcissistic threat posed to
nondisabled subjects by disabled subjects. Finally, I propose that interaction be
understood as a double movement of interpersonal relations, which allow nondisabled
persons to work-through their narcissistic defenses and share meaning with disabled
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persons, and social relations, in which the nondisabled “move toward” the disabled to
alter the figures of abjection.
In the final chapter, I argue that disabled persons, including the severely mentally
disabled, are capable of achieving what Kristeva calls the highest form of subjectivity:
genius. Arguing against an interpretation that relies on her account of psychosexual
development, I propose that feminine genius be understood as a form of intimate revolt
from the social margins that produces a work. Interpreted thusly, other forms of
marginalized genius become conceivable. I offer two examples, Susan Wendell, a
feminist philosopher, and Sesha Kittay, the daughter of Eva Kittay, as disabled geniuses.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

Page

1

Introduction
Disability Studies
Understanding Disability
The Medical Model
The Social Model
Recent Developments
A Note on Method

1
6
7
7
8
14
26

2

Knowledge: Epistemic Injustice and Disability
An Overview of Epistemic Injustice
Fricker: Testimonial and Hermeneutic (In)Justice
Medina: Epistemic Interaction
Epistemic Injustice and Disability
Problematic Practices
Institutionalization
Medicalization
Mental Disability
Conclusion

29
30
30
41
53
54
55
61
79
97

3

Meaning: Kristeva and Interaction
Lacanian Analyses, or Why Kristeva?
Sharing Meaning: Semiotic and Symbolic
Disability: Abject or Uncanny?
Kristeva’s Rhetoric of Disability
A Kristevan Account of Disability Exclusion
Conclusion

99
100
102
108
135
140
143

4

Subjectivity: Kristeva and (Disabled) Genius
Whence Feminine Genius?
Oedipus2 and the Illusory Phallus
Feminine Genius without Oedipal Psychosexuality
Intimate Revolt and Feminine Genius
Disabled Genius
Conclusion

145
146
151
161
168
179
187

5

Conclusion
Bringing the Accounts into Interaction
Future Directions

188
190
199

Works Cited

201

viii

Introduction

Invisibilia, a podcast produced by National Public Radio (NPR), recently
produced an episode, provocatively titled “Batman” (Miller and Speigel 2015a) about
Daniel Kish, a blind man who uses echolocation to move in space—to, he says, “See.” As
a child, Kish began using clicks of his tongue to sense the world around him, and as the
episode explains, because he was allowed by his mother to make mistakes, he developed
a very refined sense of echolocation such that he did not identify as a blind person until
college. Developing this skill is quite rare for blind people, however, even in those who
are blind from birth or a young age, in large part because it is discouraged. Daniel and his
mother were told that the clicks were “not socially acceptable,” and they were
consistently told that allowing him as much freedom as he had was irresponsible and
dangerous. (Nevermind, of course, the fact that any child who is rambunctious can get
into trouble or get hurt.) In college, he came across a book called The Making of Blind
Men (1981) by Robert Scott, which helped him realize that blind people are often
socialized to be incapacitated. They are encouraged to rely on charity, told they are
unable to work, isolated in sheltered workshops, guided in their movements in school and
sheltered workplaces; in short, they are determined to be helpless in advance. Kish
decided to start an organization called World Access for the Blind to help teach others,
especially blind children, how to echolocate. But this proved challenging because “a
blind person teaching another blind person how to get around is basically unheard of”
(Miller and Spiegel 2015b).
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the experiences of disabled persons
who, like Kish, are discredited and who, like the people in Scott’s study, are excluded.
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What is the harm done to persons like Kish when expressions of their experiences are
disavowed? What would it take to be attentive to experiences of disabled persons, and is
this possible for those with the most severe mental disabilities? Why are disabled people
largely excluded? And how could meaningful interaction, not integration or assimilation,
between the disabled and the nondisabled be achieved? This dissertation addresses these
and related questions by appealing to recent discussions of epistemic injustice and the
work of Julia Kristeva.
In the first chapter, I summarize arguments about epistemic injustice made by
Miranda Fricker and José Medina to understand the epistemic aspect of disability
oppression. What was the harm done to Kish when his experiences were discounted?
What harms are done to blind people when they are not given space or resources to
express themselves, especially to one another? I argue that these and many other related
cases constitute testimonial and hermeneutical injustices by applying Fricker’s theory to
two practices closely related to disability experience: institutionalization and
medicalization. Then, I suggest that the most promising way to resist these injustices is
through what Medina calls epistemic interaction, a practice which fosters beneficial
epistemic friction and the formation of meta-lucidity through epistemic virtues.
Organizations like Kish’s, in other words, serve as important spaces to develop
interpretations of disabled persons’ experiences such that they can be articulated and
resist mainstream understandings of disabled persons as, in this case, helpless. But while
the first part of the chapter applies these theories of epistemic injustice to the experiences
of disabled persons, I conclude by reflecting on mentally disabled persons, especially the
most severely disabled, to argue that there is a limit to how far the discourse of epistemic
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injustice can understand disability oppression. Specifically, the case of the severely
disabled subject raises the question of who can and cannot be the subject of epistemic
injustice. I argue that in the large majority of cases, mentally disabled persons can be and
are subjected to epistemic injustices. Thus, I suggest three practices to avoid these
injustices. First, whatever testimony disabled persons share, even if it is only expressions
of pleasure, pain, or discomfort, should be taken seriously. Second, when trying to
understand the testimony or experiences of severely disabled persons, it may be
important to consult those with similar conditions or those in similar environments who
are likely to have greater insights into the experiences of their severely disabled peers.
Finally, the epistemic skills of severely disabled persons should be fostered as much as
possible rather than being disregarded or undermined. But with these recommendations in
mind, there are still two important qualifications. First, it is important to accept that there
may very well be persons who will never develop the epistemic skills necessary to give
testimony or interpret their experiences in the ways that Fricker’s account requires.
Second, caution is necessary to avoid thinking of severely disabled persons’ lives or
experiences as meaningful in a deferred way. That is, it is important to acknowledge the
meaning of severely disabled persons’ lives as they currently are, not just as they might
be with time, therapies, trainings, and so on. With these qualifications in mind, I turn to
Julia Kristeva.
In the second chapter I explicate Julia Kristeva’s essays on disability to think
through, first, how meaning is shared and can be shared even with severely disabled
persons, and second, what psychic barriers keep others, especially nondisabled others,
from interacting with disabled persons. Because Kristeva’s works on disability are
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intended for rather general audiences, I read them through her more theoretically rich
work on language, abjection, and the uncanny. I argue that because meaning emerges
through the interaction of the semiotic and the symbolic on Kristeva’s view, that she
provides the tools for understanding how others could listen to the meanings made and
shared by even the most severely mentally disabled subjects. This form of attentiveness
resists the tendency of my recommendations in the first chapter to put severely disabled
persons in a state of deferral because it finds meaning in the experiences of disabled
persons as they are, not just as they might be. I call the prejudicial failure of this form of
attentiveness “intimate hermeneutical injustice,” to flag (a) that it concerns interpersonal
interpretive resources, not group or collective resources like Fricker’s concept of
hermeneutical injustice and (b) that it concerns the interpretation of experiences, not the
exchange of testimony like Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice. I move on to
explain Kristeva’s account of disability exclusion, showing how the threat of a
narcissistic wound that is experienced in encounters with disabled others keeps
nondisabled persons from interacting with disabled persons. In this way, Kristeva
provides a psychic explanation of the epistemic injustices discussed in the first chapter.
Epistemic interactions with disabled others are resisted by nondisabled persons because
of an experienced threat to their own narcissistic integrity. To see how Kristeva could
help contribute to resisting this exclusion, I both take up Kristeva’s recommendation and
move beyond them, with the help of an essay by Sara Ahmed (2005), to argue that
including disabled persons in a more just way will require a double movement of
working-through nondisabled persons’ narcissistic defenses in interactions with disabled
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persons, and “moving toward” disabled persons to allow for greater interaction between
disabled and nondisabled communities.
Having argued for the sharing of knowledge and meaning between disabled and
nondisabled people through interaction in the first and second chapters, I move on in the
third chapter to argue that disabled persons are not just subjects, but that some disabled
persons achieve what Kristeva thinks of as the highest form of subjectivity: genius. A
genius is a subject whose life, through common yet extraordinary intimate revolts, results
in a work that is inseparable from that life, a work that is taken up by others. Arguing
against a reading of feminine genius as depending upon Kristeva’s ableist, sexist, and
heteronormative account of psychosexual development, I propose an interpretation of
feminine genius as a form of intimate revolt from social margins. Having freed the notion
of genius from this Oedipal account of psychosexual development, I argue that this
allows us to develop a more general notion of marginalized genius which I demonstrate
through two examples of disabled geniuses: Susan Wendell and Sesha, Eva Kittay’s
severely disabled daughter.
In an attempt to give rigorous readings to each of the figures dealt with in my
chapters, I largely leave synthesizing these accounts to the conclusion. There I argue that
Kristeva offers helpful resources for understanding why epistemic injustices are
committed against disabled persons and for resisting those injustices. I also suggest that
Kristeva and Medina offer similar accounts of interaction that help to build upon one
another. Specifically, I argue that Medina’s position that spaces reserved for oppressed
persons are often necessary to resist assimilation into epistemic mainstreams could
strengthen Kristeva’s account of interaction by noting that disabled persons will likely
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need such spaces—which I call spaces of forgiveness for reasons that will be articulated
later—to achieve revolts from the margin. Indeed, I intend to play with this intersection
in my title: Moving Toward Interaction. The title evokes my intent to make progress in—
to move toward—facilitating interaction between disabled persons and communities and
nondisabled persons and communities. It also refers to two movements that I argue are
necessary for interaction throughout the dissertation: first, a movement of disabled people
toward one another to form spaces from which to challenge their oppression and
exclusion; and second, a moving of nondisabled people toward disabled people that can
allow for both interpersonal and broader social interaction.
Disability Studies
Because this is a work intended for an audience of primarily philosophers, I do
not assume readers’ familiarity with trends in disability studies. But in the interest of
keeping my arguments and developments clear in the main chapters of the work, I do not
want to make repeated digressions through the terrain of disability studies in those
chapters. Thus, I want to devote ample space here to discussing some main developments
in the field of disability studies. Of course, my aim is not to give an exhaustive review of
all the literature in disability studies. This is not only impossible but would likely be
counterproductive. Instead, I give an overview of some important themes in disability
studies, particularly arguments about how disability is best understood, and how
disability oppression is best resisted. This overview should not only be helpful to the
reader who is unfamiliar with disability studies, but will also serve as a background
against which I can position my account.
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Understanding Disability
As Lennard J. Davis explains, disability is not a stable or fixed concept, but like
other identities is “inherently unstable” (2002, 5). Indeed, it may be the most unstable
sociopolitical identity. How disability is understood, then, is no simple matter, but there
are two particular models of disability against which contemporary disability theorists
situate themselves: the medical model and the social model. I will therefore organize this
section into three parts, one on the medical model, one on the social model, and the third
on a variety of theoretical developments that respond to and call into question these
earlier models.
The Medical Model
The medical model, which is sometimes referred to as the “individual model,”
does not have a set of foundational texts. 1 Instead, this is the assumed understanding of
disability that pervades most social responses to disability. According to the medical
model, disability is a “problem” located in the disabled individual, and therefore the
appropriate response is medical cure. Understanding disability in this way has several
important consequences. The medical model justifies viewing the sole source of disability
as biomedical in nature. It also leads to problematic assumptions about disabled persons.
For example, disabled individuals may be blamed for not “overcoming” their conditions
(Linton 1998, 18-9). Those who do succeed in living with their disabilities may be
viewed as inspirational for completing activities that would be thought ordinary for a
nondisabled person; some in the disability rights movement refer to this trope as the
“supercrip” (Shapiro 1994, 16-8). The medical model also justifies understanding
1

Simi Linton (1998) and Michael Oliver (2009), for example, both discuss this model as
the “individual model.”
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disabled persons as worthy of pity, rather than as living meaningful lives or deserving of
equal rights and access to resources. I will discuss below how these narratives supported
by the medical model are rejected by the social model of disability.
There are also important linguistic consequences of assuming the medical model.
This model justifies “person first” language which is often thought to be progressive.
Person first language uses phrases like “a person with a disability,” “a person with
autism,” or “a person who is deaf,” just as other medical conditions are treated, like “a
person with the flu,” or “a person who is feverish.” The use of person first language
emphasizes that the condition is not an essential part of the person—that she is a person
first. This model also justifies the use of more offensive phrases, like “a person confined
to a wheelchair” or “wheelchair-bound,” or “a person suffering from blindness,”
especially when the latter is used for a person who does not in fact experience her
blindness as a source of suffering.
Finally, because, on this model, a disability is understood to result from the
individual’s biology alone, responses to disability are targeted at the individual. Thus,
cures (like medications, implants, and surgeries) and rehabilitation (attempts to help the
person achieve “normal” or “near-normal” biological function) are the favored response
to disability. In addition to medical, psychiatric, and rehabilitation professionals, those
who organize charities for disabled persons also usually subscribe to the medical model
of disability.
The Social Model
The social model of disability, a phrase coined by Michael Oliver, is a response to
the medical model that grew out of an influential document published by the Union of the
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Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS). According to UPIAS, disability
results from social oppression, not from individual biology. Thus, they make an
important distinction between “impairment” which is “lacking part or all of a limb, or
having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body” and “disability” which is “the
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization
which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus
excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities” (quoted in Oliver
2009, 42). This model has been influential and has been taken beyond physical disability
to understand disability in general. Thus, “impairment” can be understood as an abnormal
biological feature or process in an individual, whereas “disability” is the result of social
practices, structures, and attitudes that dis-able individuals. While the medical model
encourages pity and inspirational stories of overcoming, proponents of the social model
reject pity, view disabled lives as attempts to simply live, not inspirational plots lived for
the nondisabled, and think social oppression, not individual impairments, are what need
to be overcome.
Though social model thinkers differ in their views on language, the social model
tends to support phrases that emphasize the social causation of disability. “Disabled
person,” for example, emphasizes that a person is dis-abled by social structures, whereas
“person with a disability” individualizes disability as a trait that is had by a person.
Similarly, “wheelchair user” is preferable to “wheelchair bound” because it refuses to
think of the wheelchair as a confining artefact that is only necessary because of a
personal tragedy and instead expresses that a wheelchair is a tool actively used to enter
social realms that would not otherwise be accessible.
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Clearly, the social model also argues for addressing disabled persons’ concerns at
the social level, rather than just the individual level. Rather than seeking out cures for
spinal cord injuries, or “rehabilitating” persons with spinal cord injuries by forcing them
to approximate walking, social model theorists argue that justice for persons with spinal
cord injuries would require making buildings wheelchair accessible through ramps and
elevators, having bathrooms that are accessible to wheelchair users, maintaining
sidewalks and implementing curb cuts, the availability and affordability of both relevant
healthcare services and of technologies and aides for tasks that are difficult for
wheelchair users but assumed normal for others, and so on. The absence of structural
accessibility disables, not spinal cord injuries. The lack of affordable health care disables,
not the impairment. Historical research supports these arguments. Brendan Gleeson, for
example, argues that physical impairment in feudal England was likely “an accepted,
prosaic element of peasant life, and may only have marked itself out when, on occasion,
it was seen to have spiritual significance” (1999, 96). But the rise of city life and
standardization caused by industrialization brought with it physical structures,
employment practices, and attitudes that disabled the physically impaired. Similarly,
deafness is a disability only in the absence of certain technologies and social practices.
Nora Ellen Groce’s book, Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language: Hereditary Deafness on
Martha’s Vineyard (1985), for example, shows how deafness was not perceived as a
relevant social difference in Martha’s Vineyard because many people in the community
spoke sign language. Indeed, many in the Deaf community do not consider sign
languages to be a therapeutic tool, but think of them as languages on par with orally
spoken languages that contribute to Deaf culture.2 With better educational opportunities
2

“Deaf,” when capitalized, usually refers to the Deaf culture or members of that culture,

10

for deaf children, the availability and affordability of sign language interpreters and
technologies like text or video communications and alarms that alert senses other than
hearing, deaf persons would not face the same barriers to social interaction.
While the social model in its early iterations was focused on physical and sensory
disability, similar arguments could be developed for certain mental disabilities. The
neoliberal requirement that employees be flexible to the demands of employers, for
example, makes employment difficult for intellectually disabled persons. An employer
that expects its employees to learn a wide variety of tasks and work erratic schedules may
hinder mentally disabled persons or those who depend upon scheduled care or
transportation services from being successful employees. This would not be the case in a
flexible workplace that seeks to tailor assignments and schedules to the capabilities and
needs of its employees. To take another example, implementing inclusive classrooms and
eliminating social stigmas would likely enable many learning-disabled persons who are
now disabled by institutions and social expectations.
Taking the social model seriously means acknowledging that there are a variety of
social responses to bodies that are more or less disabling. Linton offers one way to
categorize social practices.3 The first category is “pariah,” in which disabled people are
denied most rights and considered “a threat to the group itself” (Linton 1998, 38). This
attitude is common in eugenic discourse.4 The second category, “economic and social

whereas “deaf” refers to hearing loss and persons who have difficulty hearing or cannot hear.
She bases her categories on a 1948 article entitled “The Physically Handicapped in
Certain Non-Occidental Societies,” but makes significant revisions to the analysis given in the
article.
3

4

Lest we think eugenics is a thing of the past, slippery slope arguments are still common
in discussions of reproductive rights for disabled persons. See, for example, Roberta Cepko’s
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liability,” refers to cultures in which disabled people are seen as drains on economic
resources and social success. This attitude is prevalent today among those who view the
welfare system as a “hand-out,” and employers like one manager who asked me, “Why
should my business suffer to employ this [disabled] person?” “Tolerant utilization,” the
third category, refers to practices of using disabled people in social roles to the extent that
they can “fulfill certain roles and duties designated by the nondisabled majority as
necessary” (1998, 51). One of Linton’s examples of tolerant utilization is the hiring of
deaf workers for jobs that require frequent exposure to loud machinery. The fourth
category, “limited participation,” refers to practices which accept disabled individuals
insofar as they “can ‘keep up’ with the nondisabled” (1998, 53). Whereas tolerant
utilization puts disabled persons in certain roles, limited participation says that disabled
people can participate insofar as they can fulfill the roles of nondisabled people (with no
“accommodations”). “Laissez-faire,” the fifth category, describes settings in which there
is no orchestrated response to disabled persons and instead disabled persons rely on their
families, friends, and communities for whatever support they receive. There is no active
attempt to include disabled people, in such settings, and the support disabled people
receive is likely to vary widely according to the beliefs and resources of those they rely
upon. The sixth category, and Linton’s own innovation, is “participation and
accommodation” according to which the participation of disabled people is valued and
actively sought by a society. Participation and accommodation require greater flexibility
on the part of institutions, material structures, social expectations, and so on. One of

review of case law regarding involuntary sterilization in the United States (Cepko 2013) and
Alison Kafer’s discussion of a heavily criticized deaf lesbian couple who selected a deaf sperm
donor in hopes of having a deaf child (2013).
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Linton’s examples, here, is inclusive education. What these categories reveal is that there
are multiple ways societies can react to disabled bodies, and that the reaction of any
particular society is contingent. Societies should strive, Linton argues, for participation
and accommodation as much as possible. It is important to note that these categories
rarely, if ever, accurately describe an entire society’s response to disability. Instead, any
given community will likely exhibit characteristics of multiple categories, and indeed we
could likely find instances of all six categories in the contemporary United States.
While Linton aims to categorize the multiple social responses to disability,
Charlton (2000) analyzes disability oppression in terms of similar practices that can be
found in most contemporary societies, even if their particular manifestations differ. The
first is political economy, and through this framework, Charlton explains that disabled
persons tend to be the poorest and least employed, especially given the global neoliberal
economic practices that have standardized work processes, centralized wealth in the
hands of the few, and created a massive class of unemployed and underemployed persons
around the world. Looking at cultures and belief systems, Charlton explains that attitudes
toward disabled persons “are almost universally pejorative” (2000, 25), whether this
takes the form of paternalism, religious myths of retribution, or media depictions of
disabled persons as necessarily bitter and asexual. The third dimension of disability
oppression is “(false) consciousness and alienation,” or the internalization of disability
oppression (2000, 27). The fourth and final dimension, “power and ideology” describes
the ways in which power functions to keep disabled people disempowered, and how
ideology functions to make the suffering and marginalization of disabled persons appear
natural (2000, 29-31). Through this analysis, Charlton’s readers are called to imagine and
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work toward economic practices, cultural beliefs, relations to oneself and the world, and
operations of power that could resist the oppression of disabled people. Again, oppression
is not a natural result of impairment, but a result of social practices and structures which
are contingent, and thus, this oppression can be meliorated.5
Recent Developments
There have been myriad responses to the social model of disability, such that I
could not possibly hope to discuss them all here. It is important, however, to note some
common criticisms of the social model of disability as a background for the arguments in
this dissertation. One common theme among responses is the call to pay more attention to
what social model theorists call “impairment.” Influential disability scholar, Tom
Shakespeare is one who points to the limits of the social model. Shakespeare argues that
the social model has been beneficial politically by creating a clear agenda and language
for activism, instrumentally through its effectiveness in passing legislation, implementing
reforms in transportation, employment, housing and so on, and psychologically as a
source of identity and self-esteem for disabled persons (2006, 199). But there are four
important weaknesses of the social model on Shakespeare’s view. First, it does not give
sufficient attention to impairments which are often a source of suffering for disabled
persons, even when oppressive environments are not causing suffering.6 For example,

5

I do not intend to group Linton, Charlton, or others discussed under the heading of
social model thinkers together as if they follow Michael Oliver explicitly. Instead, my aim is to
show multiple theorists who have taken up social understandings of disability to analyze current
and historical practices that have been disabling.
6

For his part, Oliver does not think this criticism has any grounding. First, he notes that
the social model is intended not as an exhaustive theory, but as a source of political change.
Second, he argues that the pain and suffering of impairment are actually quite important to his
work: “As a severely disabled tetraplegic, who every day of my life needs to make the necessary
arrangements to be able to get up in the morning and go to bed at night and, indeed, to use the
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“degenerative conditions,” especially those “which may cause premature death” appear to
cause suffering regardless of the social context (2006, 200). A person with multiple
sclerosis (MS) may experience pains as a result of her condition that do not result from
social oppression (Falvo 2014, 111), even if there are other ways in which she is
oppressed by ableism. And even if there is much more society could do to be accessible
to deaf persons, the vertigo associated with many forms of hearing loss is unlikely to be
addressed by social reforms (2014, 273-4). This worries Kafer because only addressing
“disabling barriers” threatens to make “pain and fatigue irrelevant to the project of
disability politics,” but it should be an important experience around which disabled
persons could organize (2013, 7). Second, Shakespeare argues that “the social model
assumes what it needs to prove: that disabled people are oppressed” because it “defines
disability as oppression” (2006, 201). It is impossible, given this definition, to find a nonoppressed disabled person.7 Third, the social model’s dream of a “barrier-free utopia” is
impossible (2006, 201). This is true for a variety of reasons. First, it is impractical
because the structural changes required, for example, would require leveling many
structures already in place as this would be easier than retrofitting old buildings, and
because there will remain aspects of the “natural” environment that remain inaccessible
to people with certain disabilities, like “mountains, bogs, and beaches” for wheelchair
toilet, I find such suggestions galling” (Oliver 2009, 48). Indeed, insofar as social model thinkers
have pushed for aides, expanded affordable health services, and so on, not just the installation of
ramps, it is difficult to see why one would think they are not concerned with the suffering caused
by impairments. Shifting the level of analysis to the social does not mean ignoring individual
impairments altogether, and it has important political benefits by uniting persons with diverse
impairments into a movement of disabled people.
I only aim to give a summary of Shakespeare’s arguments here, not to engage with them
critically, but it does seem as though one could respond to this criticism by noting that there may
be non-oppressed and therefore nondisabled impaired people, removing Shakespeare’s concern
about question-begging.
7
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users or the sound of babbling brooks for deaf people. (2006, 201).8 Limitations on
resources make it difficult to conceive of formatting educational materials for all disabled
persons, like large-print editions for those with vision loss, audio versions or Braille
versions for blind persons, and so on.9 Second, it may be in principle impossible because
different changes are needed to make the environment more accessible for different
impairments. “[B]lind people,” Shakespeare explains, “prefer steps and defined curbs and
indented paving, while wheelchair users need ramps, dropped curbs, and smooth
surfaces” (2006, 201). Similarly, the beeps that signal a crosswalk for blind people may
cause sensory irritation to some autistic persons, for example.
Shakespeare’s fourth criticism of the social model is one that has been articulated
in many ways: the distinction between (biological) impairment and (socially caused)
disability is too neat to accurately describe the interaction between the individual body
and the social environment. He gives the example of a person with a neurological
disorder who is depressed (2006, 201). It may well be impossible to separate the complex
interactions at play between her neurological condition, environment, depression, social
isolation, and exclusion. Is her depression caused by her neurological condition or her
exclusion? Is her isolation a result of exclusion or is she isolating herself as a result of her
depression? Did environmental factors contribute to her neurological condition, or would

Kafer (2013) provides an insightful caveat to this claim. She notes that many “natural”
environments are made accessible to nondisabled persons, whether in the form of trails or
landmarks and signs.
8

Shakespeare’s move may be too quick here. I identify as nondisabled, and I often have
to wait for interlibrary loans to get the texts I need. If research libraries purchased materials in a
variety of formats, it seems to me that a sharing program could be quite effective in filling the
research needs of persons with diverse disabilities.
9
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she have developed the condition in any environment? It is unlikely that even the most
rigorous science and theory could provide certain answers to these questions.
Shelley Tremain (2005) argues that a Foucauldian analysis is better suited to
understanding disability. First, she notes that the clear distinction between impairment
and disability is incomplete, because an impairment is in fact a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for being disabled. Indeed, this must be the case to understand why
some persons who are oppressed for biological differences, like racialized persons or
intersex persons, are not considered to be disabled. An impairment, it seems, is a bodily
state that leads to the person being disabled in a particular (that is, ableist10) environment.
Through the framework of bio-power, it becomes clear that impairment is itself the
illusory “prediscursive” or “natural” justification for the practices that in fact produce
impairment by circumscribing it as a “discursive object” (Tremain 2005, 11). In other
words, impairment becomes an explanation for disability only insofar as certain bodies
are already divided by the disciplinary tactics at work in bio-power. What counts as an
impairment is determined by practices which select certain bodies as disabled, and
impairment is then used as an explanation for disability. In this way, the social model
ends up extending the practices of bio-power that it seeks to contest by accepting
“impairments” as natural.

10

Ableism is, in its most basic interpretation, oppression against disabled people. Perhaps
the fullest consideration of ableism is given by Fiona Kumari Campbell in Contours of Ableism
(2009). Campbell defines ableism as “A network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces
a particular kind of self and body […] as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and
fully human” (2009, 5). This definition is helpful for focusing on the processes that produce
disability, rather than on disability or disabled persons, such that these normalizing processes can
be investigated and criticized at a more foundational level.
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Susan Wendell’s account of the social construction of disability also avoids the
strict division of (biological) impairment and (socially caused) disability. She writes that
“the biological and the social are interactive in creating disability […] not only in that
complex interactions of social factors and our bodies affect health and functioning, but
also in that social arrangements can make a biological condition more or less relevant to
almost any situation” (Wendell 1996, 35). Throughout a chapter devoted to the topic, she
notes myriad ways in which the biological and social interact: wars and political violence
lead to disability, as does the unequal distribution of resources and poverty; medical
practices can reduce disability, but they may also cause us to live longer and thus increase
the rate of disabilities that come with age; an increased pace of life is likely to disable
more people than a relaxed or flexible pace of life; social expectations, structures,
policies, and institutions can either be enabling or disabling depending on how they are
arranged; a social understanding of some social benefits as expected (like education,
transportation, and utilities) while others are unnecessary entitlements (like health aides,
or non-standard educational materials, or accessible transportation, or utilities designed
for different forms of communication, like sign language) is disabling for those who
require supports beyond those considered standard; stigmas and media representations
construct certain types of bodies as disabled but not others. Wendell thus favors an
approach to understanding the social construction of disability, one that acknowledges the
multiple and diverse ways in which the biological and the social interact.
While Wendell’s understanding of the social construction of disability takes into
account the pains that are likely biological in origin, Tobin Siebers (2008) worries about
a version of social constructionism of the body that neglects disabled experiences,
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especially pain. He seeks to develop instead a “new realism of the body.” Looking at
Judith Butler’s body theory and Donna Haraway’s thinking of the cyborg, he
demonstrates that the former thinks pain only as the result of external, disciplinary forces,
and that the latter cannot give an account of disability because of its emphasis of that
which exceeds the “normal” human. The pain of disability, however, is often physical
pain, not just the pain of guilt for not conforming. And the cyborgs that disabled persons
become in interaction with technologies and environments is often still painful and
limited in comparison to “normal” human capacities: prosthetics may aid mobility and
even give one greater speed than “normal” human legs, but they often cause pain where
they connect to the body; wheelchairs may be beneficial in some settings, but in other
environments they are more restricted than “normal” legs, and sitting for prolonged
periods makes it difficult to avoid sores. Thus, it is important to avoid idealizing disabled
bodies or ignoring the specificity of their experiences, especially their pain, but to do so
without then individualizing pain or disability more generally. As Siebers puts it, “The
body is alive, which means that it is as capable of influencing and transforming social
languages as they are capable of influencing and transforming it” (2008, 68). So while the
body and its pain need to be understood as resisting unidirectional social construction,
bodies and their pains should also be thought in their political relevance once they are
freed from being understood as simply individual. How can the pains experienced by
persons with diverse disabilities both be recognized in their specificity but also be useful
in galvanizing those persons around a political movement? This is the important question
for current theories of the body, on Siebers’s view.
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Sharing the concerns of others responding to the social model, Kafer develops
what she calls a “political/relational model” of disability (2013, 6-9). Such a model needs
to make room both for the social nature of disability and bodily pains and fatigue, for
disability identity, pride, and activism and for the difficulty and even sadness of losing
abilities or functions one previously had. For Kafer, disability is importantly political,
and this resists tendencies to individualize, especially through charity and medicine, the
experiences of disabled persons. Disability is also always relational, because it is never
understood in isolation such that the nondisabled are affected by ableism just as disabled
persons are. The young and elderly, for example, are affected by the same normalizing
assumptions of young adult health and ability that disabled persons are.
Normalizing forces and assumptions are an important site of analysis for many in
disability studies. First, it should be noted that the norm that determines the limits of
disability is quite restrictive. For this reason, many disability scholars point out the extent
to which ability is actually a temporary and precarious state. Writing in the context of
developing an ethic of care, Eva Kittay explains that there are inevitable periods of
dependency in any human life, though how these periods are experienced and responded
to varies over time and between social settings: “The immaturity of infancy and early
childhood, illness and disability that renders one nonfunctional even in the most
accommodating surroundings, and the fragility of advanced old age, each serve as
examples of such inescapable dependency” (1999, 29). Siebers notes that “[o]nly 15
percent of people with disabilities are born with their impairments” such that “[m]ost
people become disabled over the course of their life” (2008, 59). Thus, even if a person
does not experience a permanent disability during her lifetime, she is likely to move from
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ability to disability, perhaps multiple times. Margrit Shildrick takes this point even
further, explaining that all bodies are disorderly. “Such an acknowledgement,” she
argues, “does not cover over difference, nor deny the specificity of the phenomenology of
disability; rather it figures instability as the unexceptional condition of all corporeality”
(Shildrick 2009, 173). Thus, we should “revalue” disabled embodiment “as just another
variant on the infinite modes of becoming” (2009, 173).
Indeed, an acronym exists in the disabled community to name the fleeting nature
of “ability”: temporarily able-bodied (TAB). There are disabled persons and TABs, but
there is no such thing as a permanently able-bodied (or -minded) person. Rosemarie
Garland Thomson uses the word “normate” to point to the way in which disability (and
other forms of marginalization) is constituted by and creates the boundaries of the
“normal” subject position. The normate is “the figure outlined by the array of deviant
others whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries” (Garland-Thomson
1997, 8). In this way, the figure of the normate can help expose the relations between
those forms of otherness (disability, race, gender, sexuality, and so on) that constitute
norms without artificially separating them. Many in the autism rights movement make a
similar move in their terminology. The neurodiversity movement signals that while many
autistic persons recognize that their brains function differently than others’ brains, this
does not make them inferior. Thus, they developed the term neurotypical (NT) to label
those persons who are not perceived or diagnosed as autistic, or in some extended uses as
having other mental disorders (Sinclair 1998).11

11

Ian Hacking gives a brief explanation of the benefits of this language in his essay,
“How We Have Been Learning to Talk about Autism: A Role for Stories” (2010).
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Lennard J. Davis aims his criticism at the historical contingency of normalcy
(1995). He explains that in the English language “normal” and its related forms only took
on their contemporary meaning, as conforming to a standard, in the middle of the
nineteenth century. Prior to this point, the dominant division in the European cultural
imagination was not between normal and abnormal, but between the ideal, which no
actual human could attain, and the grotesque, the common state of the non-divine.
Through the application of statistics to human populations, however, “normal” became a
description of a range of actual humans with particular traits, such that others were
understood as deviant. These statistical methods were taken up by Marx as well as
eugenicists, and continue to inform our understanding of ourselves today. For example,
people are often comforted by being told they or their experiences are normal, our health,
academic, and career performance are determined in relation to norms, and in this way
“normal” becomes an unquestioned value used to understand and evaluate ourselves and
others. It is this historical innovation that makes disability, as it is currently understood
and experienced, possible. Others have written similar histories of disability. Michel
Foucault’s History of Madness (2006) traces understandings of madness (and their
corresponding formations of Reason) to reveal how understanding madness as “mental
illness” became possible, and in his lectures publishes as Psychiatric Power (2007), he
shows how psychiatric power spread, for example, through the figure of the “idiot child.”
James W. Trent, Jr. (1994) traces the various historical innovations that preceded the then
contemporary understanding of “mental retardation,” and through a detailed European
history, C. F. Goodey (2011) reveals the historical specificity and contingency of notions
of intelligence that allowed for the development of “intellectual disability.”
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Like the other efforts to understand disability as complexly intertwined with other
cultural formations discussed above, Fiona Kumari Campbell’s book, Contours of
Ableism argues that disability should be approached through an understanding of ableism
in order to decenter normative ability. She defines ableism as “A network of beliefs,
processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body […] that is
projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human,” against
which disability is understood as a diminished, delayed, or lacking (Campbell 2009, 5).
Like Thomson’s concept of the normate, such a framework reveals the ways in which
ability and disability are co-constitutive, and hopefully to imagine beliefs, processes, and
practices that resist ableism.12
Because ableism is a pervasive phenomenon and has shared histories with other
forms of marginalization, many disability studies scholars have sought to understand the
complex relationships between disability, race, gender, class, and other identities. Indeed,
Davis suggests that disability is the best lens through which to understand other
oppressed identities because they share a common history in eugenics and the scientific
study of deviant or problematic groups identified by race, gender, sexuality, and class. He
writes, “All these were considered to be categories of disability, although we do not think
of them as connected in this way today. Indeed, one could argue that categories of
oppression were given scientific license through these […] discourses, and that, in many
cases, the specific categories were established through these studies” (Davis 2002, 14). In
place of a postmodernism of proliferating identities, then, Davis argues for a
Campbell distinguishes this approach from those that focus solely on “disablism,”
which she thinks of as “a set of assumptions […] and practices that promote the differential or
unequal treatment of people because of actual or presumed disabilities” (2009, 4). The latter
approach, she avers, does not question the ableism which is at the root of disablism.
12
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“dismodernism” that accepts the “partial, incomplete subject” and seeks “dependency and
interdependence” rather than “autonomy and independence” (2002, 30). In this way,
disability may be a unifying framework for a new ethics and politics. Similarly, Susan M.
Schweik’s study of the so-called “ugly laws,” which banned “unsightly” persons from the
public in certain jurisdictions in the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, reveals the complex relationships between disability, gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, and race (Schweik 2009).
More specifically, Wendell and Thomson both call for intersectional approaches
to feminism and disability studies. These fields could inform one another in important
ways because many women are disabled, and many disabled persons are women, because
the same understandings of the human body are oppressive to both women and disabled
people, because both offer important questions about the meaning and value of
independence, and because both offer important insights into understanding social
identities (Wendell 2006, 243, Garland-Thomson 2004, 74-6). Kim Q. Hall shows how
feminist disability studies can offer important insights into many recent controversial
cases that are given incomplete analysis through feminist or disability studies frameworks
alone. One example is the case of Ashley X, who was given a hysterectomy, estrogen
treatments to facilitate the fusion of her bone plates, and had her breast buds removed at
age six because her doctors and parents believed she would never develop skills beyond
those of a “normal” three-month-old.13 Reports which refer to Ashley as a “sweet”
“pillow angel” reveal a gendered dimension of her treatment, while the fear of her sexual
development evokes both the assumed asexuality of disabled persons and the stereotype

13

I discuss this example further in Chapter 1.
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of hypersexual cognitively disabled persons (Hall 2011, 4). Similarly, Licia Carlson
analyzes the figure of the “feebleminded woman” to show the gendered nature of
nineteenth century conceptions of feeblemindedness (2010, 57-62), while others have
criticized the sexism of the disability rights movement (O'Toole 2004) or the ableism
present in early feminist rhetoric (Lamp and Cleigh 2011).
Race also provides an important intersection for disability studies. Anna
Stubblefield, for example, shows how the concept of intelligence arose as a “scientific
justification for racism (and classism and sexism),” and argues that the effects of this
history are still present in the United States in the segregation and unequal distribution of
educational (among other) resources to black children, the decreased life expectancy and
employment rates of black adults with “intellectual disabilities,” and environmental
injustices, among other things (Stubblefield 2010, 301, 304-8). Nirmala Erevelles
provides important analyses of the intersections of disability and race (and gender) in the
context of war (2011) and the school-to-prison pipeline (2014). And Chris Bell criticizes
disability studies for its failure to engage race, suggesting that the field itself be renamed
“White Disability Studies” (Bell 2006).
Finally, in his book, Crip Theory, Robert McRuer argues that a “compulsory ablebodiedness” permeates contemporary U.S. society in a way that both parallels and
intersects with what queer theorists have called “compulsory heterosexuality.” Like the
latter, compulsory able-bodiedness hides its own functioning, making its effects appear
natural, and disguising the fact that the able-bodied ideal, like the heterosexual ideal, is in
fact impossible (McRuer 2006, 8-9). Resisting both compulsory able-bodiedness and
compulsory heterosexuality, McRuer suggests, will require a continual problematization
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of their hegemony through performances and analyses that contest their boundaries,
ideals, and assumptions.
A Note on Method
Disability studies is a diverse and growing field, as the last section endeavored to
show. My hope is that this dissertation can contribute both to the field of disability
studies by bringing certain philosophical resources to the discussion of disability, and to
philosophy by pushing the field of my training to grapple with the experiences and
problems of disabled persons who are all too often left out of philosophical discourse.
I would like to take some brief space here to explain some of my methods and
linguistic choices. First, I have attempted to use examples throughout that are written by
disabled persons or, if necessary, their caretakers, relying on texts that give enough detail
to develop philosophical insights from. I did not seek out the testimony of disabled
persons for the dissertation, instead relying on sources already in print. I also chose not to
use fictional accounts as examples because, as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson writes,
“Disabled literary characters usually remain on the margins of fiction as uncomplicated
figures or exotic aliens whose bodily configurations operate as spectacles, eliciting
responses from other characters or producing rhetorical effects that depend on disability’s
cultural resonance” (1997, 9). Thus, I rely heavily on texts produced by disabled people,
like Loud Hands: Autistic People, Speaking (The Autistic Self Advocacy Network 2012)
and a collection called From My Perspective: Essays about Disability (Faldet and
Schanilec 2009). The essays of the latter collection were written by clients and supporters
of a service provider for disabled adults (and my former employer) in Decorah, Iowa.14 I

14

The agency is called the Spectrum Network.
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also return frequently to Eva Kittay’s accounts of her daughter Sesha because they are
moving, detailed, and generous. These accounts provide a thread that run throughout the
dissertation.
Second, I should explain some of my linguistic choices. By “disability,” I mean
any number of conditions referred to in the disability studies literature. I include in my
use of this term physical disabilities (e.g., amputations, paralyses), sensory disabilities
(e.g., blindness, deafness), chronic illness (especially when such illness is dis-abling in
other ways), and mental disabilities. I follow Margaret Price in using “mental disability,”
because of its breadth. Mental disability can refer to madness, cognitive, emotional,
developmental, and intellectual disabilities, autism, and even the mental effects of other
conditions, like “the ‘brain fog’ that attends many autoimmune diseases, chronic pain,
and chronic fatigue” (Price 2011). While this may threaten to level the particularities of
individual disabilities, my hope is that instead it reveals just how narrow the normative
“nondisabled” figure actually is. Because I am often interested in discussing those cases
of disability that challenge Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice, I will use “severely
mentally disabled” to refer to those who are unable to participate in the epistemic
practices of sharing knowledge and interpreting shared social experiences, and thus, those
who are unable to experience epistemic injustice in this narrow account. Finally, I use
“disabled person” and “disabled people” throughout, avoiding “person-first language”
like “person with a disability” because, as I discussed above, the latter both individualizes
the condition such that political coalitions of disabled people are made difficult by this
language and it fails to take into account the extent to which social worlds are dis-abling.
I attempt to use “disabled person(s)” as much as possible to maintain the particularity of
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each disabled person’s experiences, reserving “disabled people” for cases in which a
group of disabled individuals are acting together, or where the claim is true of disabled
people generally.
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Knowledge: Epistemic Injustice and Disability

Because the field of disability studies is so interdisciplinary, the injustices faced
by disabled people are often discussed in broad terms as ethical and political. In this
chapter, I will argue that it is philosophically possible and politically useful to conceive
of certain injustices faced by disabled persons as epistemic harms. To do so, I will draw
upon the theories of epistemic injustice developed by Miranda Fricker (2007) and José
Medina (2013) to argue that disabled persons are subject to pervasive forms of epistemic
injustice. First, I explain the terminology and arguments developed by Fricker and
Medina that are useful in theorizing epistemic injustices against disabled people. Second,
I analyze three specific causes of these epistemic injustices: medicalization,
institutionalization, and cultural anxieties about mental disability. Finally, I consider
severely mentally disabled persons who, because they are unable to share information or
develop interpretations of shared social experiences fall outside of Fricker’s narrow
definition of epistemic injustice. These considerations will lead to the second chapter, in
which I discuss Julia Kristeva’s work to, first, articulate a form of attentiveness that is
responsive even to severely mentally disabled persons and second, develop an
understanding for why nondisabled people subject disabled people to epistemic (among
other) injustices.
Before moving on to discuss epistemic injustice, however, I want to pause to
consider why it is worthwhile to focus on specifically epistemic harms suffered by
disabled people. If the epistemic is a part of the overall concerns of disability studies
literature, I can imagine a reader asking, then what use is abstracting the epistemic from
its complex relationships with other forms of injustice? First, my hope is that by focusing
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on the epistemic aspects of disability oppression, a clearer analysis and some helpful
connections between the experiences of differently disabled subjects will emerge. I do
not want to abstract but to focus. Second, I find certain resonances between Medina’s call
for epistemic interaction and Kristeva’s plea for interaction with disabled people to be
interesting. Instead of moving point-by-point through what each means and then
comparing and contrasting them, however, my hope is that by devoting a close reading to
each in separate chapters I can do justice to both authors but also bring out the similarities
in their recommendations. Finally, as I will address in the second section of this chapter,
the long histories of charity and medical models of disability have meant that epistemic
subjectivity has been especially undermined by disability oppression. When the telethon
organizer raising money for a disability cure thinks she knows what is best for disabled
people, or when the medical community supports the view that a cure is the only way to
solve the “problem” of a disability, it is precisely the knowledge and experiences of
disabled persons which are undermined. To better understand this phenomenon, I will
now turn to discuss epistemic injustice in general.
An Overview of Epistemic Injustice
Fricker: Testimonial and Hermeneutic (In)Justice
In her book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda
Fricker (2007) discusses two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and
hermeneutical injustice, seeking to define them and to understand how they are caused
and how they might be addressed. Hers is a virtue epistemological account, relying on
epistemic sensibility, virtues, and vices, to understand the phenomena she considers. She
also notes that she intends to focus on specifically epistemic concerns. Because questions
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about the distribution of information or education are not distinctly epistemic—that is,
because “it seems largely incidental that the good in question can be characterized as an
epistemic good”—this is not her focus (Fricker 2007, 1).1 Rather, as I will explain,
testimonial and hermeneutical injustices constitute both epistemic and ethical harms.
Testimonial injustice is broadly defined as the attribution of less credibility to a
speaker as a result of a hearer’s prejudice.2 But Fricker is especially concerned with what
she calls the “central case” of testimonial injustice, “identity-prejudicial credibility
deficit” (2007, 28, original emphasis). It may be helpful to consider some important
aspects of this definition. First, stereotypes, defined as “widely held associations between
a given social group and one or more attributes,” are not harmful in themselves, on
Fricker’s view (2007, 30, original emphasis). Indeed, she avers that we would be worse
off epistemically if we did not use stereotypes in our daily interactions. We need to make
quick assessments of who to believe and who not to trust without lengthy inferential
processes. Thus, testimonial injustices result from prejudicial stereotypes, where
“prejudice” refers to a judgment that is resistant to counter-evidence due to an “affective
investment on the part of the subject” (2007, 35, original emphasis). That is, stereotypes
are epistemically advantageous as long as they remain responsive to counter-evidence.
David Coady is critical of this view, arguing that the epistemic good of “interesting true
belief is an intrinsic value” such that distributive concerns about this good are not “only
incidentally epistemic” (2010, 106). Fricker suggests in reply that such questions are useful but
that she chose to focus on the more hidden injustices resulting from discrimination rather than the
more easily recognized injustices resulting from problems of distribution (2010, 175).
1

I considered reformulating Fricker’s use of “speaker” and “hearer” in various ways to
undermine the emphasis on oral communication. I decided against this, however, for several
reasons. First, retaining Fricker’s language may help to highlight the ubiquity of the norm of oral
speech in our language. Second, and conversely, perhaps retaining this language can help give
breadth to what “speech” and “hearing” usually mean in English. In other words, could we
conceive of both non-oral forms of communication (American Sign Language, for example), and
oral communication as speech without neglecting their differences?
2
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And because prejudices can be positive or negative (that is, a hearer can be disposed in
favor of or against a speaker), Fricker is concerned with negative prejudicial stereotypes.3
Second, the prejudices with which Fricker is especially concerned are those based on
identities found in shared social imaginations.4 An individual with idiosyncratic
prejudices might commit testimonial injustices, but not of the central type. Fricker
explains that the identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is her central case because it tends
to be both systematic and persistent (2007, 27-9). It is systematic because identityprejudicial credibility deficits tend to intersect with injustices in other arenas, such as
legal, economic, or political injustices. It is persistent because such injustices tend to
occur, not in isolation, but repeatedly over time. Indeed, perhaps one of the most
3

Indeed, Fricker (2007, 19-21) gives two arguments for the view that positive prejudices
leading to credibility excesses are not cases of epistemic injustice. First, she holds that credibility
is not a finite good, and thus, by assigning a credibility excess to one person or group we do not
necessarily assign a credibility deficit to another person or group. Second, she argues that any
harm done by a credibility excess would not result from that single instance, but would result
from the accumulation of being assigned credibility excesses over time. One may develop the
epistemic vice of arrogance, for example, or come to hold false beliefs from a lack of questioning,
but no one instance of credibility excess caused these harms. On the other hand, a single
credibility deficit could be harmful to the knower as a subject of knowledge. This seems like an
odd argument given Fricker’s focus on systemic (occurring in concert with other forms of
injustice) and persistent (repeated over time) instances of testimonial injustice. Indeed, Medina
disagrees with Fricker on this point. He argues, first, that while assigning credibility may not be a
zero-sum affair, it is comparative (Medina 2013, 61). If a person assigns a credibility excess to
one person, that usually means she assigns less credibility to another person. In other words, “I
trust you” usually means “I trust you more than…” Second, he argues that because the harm of
testimonial injustices are embedded in histories and social contexts, an “attribution contributes to
epistemic injustice” insofar as it “belongs to a chain of attributions that promotes epistemic vices”
(2013, 59). Isolated testimonial injustices are rare and much less serious than those that are
repeated.
4

The fact that identities result from the social imagination is important because it reveals
identities as contingent. Fricker defines the social imagination as shared images or “shared
imaginative conceptions” which are important to be attentive to because these shared images
often operate without individuals’ conscious awareness (2007, 14,37). She avoids the use of the
“social imaginary” out of a desire to avoid getting bogged down in psychoanalytic theory, but
others, including Linda Martín Alcoff (2010, 133-4) argue that the notion of the social imaginary,
like that found in the work of Michèle LeDoeuff, could be particularly promising for her account.
Fricker does offer a brief reply in a response article (2010).
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systematic and persistent forms of epistemic injustice is what Fricker calls “pre-emptive
testimonial injustice” (2007, 130). Pre-emptive testimonial injustice occurs when the
subject does not share information at all because she is perceived to have no credibility in
advance; she is silenced by others who do not seek her knowledge. This constitutes not a
partial but a complete undermining of the subject as a knower.
Due to the systematic and persistent nature of testimonial injustices,5 they pose an
array of harms to the speaker. Generally, the speaker is “wronged in her capacity as a
giver of knowledge,” which is, for Fricker, an essential capacity for human value (2007,
44). 6 Another way of understanding this harm is as a form of epistemic objectification;
when a speaker’s testimony is neither sought nor trusted, she can contribute to the sharing
of knowledge only as an object of knowledge (2007, 132-3). She is a source of
information but not an informant. Fricker’s benign example, here, is the difference
between a guest who enters with a wet umbrella from which you can infer that it is
raining outside (source of information) and someone telling you it is raining when asked
(informant), but there are of course much more nefarious versions of epistemic
objectification, a sample of which I will discuss below. Moreover, the individual harm of
Here and following I use “testimonial injustices” to refer specifically to the central case
of testimonial injustice discussed in the previous paragraph.
5

This account is later refined through a discussion of Edward Craig’s state of nature
account of testimony. For Craig, certain pressures have meant that what we mean by “knower” is
an objectivized form of “good informant.” That is, in our everyday epistemic interactions, we
recognize one as a knower only if they are a good informant, if they “participate in the sharing of
information” (Fricker 2007, 144-5). What this drives home, for Fricker, is that while we may
think that undermining one’s testimony is not the same thing as undermining one as a knower
(after all, one could object that a person may very well know something but not be allowed to
give testimony about it or not be trusted when they share that knowledge), in fact, what we mean
by knower is a person who is a participant in the sharing and pooling of information such that to
undermine one’s testimonial capacity is to undermine one’s status as a knower. In Fricker’s
words, “the [testimonial] injustice sends the message that they are not fit for participation in the
practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower” (2007, 145).
6
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epistemic injustice rarely exists in isolation. Because being a potential giver of
knowledge is so important to our understanding of what is human, any challenge to the
speaker’s status as a knower is also symbolically a challenge to her humanity; that is, it is
also an ethical problem. And in the case of testimonial injustice, the speaker is
undermined because of the social identity perceived by the hearer, such that the challenge
becomes a problem not just for the speaker’s epistemic competence and humanity, but for
the knowledge and humanity of all who are perceived to have the same social identity.
Testimonial injustice is in this way truly oppressive, not just a one-off ethical harm.
I want to pause, here, to note a suggestion made by Christopher Hookway in
response to Fricker’s book (Hookway 2010). He offers a distinction between two
perspectives on epistemic injustice: the informational perspective and the participant
perspective. According to the informational perspective, the relevant questions about
epistemic competence concern one’s reliability as a source of information. According to
the participant perspective, the relevant questions about epistemic competence concern
one’s ability to be involved in the activities that contribute to the growth and sharing of
knowledge (2010, 157). Hookway argues that the participant perspective is in fact
broader, and suggests incorporating testimonial injustice as a type of participant injustice.
This would allow us to understand injustices in which one’s tentative suggestions or
hypotheses are discounted, one’s questions not taken seriously, or one’s ability to
“recognize relevant information” is cast in doubt (2010, 157-8). These forms of
participation are, for Hookway, not reducible to sharing information but are just as
important to the development of knowledge and one’s status as a knower. In a reply,
Fricker agrees with Hookway that these are important aspects of our epistemic projects.
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She suggests instead, however, that we should consider instances of what Hookway calls
participant injustice as testimonial injustices because they are peripheral to the “basic
epistemic practice” of “passing on knowledge” (Fricker 2010, 175-6). My aim is not to
enter this debate but rather to flag the issue, noting that practices beyond strictly sharing
information may be discredited as a result of negative identity prejudices and that this too
can constitute an epistemic harm. In my discussion below, I will use “testimonial
injustice” in this broader sense to include other forms of epistemic participation unless
otherwise noted.
Beyond the primary harm of being undermined as a knower, there are several
secondary harms caused by testimonial injustices. First, there are practical harms.
Because testimony is such a central part of our affairs, being assigned credibility deficits
or being pre-emptively silenced is likely to have broad implications for one’s life. If one
is not trusted in a court, she is less likely to be found innocent and more likely to face
stiffer penalties. If a person is seen as lacking credibility at a job, she is less likely to
advance in her career. If a person is thought not to have a worthwhile understanding of
her predicament in a segregated living facility, she is more likely to suffer conditions
which she has no say in improving. In this way it is clear that testimonial injustices have
important ethical and practical valences.
There are also secondary epistemic harms. Those who experience testimonial
injustices may actually lose knowledge or lose epistemic virtues. For example, a person’s
self-esteem may be undermined to such an extent that she loses confidence in her beliefs
or her justifications for her beliefs. In such a case, if we adopt an understanding of
knowledge as justified, true, belief, as depending on confidence or justification we may
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say that this person has actually lost knowledge. Such a loss of self-esteem may also
hinder one from gaining knowledge that she may have otherwise gained. Imagine, for
example, a student who knew the stages of mitosis very well, but because she is subject
to testimonial injustices from her teacher loses confidence that she actually knows about
mitosis and, moreover, fails to learn as much as she could have about other chapters
studied in the course because she starts to perceive herself as incapable. It is also likely
that being subject to recurring testimonial injustices would lead one to lose, or fail to
develop, epistemic virtues like courage, “the virtue of not backing down in one’s
convictions too quickly in response to a challenge” (2007, 49). Clearly epistemic courage
is helpful in contributing to knowledge; without it, one would revise her beliefs in
response to challenges from others, whether her beliefs were true or not. For a person
subject to frequent testimonial injustices, however, it is easy to imagine that it may be
difficult to continually maintain one’s beliefs in the face of challenges given the constant
credibility deficits and silencing the person experiences.
As a corrective to testimonial injustice, Fricker develops the epistemic virtue of
“testimonial justice.” The ideal for the hearer who has the virtue of testimonial justice is
“to neutralize the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements” (2007, 92, original
emphasis). Importantly, our attributions of credibility deficits should not be understood as
inferential, but as perceptual. When one is assigned less credibility than she deserves as a
result of her social identity, the hearer is usually not making an inference, but perceives
her as less credible.7 Thus, achieving (or approaching) the virtue of testimonial injustice

7

In the most overt cases of testimonial injustice, the hearer may in fact infer that the
speaker is less credible or consciously use the premise that the speaker is less credible in an
inference. Even in such cases, however, the credibility deficit will likely result from perception as
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will require a training of one’s testimonial sensibility. This could occur in two ways. One
may have the virtue naïvely, that is, the subject’s judgments are “free from prejudice
from the start” (2007, 93). When this is the case, it is likely to be specific to some social
identities. That is, it is unlikely that any hearer would be free from prejudices regarding
all social identities. On the other hand, one may have the virtue of testimonial justice as a
corrective. In this case, the hearer makes adjustments to her attributions of credibility to
counteract negative prejudices where appropriate. This can be done in two ways, through
reflection or spontaneously. In neutralizing prejudices reflectively, a hearer recognizes
that she either has attributed, or is likely to attribute, unjust credibility deficits as a result
of the speaker’s social identity and seeks to neutralize those prejudices. To do so, the
hearer must consciously give the speaker more credibility, and ideally, about as much
credibility as she would have given the speaker in the absence of such a prejudice. Other
ways to correct for one’s prejudice might take more institutional forms, like sanctions for
apparent prejudice or “anonymization” of school or job applications, exams, or other
assignments (Fricker 2010, 165). The corrective form of testimonial justice could also be
achieved spontaneously through familiarity or through habituation. In the former,
frequent interaction with a member or members of a social identity may lead distorting
prejudices to gradually disappear such that the hearer eventually comes to trust speakers
of that social identity appropriately. In the latter case, the hearer develops the virtue by
being diligent enough about assigning neutralized credibility assessments that it becomes
second nature. This is the ideal of testimonial justice. Because we exist in complex and

well. The racist Juror 10 in 12 Angry Men (1957), for example, both perceives the defendant as
less credible and articulates the position that “You know how these people lie. It’s born in them.”
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shifting social environments, however, most hearers can only ever hope to develop this
virtue for certain social identities at any given time.8
Having given a rough sketch of testimonial injustice and its corresponding virtue,
I will move on to discuss hermeneutical injustice. The central case of hermeneutical
injustice is defined as “having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured
from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutical resource” (2007, 155, original emphasis). By “structural identity
prejudice,” Fricker means a prejudice that affects people based on their membership in an
oppressed group; that is, based on their social identity. By “collective hermeneutical
resource,” she means the interpretive possibilities available in a given social
environment. So a systematic hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person cannot
explain her experiences to others (and perhaps cannot even understand them herself)
because the hermeneutical resources of her community are lacking with regard to the
experiences of members of her social group.9 Moreover, this gap in hermeneutical
resources is asymmetrical, it does not affect all equally. Fricker’s main example here is
sexual harassment, which is an attempt to name an experience that at one time had no
way of being discussed as a shared experience. Given this gap in the hermeneutical
resources of the time, there was no way for women to make sense of their experiences of

8

It should be noted that testimonial justice is also an ethical virtue because it aims to
reattribute subjecthood to the speaker and, through repetition, to resist the practical ethical harms
resulting from testimonial injustice. That is, its end is not just truth but also justice (Fricker 2007,
121-2).
9

As in the case of testimonial injustice, there may exist hermeneutical injustices that are
incidental, that is, not systematic. In such a case, an individual or group of individuals may be
unable to understand and communicate about their experiences as result of a lack in
hermeneutical resources which is not caused by a social identity.
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ill-treatment, and thus they could not object to it. Only through sharing similar
experiences could these women gain an understanding of the phenomenon, give a name
to it, and begin a project of introducing the concept to the hermeneutical resource while
rejecting the phenomenon in practice. And importantly, this hermeneutical lacuna
affected (especially working) women in a harmful way, but it did not pose a harm to men.
Indeed, it was to men’s benefit that this behavior could only be understood as “natural” or
“harmless play.”
The harms of hermeneutical injustice map roughly on to the harms of testimonial
injustice, for Fricker. The primary harm is that the persons affected are undermined in
their capacity as knowers; that is, they are excluded “from the pooling of knowledge”
because of an identity prejudice (2007, 162). And as in the case of testimonial injustice,
there are both practical and epistemic secondary harms. Practical harms occur when the
inability to communicate one’s experiences leads to other negative consequences, like the
continued exposure to physical and psychological harm or the barriers to career
advancement in the example of the yet-unnamed sexual harassment. Secondary epistemic
harms occur when one loses knowledge or epistemic virtues one might have had were it
not for the hermeneutical gap. Because those subject to hermeneutical injustice may feel
themselves to be alone in their incomprehensible or incommunicable experience, selfdoubt and a lack of epistemic courage are likely consequences (even if it is just within the
realm of experience affected by the particular hermeneutical lacuna).
To correct for hermeneutical injustice, Fricker calls for the epistemic virtue of
“hermeneutical justice.” This virtue is a “sensitivity” to the fact that what another is
attempting to communicate is difficult given the available hermeneutic resources rather
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than writing the unintelligibility off as “nonsense” or a “subjective failing” (2007, 169).
As in the case of testimonial justice, this is achieved through adjustments in attributions
of credibility. Ideally, the hearer who is hermeneutically just would attribute credibility to
a speaker’s interpretation as if it were given in a more hermeneutically inclusive
environment. Of course, imagining one’s response within a more inclusive hermeneutical
environment before its arrival is a difficult project, precisely because our imaginations
are constrained by the hermeneutic resources of our various communities. But there are
several concrete forms this credibility adjustment could take. First, a hearer may seek out
evidence of similar, but similarly inexpressible, experiences. In the case of women’s
mistreatment in the workplace, for example, a coworker could have sought out other
working women to see if there was a common set of experiences, or a hearer may
suspend judgment. To take the same example, a male coworker could say to a female
speaker, “I do not understand the problem you are having, but I take seriously your sense
of it as a problem. If you have more experiences like this one, please continue to share
them with me so that we might come to a better understanding of your discomfort in
these situations.”
Finally, Fricker acknowledges that testimonial injustices and hermeneutical
injustices are likely to be related. In cases where a person is subject to hermeneutical
injustices based on a negative identity prejudice, that person is also likely to be subject to
testimonial injustices resulting from the same prejudice. In other words, when one is a
member of a group whose experiences are unintelligible either to all (including
themselves) or to those in the dominant social identity/identities, she will probably also
be viewed as less credible in her testimony because of her social identity. She does not
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have the words to explain her experiences, and when she tries, she is unlikely to be
believed anyway.10 This is a danger that makes the epistemic virtues of testimonial justice
and hermeneutical justice all the more important, but all the less likely.
Medina: Epistemic Interaction
Like Fricker, José Medina is concerned with epistemic injustice in his book, The
Epistemology of Resistance. But where Fricker develops a concise analytic framework for
understanding the specifically epistemic nature of these injustices, Medina undertakes a
more complex project, drawing from and making contributions to democratic theory,
social philosophy, and ethics where they intersect with epistemic concerns. It is this
productive complexity that makes Medina’s work both fruitful and difficult to
summarize. For this reason, my discussion in this section will be necessarily confined to
the specifically epistemic dimensions of his work, especially his responses to and
developments upon Fricker’s work. I turn to Medina for two reasons especially, his
discussion of epistemic injustice at a broader social level, and his reworking of standpoint
theory in terms of epistemic virtues and vices.
Medina is interested in developing an epistemology of resistance, that is, an
epistemology that fosters the contestation necessary for democracy by challenging the
epistemic practices that sustain “oppressive normative structures” (2013, 3-4). Such an
epistemology must engage individual and social levels of analysis. We do not choose the
communities we are born into, the social imaginaries or hermeneutical resources within
our communities, or our social identities. It would be insufficient, then, to understand
epistemic injustices in individual terms alone, or to hold only individuals accountable for
10

Medina expands upon this point in his book (2013, 96). Because I discuss his argument
in detail in my conclusion, I only flag it here.
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them.11 But (for the most part) the communities into which we are born, the social
imaginaries we use to make sense of the world, and our social identities are not static or
total. Our communities contain sub-communities and are in contact with other
communities;12 the resources we have for interpreting our worlds contain gaps,
contradictions, and may differ from one community to the next; our social identities
11

To be clear, I do not take Fricker to be opposed to this view. She recognizes that the
social imagination and collective hermeneutical resources play an integral role in epistemic
injustices. But hers is a book on ethics, and so its analysis and proposed solutions concern mainly
individuals and their interpersonal interactions. Indeed, she gestures toward a political analysis of
epistemic injustice in “Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on Epistemic Injustice” (2010,
176-7).
12

Medina is critical of Fricker on this point, specifically with regard to hermeneutical
injustice. Recall that on Fricker’s definition a hermeneutical injustice occurs when one’s
experiences are blocked from “collective understanding” as a result of gaps in “the collective
hermeneutical resource” (2007, 155, my emphasis). For Medina, it is inaccurate, and indeed
dangerous, to talk about a single collective or hermeneutical resource. First, this is because
whatever collective one is referring to exists alongside other collectives and contains within it
“heterogeneous subgroups.” Second, it seems to set up an ideal of an eventually unified
hermeneutical resource; but “no matter how unified and well communicated the social body
happens to be, such inventory should be suspect, for it is likely to be an artificial unification
invoked from a theoretical standpoint, which always runs the risk of disregarding some
marginalized and hard-to-find interpretive resources” (Medina 2013, 103).
Kristie Dotson develops a similar criticism in her essay, “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting
Epistemic Oppression” (2012). She argues that Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice
assumes both (a) a collective hermeneutical resource and (b) that both the marginalized speaker
and dominant perceiver have equal difficulty in making the marginalized person’s experiences
intelligible. This is rarely the case, however. Thus, Dotson develops the term “contributory
injustice” to name injustices in which a perceiver’s “willful hermeneutical ignorance” leads her to
continue using “structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources” rather than being open to
marginalized hermeneutical resources (2012, 32). Importantly, this impedes the speaker’s “ability
to contribute to shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community,” thus the name,
contributory injustice (2012, 32).
Fricker does emphasize the complexity of social identities such that “while a
hermeneutically marginalized subject is prevented from generating meanings pertaining to some
areas of the social world, she might well maintain a fuller participation as regards others” (2007,
153-4). And recall that she says that one way to achieve hermeneutical justice is to seek out
corroborating evidence in the experiences of others, which could very well take the form of
seeking out the experiences of those in marginal communities. But as Dotson points out, in her
concern to delimit her concepts of epistemic injustice, Fricker ends up excluding the development
of other forms of epistemic injustice, placing potential epistemic injustices that do not fit within
her framework in the category of “epistemic bad luck.” Medina and Dotson share the concern that
we need to always keep open the possibility of hermeneutic resources existing, especially in the
most “remote and obscure corners of the social fabric” (Medina 2013, 103). Doing so may require
opening up Fricker’s framework to expansions that she herself foreclosed.
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change over time and within different social environments. Thus, it would be inaccurate
to say that individuals’ knowledge or epistemic practices are strictly determined by their
epistemic milieu. Individuals can variously perpetuate or diverge from the knowledges
and practices of their communities. Such divergences need not be understood as
originating in completely self-determining individuals, but should be understood as
arising from (a) innovations based on the epistemic resources of one’s community and
especially from (b) epistemic friction13 produced through contact with other communities
or sub-communities, other social imaginaries, and other social identities. With these
complexities in mind, Medina proposes that we think of epistemic responsibility in terms
of “chained action.”
Building from Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility,
Medina conceives of chained actions as a way to gain a more nuanced understanding of
action and responsibility between the individual and the entire social group or collective.
He defines chained action as “an action with individual elements, the significance of
which can only be properly understood within a chain of actions, being thus crucially
dependent on the actions of others, indefinitely many others, but always particular others
and not (at least not necessarily) entire collectives or social groups” (Medina 2013, 226).
The recent events spurred by police violence against racialized persons may serve as a
useful model. Individuals are taking to the streets, often choosing acts of civil
disobedience to keep the issue in the broader public’s awareness. Importantly, those
blocking streets are a small fraction of the people that they may be acting in concert with
or on behalf of, for example, racialized communities, fellow protesters, or those seeking

13

I discuss Medina’s understanding of this term two paragraphs below.
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changes in the justice system. These acts of civil disobedience have meaning only within
a particular context of chained actions, like the history of civil disobedience as a response
to civil rights violations, the actions of fellow protesters in their communities, and the
actions of others practicing civil disobedience around the Unites States. And yet, each of
those practicing civil disobedience is acting as an individual, performatively reinforcing
the other links in this chain, and spurring reactive performances through similar acts of
disobedience, protests, media coverage, and so on.
This is chained action in progress, and it has important epistemic consequences.
While cases of police violence against racialized persons are nothing new in the United
States, chained actions like these have brought awareness to the issue in a new and
important way. The experiences of communities of color are being articulated in a
mainstream public, forcing discussions which, though they may be disappointing, would
not happen at all without the efforts of different groups acting in response to police
violence, each in their own way.14 This is an example of what Medina calls “epistemic
friction.” Epistemic friction is the result of opposing cognitive forces, which Medina
understands as the various motivations for and influences on our thinking (2013, 49). In
our example, then, bringing the experiences of communities of color into public discourse
constitutes epistemic friction for mainstream, white communities. Many white
communities are motivated to maintain the epistemic status quo because it is in their

14

The importance of this point should be underscored. There is no single national
organization organizing and carrying out the various actions taking place. Rather, networks of
communication exist such that methods and messages can be shared, but actions are led by those
in their own communities, proposed solutions are responding to particular needs of those
communities, and the tactics used by each group are chosen by and respond to the particular
communities. We need not wait for a unified message or nation-wide collective action to bring
the experiences and demands of marginalized communities into a broader public discourse.
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interests;15 and many cognitive influences in white communities (from mainstream news
and media, to the discourse of “colorblindness,” to the segregation of white communities
from communities of color) reinforce the erasure of the experiences of communities of
color. Thus, the presence of protesters in public spaces and the public discussion of some
problems faced by communities of color constitute a form of epistemic friction.
Not all epistemic friction is positive, however. As Medina notes, epistemic
friction can also work in conservative and oppressive ways, by “censoring, silencing, or
inhibiting the formation of beliefs, articulations of doubts, the formulation of questions
and lines of inquiry, and so on” (2013, 50). The discourse of colorblindness, for example,
may result in epistemic friction for communities of color, as it labels anyone who seeks to
address racial issues as “the real racists,” preemptively silencing their concerns. For this
reason, Medina introduces two principles of epistemic friction. The first is the principle
of acknowledgement and engagement, according to which “all the cognitive forces we
encounter must be acknowledged and, insofar as it becomes possible, they must be in
some way engaged” (2013, 50). So it is imperative for those in white communities to take
into account their own motivations and influences, and they should also consider the
knowledges and experiences of communities of color. Writing others off as racist, for
example, would be to fail this principle. Of course the opposite is also true. The second is
the principle of epistemic equilibrium. According to this principle, we should aim for
“equilibrium in the interplay of cognitive forces, without some forces overpowering
Charles Mills talks about this in his essay, “White Ignorance,” for example. Here he
notes that recognizing the benefits one receives from racist institutions, considering the
possibility of reparations based on histories of racial oppression, and feeling responsibility to
work alongside communities of color to change racist institutions are all obscured or erased by
the ignorance of those in white communities and thus they have a motivation to remain ignorant
(Mills 2007).
15
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others, without some cognitive influences becoming unchecked and unbalanced” (2013,
50). Importantly this does not mean “giving equal weight to all perspectives” (2013, 195).
Instead, this principle asks us to be vigilant in taking multiple perspectives into account,
so that our own thinking is not given to only one set of cognitive forces. To return to my
extended example, this would require that members of white communities not let their
motivations and the influences on their thinking keep them in the inertia of ignorance.
They must keep a constant check on these cognitive forces, and this would mean keeping
in mind the viewpoints of communities of color. For members of communities of color,
the principle would require that they not let mainstream influences overpower their own
experiences. Such persons, for example, should not let themselves be silenced by
“colorblindness” or doubt their own knowledge as a result of the failure of the white
community to take up their concerns. In this way, we can foster beneficial epistemic
friction, not friction for the sake of friction.
Of course, determining what constitutes beneficial epistemic friction will of
necessity be a context-sensitive affair, but it is helpful to understand them in terms of
“meta-lucidity” and “meta-insensitivity.”16 Meta-insensitivity occurs when people are
“insensitive to their own insensitivity” (2013, 152). It consists of an outward direction, in
which we ignore our “insensitivity towards others,” and an inward direction, in which we
ignore “our insensitivity toward ourselves—toward certain aspects of ourselves that we
Medina’s use of “meta-insensitivity” is basically interchangeable with his use of
“meta-blindness.” He notes in a forward that he maintains this language in response to much
literature which already uses the language of “blindness,” but also acknowledges the danger of
conflating blindness (and disability in general) with insensitivity or ignorance (2013, xi-xiii).
Indeed, he notes that “insensitivity” has a broader meaning—all senses can be insensitive, not just
sight, and we can be insensitive with faculties other than our senses, namely our emotions—such
that it is better suited for the complex epistemic phenomena he seeks to understand. With these
things in mind, I will, unless quoting, use “meta-insensitivity” throughout.
16

46

disregard or even deny” (2013, 161-2). The meta-insensitive person does not know what
she does not know, or more properly, does not know the limitations on her own
knowledge; she is not sensitive to her failures to take others’ experiences into account,
nor is she sensitive to the social location or privileges that allow her to remain insensitive.
In this way, detrimental epistemic friction can be seen as contributing to metainsensitivity. One example of meta-insensitivity Medina uses is culture blaming, the
phenomenon in which a group’s “culture” is viewed as a cause of suffering (even when
the same form of suffering is not blamed on the dominant group’s culture when it occurs
there). When the prevalence of single-mother households in black communities is blamed
for rates of crime, for example, or the proportion of welfare recipients, this often
constitutes a form of meta-insensitivity. Outwardly, not only is the person making this
claim which is insensitive to a broad range of problems in black communities, from
differential policing and the war on drugs to a history of segregationist practices which
impact housing and education among other needs, but she is insensitive to her own
insensitivity. That is, she does not even recognize that there may be alternative factors to
take into account, or other perspectives, namely the perspectives of black persons to heed.
The problem and solution are already given. Inwardly, this person is not only insensitive
to a broad range of privileges afforded to her because of her race, from a history of
slavery, grants, lending and housing practices that differentially benefitted white
communities to law enforcement that uses its discretion to police communities
differently, but she is also insensitive to her ignorance of her own social location. That is,
she is not just insensitive to her own privilege, but insensitive to her own relation to black
communities such that privilege could be one possible way to understand that relation.
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Meta-lucidity, unsurprisingly, is defined in contrast to meta-insensitivity, as the
“capacity to see the limitations of dominant ways of seeing” and knowing (2013, 47). The
meta-lucid person acknowledges the gaps and problems of a group’s or society’s
epistemic practices, even if she cannot detail exactly what those gaps are. In this way,
beneficial epistemic friction can be seen as contributing to meta-lucidity. Thus, to return
to the example above, the meta-lucid subject may acknowledge that there are histories
that contribute to various forms of suffering in black communities and that those histories
are often not told for political reasons, even if she does not know those particular
histories; she may acknowledge that the narrative of the single parent household does not
take into account the perspectives of persons from black communities and may therefore
seek out those perspectives; she may acknowledge that there are indeed a multiplicity of
black communities and thus a single description of “the black community” is insufficient;
she may acknowledge that, as a white person, she is in very particular social relationships
to black communities, and thus understand that her own life and identity are tied to those
others, even if she does not know exactly how. Meta-lucidity is not knowing everything,
but knowing that we do not know and striving to remain open to what we do not know.
Because it is through others that we do (and should) understand ourselves and the
world, meta-lucidity and the principles of epistemic friction are supported by what
Medina calls the Imperative of Epistemic Interaction, which requires that we develop
habits and sensibilities17 to be open and responsive to “diverse and multiple others”
(2013, 9). To fulfill this imperative it is necessary that different groups within a society
17

It is clear, here, that Medina agrees with Fricker about the perceptual and affective
nature of our epistemic interactions with others. Being closed or open, indifferent or responsive to
others involves perceiving and feeling that the other as worthy of attention as much as it involves
recognizing the other as worthy of attention.
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“can articulate their shared experiences and perspectives” (the expressibility requirement)
and that different groups within a society, and perhaps the society as a whole, take up
those experiences and perspectives (the responsiveness requirement), such that true
interaction can occur (2013, 9). Importantly, for Medina, the language of “interaction” is
preferable to “integration,” because the latter is stronger, often taking on a sense closer to
that of “assimilation” which he avidly wants to avoid. Integration may require “those who
have been so far excluded and marginalized to find their place in practices and
institutions that have not been traditionally theirs,” and thus undermine the beneficial
epistemic friction required for meta-lucidity and create detrimental epistemic friction
which fosters meta-insensitivity (2013, 8). (After all, if all persons and groups are
integrated in the sense of assimilated, where could friction come from other than the
friction of dominant discourses against individual experiences?) Interaction, on the other
hand, is a weaker notion and thus allows for spaces, institutions, histories, or discourses
intended primarily for marginalized groups. In this way it fosters beneficial epistemic
friction and contributes to meta-lucidity.
So far I have discussed the epistemology of resistance in terms of guiding ideals.
We should seek out beneficial epistemic friction to foster meta-lucidity, and we should
resist detrimental epistemic friction to avoid meta-insensitivity. To do so will require that
societies follow the Imperative of Epistemic Interaction. Medina also discusses three
epistemic virtues necessary to achieve meta-lucidity, and three opposing vices that lead
persons to be meta-insensitive.18 The first virtue Medina discusses is epistemic humility,
or “attentiveness to one’s cognitive limitations and deficits” (2013, 43). This is a virtue
18

Medina does not take this list to be exhaustive but argues that these virtues and vices
are central for his purposes (2013, 31).
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because, in moderation, it leads to certain epistemic benefits. It can help subjects make
more specific, nuanced arguments, recognize lacunae in their knowledge, and formulate
questions about unwarranted generalizations or gaps in knowledge that should be filled.
Its opposite is epistemic arrogance. Epistemically arrogant people are inattentive to the
limitations and gaps in their knowledge, and thus it is more difficult for them to learn
from mistakes, question presuppositions and biases, or contest their own beliefs (2013,
30-1). A second virtue is “intellectual curiosity/diligence,” which is the motivation to
meliorate gaps in one’s knowledge and one’s cognitive limitations (2013, 43). Its
opposite is epistemic laziness, the lack of motivation to fill, and often concerted effort to
avoid filling, gaps in one’s knowledge (2013, 33). A third epistemic virtue Medina argues
for is open-mindedness. The open-minded subject is open to, and may even seek out, the
perspectives of others, especially those perspectives that may contest her current beliefs
(2013, 44). The opposite of open-mindedness is closed-mindedness. Closed-minded
subjects are “systematically closed to certain phenomena, experiences, and perspectives,
come what may,” often in an active, defensive manner (2013, 34-5). As epistemic
character traits, these virtues and vices involve cognitive, affective, and perceptual
components. That is, open-minded subjects ideally recognize, perceive, and are
emotionally open to others, especially relevantly different others, as sources of alternative
perspectives that may contribute to beneficial epistemic friction. Because of this
complexity, these virtues and vices are habituated; they are not natural, nor the result of
cognitive effort alone.
As habituated character traits, we may expect that some experiences will be more
likely to lead to the development of epistemic virtues than others. One relevant way to
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organize such experiences is the relationship of oppressor and oppressed. On Medina’s
view, epistemic virtues and meta-lucidity will tend to correlate with oppressed persons,
while epistemic vices and meta-insensitivity will tend to track oppressors. This is because
mainstream discourses, practices, and institutions often leaved oppressors unchallenged,
while constantly contesting the marginalized. By being given default, and often undue,
epistemic authority, oppressors will likely develop arrogance; only being required to
understand and navigate their own, mainstream social milieu will likely lead to laziness;
and because acknowledging one’s privilege and implication in the material and social ills
of others would result in an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance, oppressors are likely to
develop unconscious defense mechanisms such that they remain closed-minded (2013,
30-36). Insofar as these vices contribute to epistemic meta-insensitivity, then, we can say
that oppressors are more likely to develop meta-insensitivity, especially with regard to
the oppressed.
The oppressed on the other hand are likely to have experiences that foster
epistemic virtues. Because oppressed persons are likely to experience gaps in mainstream
epistemic practices, discourses, and institutions which block the mainstream from
understanding their experiences, the oppressed are more likely to develop humility.
Indeed, if oppressed persons are able to identify with others’ exclusions as a result of
their own experiences of exclusion, this may lead them to be more attentive, not just to
the limitations of the mainstream, but to their own limitations in relation to understanding
other oppressed groups.19 Similarly, it is common for oppressed subjects to benefit from
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For example, the fact that the mainstream claims to speak on behalf of women despite
its obvious failures to account for the experience of women could lead white women to recognize
that there are limits on their own understandings of the experiences of women of color or
immigrant women. Of course, the failure of women’s groups to make this connection has been a
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knowledge of, and have frequent opportunities to learn about, their oppressors. Surviving
under oppression often requires oppressed persons to navigate different social realms (at
the very least, their own milieu and the oppressor’s world), which requires them to gain
the relevant types of knowledge. If the curiosity that the oppressed benefit from
developing becomes a character trait that can be directed at other social realms, in
addition to their own realm and that of their oppressor, then we can see that oppressed
persons have occasions for developing intellectual curiosity that oppressors lack. Finally,
oppressed persons “are often encouraged and typically even forced to see reality not only
through their own eyes, but also through the eyes of others [that is, oppressors] whose
perspectives and social locations matter more” (2013, 44). If this openness to the
perspective of their oppressors can be generalized, then they will be more likely to open
themselves to the perspectives of different others as well, especially the perspectives of
other marginalized persons. Insofar as these virtues contribute to meta-lucidity, oppressed
persons are more likely than oppressors to develop meta-lucidity.
To be clear, the tendencies discussed in the last two paragraphs are just that:
tendencies. First, the virtues discussed are not exclusive to the oppressed, nor are the
vices exclusive to oppressors. Second, the virtues discussed are not universal to
oppressed persons, nor are the vices universal to oppressors. Finally, the virtues do not
automatically follow from being oppressed, nor do the vices automatically follow from
major source of criticisms of Western feminism. I think Medina’s suggestion is still convincing,
though. He is careful to qualify his position, so that all he really needs to show is that oppressed
persons will be more likely than oppressors to develop these virtues, and this is because they are
more likely to experience epistemic friction than oppressors. Indeed, while there is always more
work to be done, anti-oppression theorizers and activists do tend to be more responsive than
others to alternative perspectives. For example, it is commonplace in activist circles to follow the
lead of those whose fight it is, while charities and government agencies still take the lead with
little input from those they supposedly work on behalf of.
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being an oppressor (2013, 43). There will almost certainly be humble oppressors, for
example, and closed-minded oppressed subjects. We must also be careful not to
romanticize the epistemic privileges of oppressed groups. As Medina notes throughout
his book, oppression creates epistemic disadvantages alongside its other (e.g., material,
symbolic) manifestations. Oppression may result in moderate epistemic humility, but it
may also lead to oppressed subjects who experience limitations to the point of being
epistemically undermined. While oppressed persons may be in better situations to
develop curiosity and epistemic diligence, they may also be barred from acting on their
curiosity or lack the resources to be diligent. And though open-mindedness may be
encouraged in the oppressed by the necessity of taking the perspective of their
oppressors, the same forces may lead to a dissonance or double-consciousness that
hinders epistemic growth and may lead to psychological suffering. Thus, Medina’s
argument must be nuanced: as a result of oppression, oppressed persons will have certain
experiences that may prompt the development of epistemic virtues and meta-lucidity.
Oppressors, on the other hand, will probably not have these experiences, and indeed often
have experiences that support or incentivize epistemic vices and meta-insensitivity.
Summarizing these points, Medina writes, “although I will depart from those strong
positions that attribute some kind of epistemic superiority to oppressed groups, I will
defend the claim that there are distinctive epistemic advantages that can be found among
oppressed subjects” (2013, 45).
Epistemic Injustice and Disability
The discussion of Fricker and Medina in the previous section is intended to
outline the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and the ways in which it might be

53

addressed. In this section, I turn to epistemic injustices specific to the oppression of
disabled persons. The section is organized into two subsections, one focusing on practices
that have epistemic effects for a broad spectrum of disabled persons (institutionalization
and medicalization), and the other focusing on some specific issues that arise when
discussing epistemic injustice in relation to mental disability. Before turning to these
issues, however, a few qualifications are in order. First, though I frequently combine my
discussions of physical disability and chronic illness, I do not intend to conflate them.
Rather, because there are certain similarities in the epistemic injustices faced by
physically disabled persons and chronically ill persons, I will discuss them in parallel,
highlighting relevant differences along the way. Second, by dividing physical disability,
sensory disability, and chronic illness from mental disability in the final subsection I do
not intend to understand them as opposed. Instead, because mental disability can pose a
unique challenge to discussions of epistemic injustice—specifically the question of
whether or not persons who are often understood to have natural epistemic limitations
can be subject to epistemic injustices—I have separated the discussions to emphasize this
issue. Of course, there will be common themes that emerge in discussing disability in its
myriad forms, and there are persons who are both physically disabled or chronically ill
and mentally disabled. Finally, I do not address all, or even most, disabilities in this
section. What I hope to accomplish is to understand some themes that have emerged in
disability studies with the tools of the literature of epistemic (in)justice discussed above.
Problematic Practices
Understanding the myriad epistemic injustices faced by disabled and chronically
ill persons would be too large a task for this project, so I organize this subsection by two
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related practices: institutionalization and medicalization. These practices have long been
contested by disability studies scholars and disabled communities, yet they are still very
common in the contemporary United States. What I aim to home in on are the specifically
epistemic aspects of these practices. This focus is important for several reasons. First,
because institutionalization, medicalization, and related practices to which disabled
persons are often subject are importantly epistemic in nature, treating disabled persons as
objects of knowledge, not subjects with knowledge. A second reason for this focus is that
disability studies has largely been concerned with the ethical and political aspects of
disability oppression, such that my focus on epistemic injustice can provide a helpful
supplement to understanding disability oppression.
Institutionalization
I will begin by discussing the epistemic consequences of institutionalization. By
institutionalization I mean the practices of confining disabled people in either public or
private institutions. Related to institutionalization is the practice (often seen as the only
alternative to brick-and-mortar institutions) of tracking disabled persons into segregated
housing and employment. According to ADAPT—formerly the American Disabled for
Accessible Public Transit, and later the American Disabled for Attendant Programs
Today20—more than “250,000 people in nursing homes want to return to the community”
(ADAPT 2015). Indeed, nursing homes became the new space of confinement for many
disabled people as large-scale institutionalization in its previous manifestations fell out of
favor in the wake of controversies about their terrible conditions in the 1970s (Shapiro
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See Thomas (2015) and Shapiro (1994) for insightful histories of ADAPT.
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1994, 241).21 Despite the move away from larger institutions, “33,732 American people
were still housed in large state institutions housing 16 people or more” in 2009, “and
most states continue to channel a significant proportion of long-term care funding into
institutions” (Chapman, Carey and Ben-Moshe 2014, 11). It is also important to
recognize that prisons serve as sites of confinement for disabled persons. In 2012, for
example, the Treatment Advocacy Center (Torrey, et al. 2014) reports that there were
approximately 356,000 prisoners diagnosed with mental illnesses in just state prisons and
county and local jails. Disabled persons are funneled into prisons by a system that
criminalizes non-normative behavior and fails to address mental health issues in
productive ways. On the other hand, the prison environment is disabling in many ways.
As Chapman, et al. (2014, 16) explain, the difficult labor in unhealthy conditions, the use
of drugs and shared needles, the scarcity of medical equipment, and emotional, physical,
and sexual violence all constitute disabling aspects of the prison environment. Thus
institutionalization may change forms over time, but it is a remarkably persistent social
reaction to disability.
What, then, are the epistemic consequences of institutions? Frequently, the
institutionalized are subject to testimonial injustices. Perhaps most profoundly, disabled
subjects’ knowledge about the institutions in which they are imprisoned is often
disregarded. Joseph Shapiro discusses the example of Jeff Gunderson, a man with
cerebral palsy who was placed in a nursing home from ages eighteen to twenty-seven
(1994, 237-250). Gunderson’s various wishes were not heeded and he was forced, for
example, to go to bed at 7:00pm as a young adult, to eat bland “gruel” meant for the
21

For a fascinating microcosm of this transition, see Carey and Gu (2014) who discuss
the role of parents’ organizations in the deinstitutionalization reforms of Pennsylvania.
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elderly in the nursing home, and was subject to many forms of abusive behavior. The fact
that this sort of treatment can continue for over eight years reveals the extent to which his
and others’ testimony is often disregarded by institutional staff and administration.
Indeed, this treatment had the sort of epistemic and practical consequences that Fricker
discusses. Gunderson came to doubt his own beliefs, undermining his epistemic
subjectivity (the primary harm) and his willingness to hold to his convictions (the
secondary epistemic harm), such that he could not resist the abusive behavior inside the
institution (the secondary practical harm). Indeed, it took the pleas of a (testimonially
just) social worker to convince him that his desire to leave the nursing home was
justified. Shapiro writes that Gunderson said of this encounter, “I thought it was
impossible, […] even though I’d always been screaming, ‘Get me out’” (1994, 242).
Mark Friedman and Ruthie-Marie Beckwith, writing about two self-advocacy groups of
intellectually and developmentally disabled people, Speaking For Ourselves of
Pennsylvania, Inc. and People First of Tennessee, Inc., note the frequent testimonial
injustices faced by disabled members as they sought to organize against
institutionalization. They explain, for example, “Insightful reflections shared by leaders
[of the organizations] were dismissed as the product of manipulation and subversive mind
control techniques employed by the nondisabled organizers and advisors” (Friedman and
Beckwith 2014, 239). Here, it is clear that the organizers faced testimonial injustices.
Professionals and the family members who assumed that they should be in institutions
found the testimony of the organizers to lack credibility because of their disabled
statuses. Indeed, the assumption was that these ideas must have been coming from
outside, from nondisabled organizers feeding them to the disabled organizers. Again, this
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treatment led to the sorts of harms Fricker discusses. In addition to disrespecting their
epistemic subjectivity (the primary epistemic harm), many members of the organization
had developed a sort of learned helplessness, a feeling of inability to trust their own
knowledge (the secondary epistemic harm) and make decisions about their lives. It was
also common for them to acquiesce to poor treatment, abuse, and threats in institutions (a
secondary practical harm) because of this conditioning over the course of their lives.
Indeed, one member, Betty Potts, recalls her experience of trying to bring awareness to
an instance of abuse: “I once spoke up about their hitting someone and handled rough but
they said I lied about it but I didn’t” (2014, 241). Though she remained insistent, and thus
resisted some of the secondary epistemic harms (like loss of epistemic courage), she was
clearly subject to a testimonial injustice in this case, one that undermined her as a
knowing subject and that led to continued practical harms.
Clearly, the testimonial injustices to which disabled persons, like Gunderson and
the self-advocates just discussed, operate in such a way that beneficial epistemic friction
is removed within the institutions, but the institutions themselves obstruct beneficial
epistemic friction in the wider communities. Within institutions, epistemic influences
which point to the harms caused by institutions, the evidence that institutions are
unnecessary because of—and indeed inefficient compared to—various technologies and
home care services, and their inability to effect cures are met with the closed-mindedness
of workers, legal custodians, and administrators who will not consider alternatives to
institutionalization and the arrogance of those who think they know what is best for the
institutionalized. Discussing the historical developments in institutions that led to the
creation of back wards, or institutional spaces designed for the “untreatable” and which
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often have the most deplorable conditions, Philip M. Ferguson (2014) notes that these
wards developed largely out of the need for administrators to maintain their claims to
expertise. When the institutionalized did not appear to be improving or responding to the
therapeutic means used, administrators in these institutions could claim that they had
been misclassified, rather than admitting that the therapies were ineffective. In the back
ward, experts claimed to have “discovered” persons who were beyond therapeutic help,
and in this way they bolstered their claims to expertise while simultaneously eliminating
epistemic friction within the institutions, within the medical community, and in extrainstitutional communities. Moreover, institutions themselves eliminate epistemic friction
from their surrounding communities. By isolating “abnormal” people, institutions keep
communities from needing to consider forces which may cause people, individually or
collectively, to question or contest their own beliefs. For example, when persons who
depend upon aids to care for their bodies are in nursing homes, outside communities have
little impetus to contest the meaning of independence that we assume in our everyday
lives, work spaces, or political discourse. The presence of such persons and the
expressions of their experiences in our communities, on the other hand, might serve as a
powerful force of questioning. What is independence for an adult who must be fed or
bathed by someone else, or for someone who depends on technology for mobility or other
activities? Are those who are considered nondisabled really so independent of others and
technologies? Such questions could serve as important sources of contestation for views
of independence and autonomy that assume forms of embodiment that allow for
individual executions of one’s will. But institutions remove such epistemic friction from
mainstream view. In this way, institutions also result in hermeneutical injustices. They
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prevent the interpretation and articulation of the experiences of the institutionalized in
collective hermeneutic resources.
Resisting these injustices may indeed require the virtues of testimonial and
hermeneutical justice. After all, when institutionalization is taken to be the only possible
response to certain disabilities and institutions function so as to disregard the testimony
and experiences of the institutionalized, it would take a non-institutionalized person
breaking rank and taking the testimony of an institutionalized person seriously to begin
letting disabled persons speak for themselves. But I am less interested in this form of
resistance for two reasons. First, depending upon the testimonial justice of others may
reinscribe a paternalistic relationship between institutionalized persons and the noninstitutionalized. Second, and related to the first concern, the most effective forms of
resistance to epistemic injustices (and injustices in general) resulting from
institutionalization have come from the disabled community, especially the
institutionalized and formerly institutionalized. Resistance of this sort is better explained
by Medina’s understanding of epistemic interaction as leading to beneficial epistemic
friction. Michael Oliver (2009) explains, for example, that after his spinal cord injury, it
was his involvement in organizations led by disabled persons, whether sports clubs or the
Spinal Injuries Association or the British Council of Organizations of Disabled People,
that helped him to understand his experiences as oppressive, find spaces in which he
could express his views, and ultimately bring the experiences of the members of those
groups to a broader level of social awareness. Similarly, those organizing against
institutionalization in the United States, like Speaking For Ourselves and People First
discussed above, first developed spaces in which they could discuss their experiences,

60

like speak-out sessions and meetings with privacy policies (in other words, “what’s said
here, stays here”), to regain their sense of epistemic subjectivity and courage (Friedman
and Beckwith 2014, 239-43). This facilitated other learning processes, like visiting other
institutions, and practices of epistemic contestation, from letter-writing and calling
campaigns to publications which were made possible by a shared understanding of their
experiences and newfound confidence in their own beliefs. Note that this is in line with
Medina’s preference for interaction over integration. The separate spaces and emerging
discourses of disabled people allowed for expressions of knowledge that would not have
been possible if disabled people were simply integrated, that is assimilated, into
communities. The knowledge gained in these organizations could then become the source
of beneficial epistemic friction in their wider communities. Thus, resistance to the
testimonial injustices and meta-insensitivity fostered by institutions finds its most
effective form in the collective consciousness-raising of disabled people and their
subsequent interactions with nondisabled communities.
Medicalization
Closely related to institutionalization is medicalization. Indeed, the rise of
institutionalization was an important contribution to the normalizing discourses that still
characterize most of contemporary medicine.22 I want to separate them here, however, to
try to get clear on some of the epistemic injustices that result from medicalization. By
medicalization I mean the practices of understanding disability and/or chronic illness in
biological terms alone and responding to disability and/or chronic illness with only or
primarily medical interventions or “cures.” To be clear, my intent here is not to argue for
22

For discussions of this relationship, see for example, Michel Foucault (1994) and
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an end to medicine (as if such a thing were possible), nor to criticize all aspects of
medical practices. Instead, I want to draw some critical attention to the epistemic
consequences of medicine’s largely unquestioned authority over those subjected to
medical diagnoses and treatments. This is especially important in the United States given
our dependence upon medical diagnoses for insurance claims, government resources, and
school and workplace alterations; a physician’s signature, not the subjective experience
of being disabled, is the litmus test for access to these resources.
The practices of medicalization can result in testimonial injustices in at least two
ways. First, in providing diagnoses and prognoses, medical professionals often disregard
the testimony of disabled and chronically ill persons. Susan Wendell, who discusses this
problem at length in her book The Rejected Body, summarizes the point:
The authority of medicine tends to delegitimize our experiences of our bodies as
sources of knowledge about them, because the authoritative, that is, the medical
and scientific, descriptions of our bodies are third-person descriptions of physical
conditions. For example, our own phenomenological descriptions are at best
treated as weak evidence for the truth of medical and scientific descriptions. They
are almost never treated as even weak evidence against a medical or scientific
description of our bodies. (1996, 119)
Indeed, the perceived authority of medicine is so complete that there is relatively little
acknowledgement of the gaps in medical knowledge. Thus, when medicine has not (yet)
developed an understanding of a condition affecting a patient or patients, they are likely
to be told, “There is nothing wrong with you,” rather than having the limitations of
medical knowledge explained and having their concerns taken seriously. Responses like
this constitute testimonial injustices because they disregard the knowledge of patients
whose experiences do not fit the mold of current medical diagnoses. Such attributions of
credibility deficits are prejudicial, on Fricker’s understanding, because they are

62

judgments that resist counter-evidence due to the person’s affective investments (Fricker
2007, 35). In this case, the medical professional views the patient’s testimony as weak
(that is, she resists the evidence of the patient’s testimony) due to her own investment in
her expertise, profession, and so on. Rather than admit her own limitations, the doctor
rejects the patient’s testimony. This undermines subjects as knowers of their own bodies
and experiences (the primary epistemic harm); it often leads to further physical and
psychological suffering as they often try to be more active than they should, placing
unnecessary strain on their bodies, and often feel isolated from others who cannot
understand their experiences and will not take them seriously (secondary practical
harms); and it may lead them to lose epistemic courage as they learn not to maintain
convictions in the face of challenges, even when this concerns their own bodily
experiences (the secondary epistemic harm). In very real ways, being told by a doctor that
“there is nothing wrong with you” prompts a difficult decision: either one must reject the
putative authority of medicine and hold on to one’s bodily knowledge, or one must reject
one’s own bodily knowledge and accept the authority of medicine (1996, 124). In an
environment that puts its faith in medicine to the extent that ours does, rejecting medicine
is likely to bring with it the scorn and doubt of insurance providers, employers, family
and friends, and even oneself because the person is likely to have placed her trust in
medicine prior to the experience of testimonial injustice.
Of course, injustice can result from diagnosis just as it can from the failure to give
a diagnosis. Katie Aubrecht describes her experience with psychiatrists thusly:
I was constantly quizzed about how well I knew the experiences I had were
actually true experiences. I couldn’t be sure what I felt, liked, or wanted anymore.
I did, however, become ever more familiar with what doctors felt, liked, and
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wanted, and that those things would be the right things to feel, like, and want.
(Fabris and Aubrecht 2014, 190)
Here, Aubrecht gives an account of how the testimonial injustices of her physicians
undermined her epistemic subjectivity, led to self-doubt, and ultimately led her own
knowledge to be covered over by the knowledge of the doctors. One may object that if
the doctors were quizzing her, it seems unlikely that they would disregard her knowledge.
On Aubrecht’s description, however, the quizzes did not serve as genuine requests for
testimony about her experiences and beliefs, but instead introduced skepticism about her
testimony. Moreover it is clear that, as she describes it, the doctors have an investment in
imposing their own beliefs to maintain their own expertise such that they resisted
evidence to the contrary, gradually moving Aubrecht to a space of confusion and
compliance. Insofar as medical diagnoses are inflexible to the experiences of patients,
then, it is likely that patients will continue to experience testimonial injustices.
Authoritative predictions of how a condition will change over time can also
constitute what Fricker calls preemptive testimonial injustices, as they silence the
patient’s future testimony. Consider, for example, Alison Kafer’s experience:
[M]y doctor suggested that my thoughts of graduate school were premature, if not
misguided. He felt that I would need to spend the next three or four years living at
home, under my parents’ care, and only then would it be appropriate to think
about starting school. His tone made it clear, however, that he thought graduate
school would remain out of reach; it was simply not in my future. What my future
did hold, according to my rehabilitation psychologist and my recreation therapist,
was long-term psychological therapy. My friends were likely to abandon me,
alcoholism and drug addiction loomed on my horizon, and I needed to prepare
myself for the futures of pain and isolation brought on by disability. (2013, 1)
This response to Kafer’s acquired disability is clearly an instance of testimonial injustice.
The doctors and therapists Kafer depended on for treatment disregarded her own beliefs
about what was possible for her. As discussed above, she had to make a complex decision
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about whether to maintain her beliefs despite the pronouncements of medical authority or
to take their knowledge as authoritative and disregard her own convictions. But what may
be even more threatening, here, is the predictive nature of her interactions. Not only do
their predictions threaten to create self-fulfilling prophecies—one can easily imagine a
person in Kafer’s position socially withdrawing as a defensive response to the fear of
abandonment, or giving up on graduate school in response to the doctor’s doubts—but
they also threaten to silence the patient in advance. In telling Kafer to prepare for a life of
isolation, for example, those professionals trusted with her “rehabilitation” preempted
any testimony she may have given about the resilience of her social ties or her knowledge
of resources that could allow her to live in more socially integrated settings. By
predicting drug and alcohol abuse, they preempted any testimony about whether or not
she herself felt, or conceived of herself as, prone to such outcomes. Such interactions
have the structure of preemptive testimonial injustice described by Fricker: “The
credibility of such a person on a given subject matter is already sufficiently in prejudicial
deficit that their potential testimony is never solicited” (2007, 130).23
A third instance of testimonial injustice often occurs as a result of medical
treatments or therapies. Take, for example, Katie Aubrecht’s experience of being
diagnosed as mentally ill and prescribed medications for her condition. Among other
complaints, Aubrecht experienced her medicated self as “alter[ing] the very way I
moved,” fatigued, disoriented, restless, nauseous; the medication made it “seemingly
impossible to be where I was” (Fabris and Aubrecht 2014, 191, original emphasis).
Again, I believe this behavior can be considered prejudicial given Fricker’s definition
because it involves resistance to counter-evidence (the patient’s testimony) as a result of the
professionals’ affective investments (in, say, their educations, professional expertise, reputation,
and so on).
23
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Despite these complaints, doctors continued to assure her that medications for depression
and anxiety are normal, that they would help her be more social, and even that the source
of her “problems” might be estrogen levels such that her birth control prescriptions were
experimented with. Michael Oliver offers resonant criticisms of rehabilitation
professionals’ insistence on approximating walking. First quoting Vic Finkelstein, who
wrote that the imperative to walk resulted in “endless soul-destroying hours at Stoke
Mandeville Hospital trying to approximate to able-bodied standards by ‘walking’ with
calipers and crutches,” Oliver argues that for many with disabilities, walking is the least
enabling option, that it results in greater suffering than learning to use other technologies
like wheelchairs, and that “rejecting nearly-walking […] threatens the power of
professionals, it exposes the ideology of normality and it challenges the whole
rehabilitation enterprise” (2009, 36). These examples reveal the testimonial injustices to
which patients can be subject once they are given treatment regimens by medical
professionals. The testimony of those whose experiences do not follow the normal or
expected course during treatment are disregarded; doctors insisted that Albrecht would
improve with medication even though she experienced medicated life as more anxious
than her life prior to treatment, and rehabilitation specialists insisted, in Finkelstein’s
case, that near-walking (to use Oliver’s terms) would be better than using a wheelchair,
even though he knew his own preference for using wheelchairs for movement. As
discussed with other examples above, these testimonial injustices are largely motivated
by medical professionals’ own investments in their expertise.
Medicalization also tends to produce hermeneutical injustices and detrimental
epistemic friction. Because medical discourse admits of only measurable, “objective”
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information, patients are often at a loss to interpret their own subjective experiences.
Indeed, the unquestioned authority of medicine is apparent in Fricker’s own work, where
she uses the example of an undiscovered disease to explain the difference between a
collective hermeneutical disadvantage and a hermeneutical injustice. She writes:
If, for instance, someone has a medical condition affecting their social behavior at
a historical moment at which that condition is still misunderstood and largely
undiagnosed, then they may suffer a hermeneutical disadvantage that is, while
collective, especially damaging to them in particular. They are unable to render
their experiences intelligible by reference to the idea that they have a disorder,
and so they are personally in the dark, and may also suffer seriously negative
consequences from others’ non-comprehension of their condition. But they are
not subject to hermeneutical injustice; rather, theirs is a poignant case of
circumstantial epistemic bad luck. (Fricker 2007, 152)
What is required for such a hermeneutical disadvantage to be an injustice is the inclusion
of hermeneutical marginalization, the asymmetrical “hermeneutical participation” of a
group; that is, the ability of a hermeneutic resource to provide interpretations of a
dominant group’s experiences but not those of a marginalized group (2007, 152-3). I do
not want to argue that Fricker’s example would always be a case of hermeneutical
injustice and never a case of epistemic bad luck, but I do think there are cases that fit
Fricker’s description in which a hermeneutical injustice has been committed. Wendell’s
discussion of the experience of pain provides such an example. As she explains, medicine
lacks interpretive resources, and is resistant to expand its interpretations, of pain. She
begins with the informative example of a woman who described her pain as a crab that
tore at her insides; she was later discovered to have an enormous ulcer in her stomach,
but because the doctors could find no physical cause of her suffering, she was sent to a
mental hospital (Wendell 1996, 134). Wendell also shares a similar story of a woman,
later diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, who for five years was told that she had
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“housewife’s syndrome,” and because of this tried to be more active which increased her
suffering (1996, 124). Drawing from her own experiences, Wendell explains that she
finds the language medical experts use to describe her symptoms from chronic fatigue
syndrome (CFS), like “fatigue,” to be inadequate; she prefers a term she found in
literature written by another person diagnosed with CFS, “cellular exhaustion,” because it
describes the “deep and pervasive” nature of her experience, unlike fatigue, which she
experienced before she had CFS symptoms and which other people frequently experience
(1996, 135). Instead of medicine, it was turning to her experiences and those of others
with chronic pain that helped her to better understand her pain as an “interpreted
experience;” rather than resisting the pain, she discovered the ability to “relax ‘into it,’”
an “attitude of acceptance toward it, giving in to it, or just watching/observing it” that
“can reduce the suffering it actually causes” (1996, 171-2). In these three instances, the
people suffering were members of a group (those experiencing pains unrecognized by
medical authority) who were disadvantaged by the hermeneutical resources which
privileged the experiences of others (medical professionals and those whose pains they
could diagnose) such that they were unable to interpret their own experiences or
communicate their experiences to others, and some of them suffered non-epistemic harms
as a result of this treatment. Moreover, I aver that these are not simply instances of
epistemic bad luck. They result from the hegemonic epistemic authority of medicine
which refuses to consider experiences for which it cannot account as even possibly
credible. The medical professionals in these examples could have admitted the limits in
their knowledge and remained open to interpretations of experiences that did not fit their
diagnoses or methods of assessment; they could have, in other words, exhibited
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hermeneutical justice. The doctors’ responses in these cases also individualized the
patients, such that they were not able, or at least not encouraged, to seek out others with
similar experiences to better understand them. Imagine, for example, that the first doctor
did not diagnose the patient with a mental illness, but remained open to her experiences
and sought out others with similar descriptions of their symptoms to assist the patient in
gaining better interpretive resources for her suffering. Or consider how differently the
second person would have been treated if, instead of considering herself as an isolated
case she would have tried to find others with similar symptoms to better understand her
own. Indeed, this is what Wendell herself found: seeking out others’ interpretations of
their own experiences helped her to better understand and respond to her own (1996,
109).
Indeed, this individualization that is encouraged by medical discourse is a
generally important source of hermeneutical injustice. When chronically ill or disabled
persons are treated only as patients, they are discouraged from seeking out alternative
explanations for their experiences. As much work in disability studies has shown,
however, chronic illness and disability can only be most fully understood in their social
settings. Interpreting Wendell’s experiences with CFS through medicine alone would be
incomplete, as her experiences are shaped by how her employer, friends and family,
services, and so on, interact with her. Oliver’s experiences after his spinal cord injury can
only very partially be understood by medicine, as the value of walking, for example, is
determined by, among other things, the technologies available to him, the structures in his
environment, and the attitudes and knowledge of those around him. Understanding
Albrecht’s experiences with psychiatry alone would neglect how her gender, her school’s
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expectations and responses to her, and her family and friends, among other things,
influence her experiences diagnosed as simply depression and anxiety. By imposing
medical interpretations, chronically ill and disabled people are hindered in understanding
the complexity of their experiences; and when they act in solidarity to develop
interpretations of, and language for, their experiences, they face resistance in modifying
the hermeneutic resources of the wider community. The inertia of the hermeneutic
resources in these cases can in part be explained by the interests and motivations of the
medical field. Medicine identifies itself with individualized, biological explanations and
treatments, and professionals have (largely unconscious) investments in maintaining their
expertise, investments which keep them from admitting the limitations of their
knowledge, or considering the extra-biological and social causes and possible responses
to chronic illness and disability.24
But the field of medicine is surely not alone in fostering the hermeneutical
injustices caused by medicalization. Rather, in the contemporary United States (and at
least for the last century), medicalization has become a much more widespread
phenomenon with myriad sources contributing to the detrimental epistemic friction which
hinders the development of non-medical understandings of disability. Researchers and
doctors are not the only people invested in the hegemony of medicine. Insurance
companies, businesses, and government agencies that provide resources to disabled and
chronically ill people have an interest in a medicalized understanding of disability
because it allows doctors to serve as gate-keepers to their resources. Medical
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In the essay discussed above, Michael Oliver provides an insightful critique of
rehabilitation professionals regarding their investments, specifically concerning walking and
“near-walking” (2009, 35-9).
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professionals often testify about individuals to convince courts, for example, of whether
or not the individual is deserving of “accommodations” or other resources.25 Of course,
medical and pharmaceutical manufacturers are also invested in medical understandings of
disability. Fiona Kumari Campbell gives an insightful discussion of the example of
cochlear implant (CI) manufacturers in Australia. The manufacturers of CIs never
consulted Deaf groups or deaf individuals in the development of their products, and they
rely upon ableist assumptions about the tragedy of hearing loss to defend the
development and marketing of their products (Campbell 2009, 88-90). As these
manufacturers came to be seen as an important part of the Australian economy, the
investment spread beyond the companies to the nation: the effect of people’s choice not
to receive CIs was reported in terms of the impact on the national economy, and some
Deaf people even reported that they did not want to be critical of CIs “because to do so
would be to criticise the work of [Australian] Professor Graeme Clark and bear the
allegation of being pronounced un-Australian” (2009, 89). Material investments like
these which motivate detrimental epistemic friction are surely widespread and profound
in their impact, but I also want to consider the psychic and symbolic investments that
support medicalization and its resulting hermeneutical injustices.
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Indeed, that is what makes doctors like Perry Timberlake so subversive. Timberlake is
a doctor in Hale County, Alabama known for referring patients to disability programs for
conditions that might, in other settings, be not considered disabling. Because almost all
employment opportunities in the area require employees to stand for all or most of their shifts,
Timberlake considers conditions like chronic leg and back pain to be disabling. His story is part
of an interesting series of reports by the Planet Money team on NPR (Joffe-Walt 2013). While
this may be a subversive use of his medical authority, Fiona Kumari Campbell (2009, 24-9)
warns about certain dangers of practices like these. When individuals take on disability identity or
diagnoses for subversive reasons, like getting access to resources that they would not otherwise
be able to, not only does this reify ableist institutions and practices rather than contesting them,
but there is also a dangerous potential that this identity will become internalized.
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Wendell discusses these investments in terms of idealized and invulnerable
bodies. She writes that all subjects in our particular normalizing society are expected to
“deny bodily weaknesses, to dread old age, to feel ashamed of and responsible for their
distance from the ideals, and to objectify their own bodies at the expense of subjective
bodily awareness” (Wendell 1996, 91). These expectations create a feedback loop of
sorts: people desire to control their bodies; then because they are made to feel responsible
for their bodies, they believe they can control their bodies and seek to meet ideals; but
because these ideals are never really met, the desire for bodily control is never satisfied.26
Disability comes to represent, under these conditions, the abnormal, and as such it calls
forth the “fear of being or becoming abnormal,” whether that means weak, unattractive,
old, or whatever else falls outside of normative parameters (1996, 91). Perhaps the most
severe form of rejection occurs when disability reminds one of the possibilities of illness,
suffering, or death. Wendell’s example of reporting pain is powerful and generous, so I
quote it at length:
[W]e remind them of the existence of pain, the imperfection and fragility of the
body, the possibility of their own pain, the inevitability of it. The less willing they
are to accept all these, the less they will want to know. If they cannot avoid
confronting pain in our presence, they can avoid us. They may even blame us for
being in pain. They may tell themselves that we could have avoided it, in order to
believe that they can avoid it. They may want to believe they are not like us, not
vulnerable to this; if so, they will cling to our differences, and we will become
‘the Others.’ (1996, 92)
Disability is thus rejected as a reminder that we are all temporarily able-bodied (indeed,
some in disability studies use the acronym TAB to emphasize the fleeting nature of
ability), resulting in detrimental epistemic friction that is difficult to counter or even
26

One could argue, following Lacan for example, that it is the nature of desire not to be
satisfied, but the important point Wendell makes here is that the particular desires we have
regarding our bodies are importantly shaped by normalizing expectations.
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address.27 Though Wendell does not use the term “medicalization,” it is clear that for her
these responses to disability are tied to the practices I have been referring to under the
heading of medicalization. As a result of the fear of abnormality, suffering, and death,
people embrace medicine as a way to understand illness and disability rather than the
subjective experiences of the ill or disabled. Doing so fosters the myth of control, the idea
that medicine could prevent the nondisabled from becoming disabled, or that medicine
can provide cures should one become disabled. In order to maintain this myth, chronic
illnesses and disabilities must continue to be understood as individual and medical. Here
we can see the full range of the epistemic vices Medina is concerned with. As a result of
medicalization, the nondisabled arrogantly maintain their own or doctors’ interpretations
of disability regardless of the experiences, interpretations, or testimony of disabled or
chronically ill people; the nondisabled cultivate laziness favoring medical diagnoses and
stories of curing or overcoming disability rather than seeking out the experiences of
disabled people; and the nondisabled are closed-minded in their refusal and disavowal of
disability, suffering, and vulnerability. Opening the wider hermeneutical resource to
disabled and chronically ill people such that they could interpret and communicate their
experiences as resulting not just from biology but from material structures, economic
practices, government policies, social attitudes, ideologies, and so on, would have the
potential to shatter the myth of bodily control. Thus, the detrimental epistemic friction
that keeps hermeneutic resources from expanding to include the interpretive resources
disabled people have developed is widespread and powerful. In this way, most people,

27

I will return to this theme in the second chapter where I elaborate a Kristevean
explanation for the rejection Wendell discusses.
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not just medical professionals and institutions, participate in the medicalization that
contributes to hermeneutical injustices against disabled and chronically ill people.
As in the case of institutionalization, achieving epistemic justice in response to
medicalization will likely require both the individual epistemic virtues discussed by
Fricker and Medina, and the wider practices of epistemic interaction. Wendell, for
example, describes positive experiences with her doctors and colleagues who attempt to
take her seriously, even when they cannot immediately understand her experiences or
may be tempted to meet her explanations with skepticism (1996, 2-3). One of the most
widely read books on the emerging disability rights movement, No Pity, was written by
Joseph Shapiro, which surely required him to give credit where many refused to, and to
be open to interpretations of disability experience which were largely unknown (and
which remain for many unintelligible). As I discussed above, however, depending on the
nondisabled to adopt epistemic virtues often promotes paternalism and encourages a
deferral of aims; “people will change their minds, just give it time.” Thus, as in the case
of institutionalization, the most significant gains against the epistemic injustices resulting
from medicalization have come from groups of disabled and chronically ill people
coming together to forge new understandings of their experiences and finding ways to
inject these evolving interpretations into wider discourses.
The distinction I have drawn here is surely a vague one. Even within the spaces of
disability activism and scholarship, the strong influence of ableism makes it likely that
disabled people will have internalized aspects of ableist culture, like norms, assumptions,
and medical and individual understandings of their own disability.28 Rod Michalko
28

Helpful discussions of internalization can be found in Charlton (2000), especially
Chapter 5, and Campbell (2009), especially Chapter 2.
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recounts his own move from taking for granted the individual, biomedical character of his
blindness to a sociologically informed understanding of his blind identity. In a meeting
with a genetic ophthalmologist, he explains, “At no point during our conversation did I
tell the doctor that I did not want to be blind, nor did he ask me whether I wanted to be.
Yet, we both knew that I did not” (Michalko 2002, 46). But the doctor advised Michalko
not to have biological children. Since there was a roughly fifty percent chance that he
would pass the relevant gene on, the doctor explained, “You wouldn’t want them
suffering what you’re suffering” (2002, 42). This led him to ask, “Why not?” and this
question was fostered by his studies in sociology and learning about others’ disability
scholarship and other disabled persons’ experiences. He even names one of his
professors, Dorothy Smith, as influential on his growing understanding of blindness in its
social complexity (2002, 26). For Michalko then, and likely for many others, being given
credibility where it is normally denied and being given the space to offer new
interpretations, even when they are difficult to make intelligible, is necessary in
interpersonal interactions to overcome the internalized medical, ableist view of disability
and make possible spaces in which new hermeneutic resources can develop.
To gain a better understanding of what such spaces look like, I will briefly discuss
two such spaces: centers for independent (or integrated)29 living (CILs) and disability
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In a response to the failures of the disability rights movement in the UK, Vic
Finkelstein argued that centers for independent living are misguided, and that the goal should be
integration and the training of professionals allied to the community (PACs). This is, in part,
because working with professionals and developing their own agendas would allow CILs to better
respond to the needs of the disability community, while seeking independence would
individualize resources and solutions, effectively creating a race to the bottom for cheaper service
providers. His response is printed in (Oliver 2009, 142-52). While this reasoning is convincing,
organizations in the United States have largely called themselves centers for independent living,
and so I will use this convention.
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studies scholarship. (Of course, these realms are not mutually exclusive. CILs have
influenced disability studies and vice versa, disability studies scholars have been involved
in CILs and activists with CILs have been scholars, and so on.) Centers for independent
living are organizations run by disabled people that seek to represent and work in the
interests of disabled people. Though CILs vary in their aims and tactics by city and over
time, Shapiro nicely summarizes the goals of the first CIL in California which inspired
the creation of other such centers: “It would be run by disabled people; approach their
problems as social issues; work with a broad range of disabilities; and make integration
into the community its chief goal. Independence was measured by an individual’s ability
to make his own decisions and the availability of the assistance necessary […] to have
such control” (1994, 53-4). It is easy to see how these centers could serve as spaces in
which to develop new hermeneutic resources and from which to interact with surrounding
communities. Unlike rehabilitation agencies, CILs are operated by disabled people
allowing them to forge their own understandings of disability and craft their own aims in
response to the oppression they face. Thus, they developed and continue to promote an
understanding of disability as a social phenomenon, not (solely) medical or individual in
nature; they incorporated the experiences and interests of many different disabled people,
rather than representing only similar groups of disabled people (like organizations only
for blind persons or wheelchair users), and in this way could gain a broader
understanding of disability; and they fought for integration of all disabled persons into
the community, not just those who faced the fewest obstacles or had the most resources,
and this fostered an understanding of integration that would require the nondisabled
community to change, rather than disabled persons integrating by assimilating to ableist
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norms. In other words, CILs foster alternative hermeneutic resources which can resist the
nondisabled hermeneutic resources and provide understandings of disability from which
to launch political movements.
A seminal text on disability oppression, Nothing about Us without Us, was written
by James I. Charlton, who worked for a CIL called Access Living of Metropolitan
Chicago. Indeed, he writes in his acknowledgments, “Much of the credit for the insights
in this book goes to my colleagues in the disability rights movement in the United States,
especially my comrades in Chicago” (Charlton 2000, xi). Thus, CILs have influenced the
creation and content of disability studies. Indeed, Simi Linton draws a parallel between
the disability rights movement30 and disability studies, writing, “Disability studies
provides the means to hold academics accountable for the veracity and the social
consequences of their work, just as activism has served to hold the community, the
education system, and the legislature accountable for disabled people’s compromised
social position” (1998, 2). It is thus clear that CILs, and the disability rights movement
more broadly conceived, have interests in common. What I am concerned with here,
however, is the way in which disability studies, as an academic field, has served as a
space in which to develop an alternative hermeneutic resource to generate beneficial
epistemic friction within the academy, and gradually within wider hermeneutic resources.
Disability studies is an interdisciplinary field that seeks to articulate new understandings
of disability, especially within the humanities.31 Linton articulates a variety of problems
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To be clear, I do not mean to conflate CILs and the disability rights movement. I
simply want to note the ways in which disability studies is related to disabled people’s political
activism and policy advocacy, and I take CILs to be an integral part of that work.
31

Linton, who provides perhaps the most complete articulation of the value of disability
studies within academic curricula, argues that applied versions of disability studies, those that
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with traditional understandings of disability in the academy, many of which support the
medicalized understanding of disability I have been discussing: individualizing disability,
constructing disability as a problem, lack or pathology, the absence of disabled
perspectives and “objectification of disabled people,” an emphasis on individual cure or
rehabilitation, and not the types of solutions disabled people have fought for, and the
“marginalization of the study of disability” (1998, 134-5). Given how pervasive ableism
is in academic scholarship and teaching, disability studies has and continues to serve as
an important site from which to contest this ableism and create new hermeneutical
resources for understanding the experiences of disabled persons. Thus, from sociological
perspectives, Oliver asks “What’s so wonderful about walking?” (2009, 28) and
Michalko asks “What does my society have against my type [that is, blind people]?”
(2002, 71). From the perspectives of philosophy and feminist theory, Margrit Shildrick
asks why “the western world and its developed counterparts should be so unsettled by
anomalous embodiment?” (2009, 1), Wendell critically interrogates both the “flight from
the rejected body” and feminism’s rejection of transcending the body (1996), and Alison
Kafer (2013) imagines alternative disabled futures. Robert McRuer, an English professor,
argues that we need to understand a “compulsory able-bodiedness” that functions
alongside and intersects with compulsory heterosexuality (2006, 2). From the perspective
of geography, Brendan Gleeson interrogates the space of disability (1999). And scholars
from a broad range of professions have written for edited volumes on specific topics
concerning disability. What all of this research has in common, however, is that it reveals
train occupational and rehabilitation therapists and healthcare workers, for example, are “Not
Disability Studies” on her definition because of the way in which they reinforce problematic
assumptions about the nature of disability. For this reason, she favors a broader liberal arts
approach to disability studies (Linton 1998, 133).
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“the ‘natural body’ [and, I would add, mind] as an ideology and a social construction
[which] brings disability back as a voice and an interlocutor in the conversation of the
meaning of humanity” (Michalko 2002, 71). In other words, disability studies provides
the space for the development of a hermeneutic resource which can contest the dominant,
ableist hermeneutic resource of medicalization; it allows for new and different
understandings of disabled persons’ experiences, and therefore questions how we
interpret the experiences of nondisabled people as well; in short, it brings beneficial
epistemic friction to the academy and gradually to wider communities.
Mental Disability
While much of the discussion in the previous section applies to mental disability,
I think it is worthwhile to focus on mentally disabled persons because of the anxiety it
seems to arouse in academic settings. Kittay writes about the birth of her mentally
disabled daughter Sesha, for example, “I was committed to a life of the mind. Nothing
mattered to me as much as to be able to reason, to reflect, to understand. […] If my life
took its meaning from thought, what kind of meaning would her life have?” (1999, 150).
Similarly, Shildrick reflects on her own work, writing, “My own failure, as yet, to
adequately address the issue of sexuality and developmental disability, for example, is
not, I suspect, a simple matter of assessing where the greater relevance to my project […]
lies, but more in the nature of a resistance to disorders of mind” (2009, 88). And in the
introduction to her book on mental disability in academia, Margaret Price writes,
“Academic discourse operates not just to omit, but to abhor mental disability—to reject
it, to stifle and expel it” (2011, 8). Thus, if academic work, including philosophy, has
investments which result in epistemic injustices committed against persons with mental
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disabilities, it is important to ask what form these injustices take and what can be done to
rectify them.
First, I should note that I adopt the term “mental disability” from Margaret Price
because of its breadth. It can include “mental illnesses,” cognitive disabilities, intellectual
disabilities, learning disabilities, and perhaps even the mental effects of other
disabilities.32 What makes these disabilities problematic in the context of this chapter is
that they seem to hinder or bar the possibility of participating in the knowledge pooling
practices with which Fricker, and to some extent Medina, are concerned. In other words,
mental disability may be a feature that hinders one’s epistemic capabilities such that
taking it into account when we assess epistemic competence may be warranted, and this
is unlike gender, race, or other identities discussed in the epistemic injustice literature,
and unlike, I have argued, physical disability. For example, if a person experiences
delusions and is therefore diagnosed with schizophrenia, it appears that others would be
justified in maintaining that it is warranted to attribute the person less credibility.
According to the DSM-V, a person diagnosed with “profound intellectual disability” has
“very limited understanding of symbolic communication in speech or gesture” (American
Psychiatric Association 2013); could others be said, then, to limit her hermeneutic
resources or assign her an unjust credibility deficit? And autism rights advocate, Jim
Sinclair, writes that an autistic child may not “respond in any way you recognize as being
part of that system [of communication]” (Sinclair 2012a, 17). Given this “communication
breakdown,” would others not be justified in thinking it is autism and not hermeneutic
resources which hinder our collective interpretations of her experiences? Considering
Price’s example, here, is “the ‘brain fog’ that attends many autoimmune diseases,
chronic pain, and chronic fatigue” (2011, 19).
32
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examples like these, I will answer these questions negatively. In most cases of mental
disability, credibility deficits are unwarranted and hermeneutic injustices are often
committed against such persons.
To see why, it is important to note that the myriad people diagnosed with mental
disabilities are very different. Though people diagnosed with intellectual disability (ID)
may all share something in common, namely their fitting certain diagnostic criteria, those
criteria are quite vague. All that is required to fit this diagnosis is a deficit in “intellectual
functions,” a deficit in “adaptive functioning,” and onset “during the developmental
period” (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Thus, differences can occur both
within and between levels of severity (mild, moderate, severe, and profound). While one
person diagnosed with mild ID may have difficulty with mathematical reasoning, another
person given the diagnosis may have difficulty with reading. And whereas a person
diagnosed with mild ID may experience difficulty with a small range of tasks, say
writing, a person diagnosed with severe ID may have difficulty with a broader range of
tasks. The same analysis could be given to any of the disabilities I am considering under
the heading of mental disability. The capacities and experiences of individuals given
these diagnoses are unique. Thus, attributing credibility deficits to mentally disabled
persons based on their diagnosis is unjustified, because it assumes that all persons who
share a diagnosis deserve equal (and usually equally low) credibility.33 Furthermore,
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Licia Carlson calls the tendencies of one member of a category to be more
representative than others of the category as a whole “prototype effects.” These prototype effects
change over time. So what is seen as most representative of intellectual disability changes over
time, and has changed since its genealogical predecessors like mental retardation and
feeblemindedness (Carlson 2010, 96-8).
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attributing generalized credibility deficits to a mentally disabled person based on a
limited range of capabilities is unjustified.
And yet, such attributions are common. Above, I already discussed Aubrecht’s
discussion of her experiences (Fabris and Aubrecht 2014). She sought therapy only for
anxiety, but the aggressive and skeptical questioning of her doctors revealed a general
distrust of her self-understanding. Moreover, their insistence that she remain on
medications undermined her trust in herself, since she experienced them as worse than
her original anxiety. Price offers some insightful examples of the ways in which teachers
attribute undue credibility deficits based on presence and participation, for example
(2011, 64-79). Students who often miss class or are often late are generally assumed to be
slackers, but such students may actually experience depression which keeps them from
getting out of bed, or anxiety that makes coming to class a difficult or even dreadful
prospect. Similarly, students who do not participate in the generally accepted ways are
often judged to be disruptive or inattentive; but a student passing notes may actually be
trying to gain insight from peers when the lesson is proceeding too quickly, or a student
who never answers questions in class may need more time than the teacher is allowing to
think through the material at hand. When teachers make such assumptions and treat their
students accordingly, this can have profound effects upon the students as knowers (the
primary epistemic harm) and upon their confidence (the secondary epistemic harm) and
their academic (and potentially non-academic) careers. At a broader social level, those
diagnosed as mentally ill often suffer testimonial injustices. For example, despite the
objections of many in the Mad Pride movement, organizations like the National Alliance
on Mental Illness (NAMI) continue to support a biological explanation of and biomedical
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responses to “mental illness” (Rembis 2014, 148). And when President Bush created the
New Freedom Commission to re-evaluate mental health services in the United States,
only one of its fifteen members had “personally experienced the mental health system”
(Lewis 2006, 348).
In academic philosophy specifically, Licia Carlson notes that many philosophers
who use (often fictional) intellectually disabled persons as examples do so without
consulting disabled persons or the disabled community. She writes, “While individuals
with profound and severe intellectual disabilities may be incapable of entering into the
conversation, there is a paucity of work that includes the voices of those with mild
intellectual disabilities” (Carlson 2010, 121). This is especially chilling given that
intellectually disabled persons are often used as cases to justify abortion, prenatal testing,
and, through comparisons to animals, animal rights.34 Appealing to examples of
intellectual disability without consulting their own experiences constitutes a testimonial
injustice which undermines intellectually disabled persons as knowers, contributes to
their treatment as inherent sufferers, and may keep them from participating in other
epistemic practices. Uses of intellectual disability in philosophy also contribute to
hermeneutical injustices by creating an unquestioned link between intellectual disability
and suffering. But as Carlson notes, when the experiences of ID persons are consulted, a
more complex understanding of intellectual disability’s relation to suffering can emerge.
For example, in mainstream philosophical discourse, the suffering experienced by
intellectually disabled persons can only be imagined as caused by the disability itself.
This obscures the ways in which suffering may in fact be caused by external factors like
34

Carlson gives a helpful overview of these trends in philosophy in her essay,
“Philosophers of Intellectual Disability: A Taxonomy” (2010).
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social attitudes, institutional mistreatment, and so on, rendering the experiences of ID
individuals unintelligible to these philosophical discussions.35
Even the common derogatory use of “retard” functions, in part, epistemically. In
an autobiographical essay, Ron Munsterman discusses how he grew up being called “Ron
the retarded” (2009, 69). This use of the word, along with others like “moron” and
“idiot,” serves to epistemically silence the speaker. When a person who is not identified
as intellectually disabled is called a retard or retarded, this means that she deserves only
as much credit from others as those with ID diagnoses, the assumption being that
intellectual disabled persons are innately deserving of less credibility. The widespread
nature of these assumptions is experienced by many people with ID diagnoses. Take, for
example, Charla Hageman’s discussion of her experience of trying to marry another
disabled person. She, along with her family and the staff at her housing and employment
agencies, met to discuss her potential marriage, and she reports, “It seemed like they were
making decisions for us. They would talk about you like you weren’t even in the room.
[…] I felt I did not have any say about how I wanted to live my life” (Hageman 2009,
49). Eventually it was agreed that Charla could marry her partner if they proved their
stability by living together for two years before getting married. Thus, while many people
who are not diagnosed as intellectually disabled decide to get married with little
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Carlson dedicates an entire chapter of her book to the topic of suffering, and so I
cannot do justice to all of her insights, here. For example, while I note the failure to interrogate
the distinction between internal and external causes of suffering, she also discusses the
differences in external sources of suffering depending on the severity of the intellectual disability.
So, for example, persons diagnosed with mild intellectual disability are more likely to suffer from
attitudinal barriers, while those with severe or profound intellectual disability may be more likely
to suffer from abuse or neglect (Carlson 2010, 169). All I aim to develop, here, is an
understanding of some of the phenomena she discusses through the framework of epistemic
injustice.
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foresight, Charla, who knew her partner for about seven years before the two-year living
agreement was reached, was not trusted to make this decision. In this way, calling
persons retards and diagnosing persons with intellectual disabilities preemptively silences
them, discredits their testimony, and makes their experiences intelligible only in terms of
individual, medical conditions.
As in the case of intellectual disability, the very diagnosis of autism often carries
epistemic consequences for the person diagnosed.36 Amy Sequenzia, who is labelled as a
“low-functioning” autistic person because she does not communicate orally, discusses the
ways in which her diagnosis and use of communication technology discredits her in the
eyes of others. She writes, for example, “I am a self-advocate and I can type my thoughts.
But at the moment I show up with my communication device and an aide, my credibility,
in the eyes of most neurotypical people, is diminished” (Sequenzia 2012, 159). Indeed,
she goes on to explain that most people assume her aide is present to speak for her, when
in fact she requires aides to help her with “everyday tasks,” while her device helps her
communicate for herself (2012, 160). While Sequenzia’s testimony is unjustly discredited
directly, by expanding the notion of testimonial injustice to include other epistemic
practices, per Hookway’s suggestion, other testimonial injustices may be revealed.
Persons diagnosed with autism are often denied entry into epistemic practices that
contribute to the development of knowledge, even when they are asked to speak. Sinclair
discusses the phenomenon of the “self-narrating zoo exhibit,” in which autistic persons
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It is important to note that those diagnosed with autism are also often diagnosed with
ID, such that considering them as mutually exclusive would be inaccurate. For my purposes, here,
I only want to note that the perception of autistic persons as lacking in sociability and empathy
leads to epistemic injustices. Since these conditions are linked to autism and not necessarily ID, it
is useful to consider them separately.
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are expected to explain their experiences to parents and professionals as a resource to
parents of autistic children, but they are not treated as people worthy of interaction in
themselves or as people with interpretations of their experiences that may counter
medicalized understandings of autism as an individual tragedy (2012, 55). In Fricker’s
terms, autistic people tend to be treated as sources of information but not as informants
by non-autistic people; they can help others understand the experiences of autistic people
generally, but they cannot contest the biomedical understanding of autism, nor are they
seen as worthy of knowing as persons. An anonymous contributor to the Loud Hands
Project describes another instance of epistemic injustice: she was placed in a “special-ed
high school” for “fighting” and her principal tried to convince her not to take a
“mainstream” Spanish course. “He said it was too ‘difficult’ for a special-ed student, and
I didn’t need a language. I only needed the lesser diploma that doesn’t get you into
college” (Anonymous 2012, 154). She went on to earn a Master’s degree. The principal
discredits her in two ways, here, first by assuming that the course will be too difficult
simply because of her label as a special-ed student, and second, by assuming that even if
she could pass the class it was not worth it to try since she would not be going on to
attend college anyway. In this way, her difficulties with speech and sensory sensitivities
were generalized by the label of “special education” to discredit her knowledge and her
future epistemic potential. Autistic persons are also commonly subject to hermeneutical
injustices through assumptions about their social skills. Elizabeth J. Grace explains a
situation in her graduate school education when a prominent autism researcher said, “By
definition, a person with autism does not know what it means ‘for life to be like
something for someone,’ so she cannot possibly get the concept of what it is like to be
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herself,” based on research in Theory of Mind which posits that autistic persons lack a
theory of mind (2012, 142). In other words, the assumption that autistic persons cannot
empathize with or understand the thoughts and feelings of others37 bars any interpretation
of autistic experience as empathic, social, or concerned for others; the professor
mentioned in Grace’s story even suggests that autistic people have no understanding of
their own sense of self. In this way, autistic persons face barriers in developing
interpretations of their own experiences and in communicating those interpretations to
non-autistic persons. Because of assumptions about autistic persons’ lack of sociability,
for example, the idea of an “autistic community” becomes an oxymoron, and friendship
with or between autistic persons becomes unintelligible. Indeed, Sinclair explains that in
the process of forming Autism Network International, he was discredited as a member of
the autistic community by non-autistic persons, especially “experts,” precisely because he
was seeking to express himself, form a community, and engage in other activities seen as
inconsistent with biomedical understandings of autism (2012b, 34-5). Winter shares a
similar experience in which she is told that as a high-functioning autistic person, she
cannot speak on behalf of low-functioning autistic persons. The irony here, of course, is
that experts who are diagnosed with no form of autism are trusted to speak on their behalf
(Winter 2012, 119-20). All of this contributes to the hermeneutic injustice of closing off
all non-medical interpretations of autistic persons’ experiences.
As in the other cases of epistemic injustice discussed in the previous subsection,
addressing these problems will require both epistemic virtues exercised in interpersonal
37

As Penni Winter notes, this assumption is a sloppy one that often fails to take into
account the distinction between cognitive empathy, or the ability to pick up on non-verbal cues to
recognize others’ emotional states, and affective empathy, or the emotional responses one has to
knowledge of others’ emotions (2012, 118).
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interactions as well as spaces in which new interpretations of mentally disabled persons’
experiences can be created and from which those interpretations can be expressed to
generate beneficial epistemic friction in broader communities. To be sure, testimonial and
hermeneutical justice in these cases may require new skills in correcting for credibility
deficits and being open to new interpretations of mentally disabled persons’ lives. In
academic settings, for example, teachers may need to set aside assumptions about what
presence and participation mean for students. Price suggests that when designing courses
instructors should structure them with access in mind, rather than accommodation. While
accommodation assumes that there is a problem faced by an individual that needs to be
fixed, leaving the course structure mostly unchanged, improving the access of a course is
to design it such that it is “flexible, multi-modal, and responsive to feedback” (Price
2011, 130). For example, “We can open as many different channels of communication as
possible, in hopes that at least one will be accessible enough for a given student to use it,
and trust that our own attitudes will have much to [do] with student response” (2011, 89).
To be clear, Price is not suggesting here that teachers extend themselves beyond their
means. Instead, she is noting that different instructors have different skills and
preferences that may be more beneficial for some students and less so for others. If all
instructors opened their range of communication styles to those they find comfortable,
this would create a range of channels of communication both in individual courses and
between classes such that students would have maximum ability to choose those styles of
communication that best suit them. For example, some students may find online
discussion boards to be the most helpful, while others may prefer face-to-face
communications; some may prefer agonistic environments and others may prefer
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cooperative interactions. The point is not to be accessible to all of these modes of
participation and presence in each course, but to define participation and presence widely
enough within courses and between courses so that as many students can benefit as
possible. Medical professionals also need to open themselves to the testimony of
mentally disabled patients, whether that means taking concerns about the side-effects of a
medication seriously or considering potential solutions to the problems patients express
outside of biomedical treatments. Autism, because it includes difficulties in normalized
forms of communication, offers a special case of the need for testimonial justice. As
James Sinclair explains, because autistic persons are foreign to shared systems of
communication, taking them seriously means “[y]ou’re going to have to learn to back up
to levels more basic than you’ve probably thought about before, to translate, and to check
to make sure your translations are understood. You’re going to have to […] let your child
teach you a little of her language, guide you a little way into his world” (2012a, 17).
Thus, while testimonial justice in the case of mental disability may require challenges
that are unique compared to other forms of testimonial justice, it is certainly possible.
Addressing hermeneutical injustices may require imagining otherwise with regard
to the experiences of mentally disabled persons. Kafer provides an example of this in the
case of Ashley X, the girl diagnosed as “permanently unabled” who was given what has
become known as the “Ashley Treatment,” which consists of the removal of breast buds,
a hysterectomy, and estrogen patches which accelerates puberty leading to a forty percent
reduction in predicted weight and twenty percent reduction in predicted height
(pillowangel.org 2012).38 As Kafer notes, in justifying this “Treatment,” Ashley’s doctors
Each of these aspects of the “Treatment” is justified as having both direct benefits and
additional, indirect benefits. For example, the primary “benefit” of removing the breast buds is
38
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and parents and other advocates mentioned the myriad sources of potential pain that
Ashley might face without the “Treatment,” but “[i]t is seemingly inconceivable to
imagine Ashley’s body—her disabled female body—as the source of any sensation other
than pain” (2013, 65). Indeed, severing the link between mental disability and suffering
in the mainstream hermeneutic resource would be an important form of hermeneutic
justice generally. Other examples of hermeneutic justice might include being open to
treatment alternatives outside of institutionalization and pharmaceutical treatments,
which many in the Mad Pride movement and other survivors of the mental health system
have come to understand as a form of “chemical constraint” (Fabris and Aubrecht 2014).
Such alternatives might include peer-run services (Lewis 2006), or even the formation of
alternative spaces or communities (Ben-Moshe 2014). Currently it seems there is no such
room for interpretations of mentally disabled experiences like this, however, in the
mainstream hermeneutical resource.
Multiplying the interpretive resources for understanding mental disability in this
way cannot depend upon the nondisabled alone, however. As discussed in the previous
subsection, developing spaces in which new understandings of mentally disabled
persons’ experiences can emerge is critical to the creation of beneficial epistemic friction
in the hermeneutic resources of their wider communities. Organizations of intellectually
disabled persons, like People First of Tennessee, have developed new understandings of

preventing the future pain of predicted large breasts, and a secondary “benefit” is that it “avoids
sexualization towards caregiver[s]” (pillowangel.org 2012). As Kafer explains, it is unclear why
the imagined large breasts are only considered a source of potential pain and not a source of
potential pleasure. I would add that it is unclear why the imagined pain of imagined large breasts
is given more weight than the pain caused by the treatment itself. Kafer is also critical of the
claim that having small, undeveloped breasts would make Ashley X any less likely to be abused
(2013, 64-5).
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the current and potential experiences of intellectual disability (Friedman and Beckwith
2014); the Mad Pride movement in general and particular organizations like the Center
for Mental Health Services and Mindfreedom have been important sites for gaining new
understandings of the experiences of “mentally ill” persons and imagining new
alternatives to living with “mental illness” (Lewis 2006, Rembis 2014, Fabris and
Aubrecht 2014); the Autism Network International and the Loud Hands Projects provided
a space in which to develop, and resources to disseminate, new understandings of the
experiences and lives of Autistic persons, understandings which challenge the biomedical
model of autism which understands autism as a personal tragedy rather than a different
set of ways of experiencing the world that leads to oppression by a normalizing society
(Bascom 2012, Sinclair 2012b).39
With all of this in mind, however, there are persons whose testimony or
interpretations of their own experiences may very well never go beyond expressions of
likes or dislikes, pleasures or pains, if even these are expressed. This likely includes
persons diagnosed with profound intellectual disability or “Level 3” autism, for example
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). Eva Kittay’s daughter Sesha, who I discuss in
more detail in the next chapter, and Ashley X, are likely examples given the descriptions
we have of their behaviors and experiences. What would it mean to be testimonially or

39

One such development is a profound reversal of normal understandings of autism.
Sinclair writes, “Each of us who does learn to talk to you, each of us who manages to function at
all in your society, each of us who manages to reach out and make a connection with you, is
operating in alien territory, making contact with alien beings. We spend our entire lives doing
this. And then you tell us that we can’t relate” (2012a, 18). In other words, Sinclair suggests,
maybe it is “normal” people who have difficulty communicating with autistic people and not vice
versa.

91

hermeneutically just in one’s interactions with such persons? I believe there are at least
four considerations to keep in mind, here.
First, others should be open to the expressions of pleasure and pain, preferences
and dislikes of even the most severely disabled persons and take them seriously. Such
expressions are, after all, means of sharing information about experiences. Treating a
disabled person’s pleasure or pain as less worthy of consideration is also a way of
disregarding her testimony about her experiences. Or disregarding a disabled person’s
musical preferences, for example, also places one’s own testimony above hers. Whatever
such persons express, however limited in scope it may be, should be taken seriously. But
this principle is not likely to carry nondisabled persons very far in determining how to
respond to those with severe intellectual disabilities.
Second, then, it is important to be open to the testimony and interpretations given
by others who are close to severely intellectually disabled persons. Others who are
disabled but expressive and are institutionalized alongside severely disabled persons or
are given similar medical treatments may very well have insights into the experiences of
their more severely disabled peers.40 Such persons may also be more open to listening to
severely disabled others as a result of their own experiences of being silenced or shared
coping techniques. Grace explains an example of a “man who said everything through
lines from famous movies, television shows and commercials” (2012, 142). Because she
was willing to listen, she understood that he was using these quotations to communicate,

40

I cannot emphasize enough, however, that I am not suggesting that the experiences of
these two groups are equivalent. My only intent is to suggest that persons subject to similar
treatments are more likely than physicians, professionals, or others who have never interacted
with severely disabled persons to understand those experiences which are shared. Any
generalization about parallels beyond this must be made very cautiously.
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not repeating them randomly, and was able to convince his staff such that they gained
limited communication with him. Here is an example of Medina’s suggestion that
oppressed persons are more likely to develop epistemic virtues. Because of her own
experiences, Grace was open-minded and diligent about other autistic persons’ attempts
to speak in ways that non-autistic people were not. Similarly, others who work with or
care for severely intellectually disabled persons may be in a better position than others to
understand their experiences. Carlson discusses this suggestion in detail as a “spectrum of
certainty” (2010, 178). For example, the caregiver who works closely and frequently with
a disabled person is likely to have a better understanding of the person’s life than a
medical professional who only interacts with the person in short appointments and
understands the persons experiences through only biomedical diagnostic and treatment
schemes. Still because the doctor does have this knowledge, she would be situated higher
on the spectrum of certainty41 than the armchair philosopher who has not interacted with
the person (or even other disabled persons). Eva Kittay makes a similar point, suggesting
that caregivers are likely to have particular knowledge of their severely disabled charges
that others, including medical professionals, do not (1999, 169-70). However, these
evaluations must be made cautiously. Though others subject to similar treatment may
tend to have more insight into the experiences of severely disabled persons, their
experiences may differ widely. And though caregivers may better understand the
experiences of those they care for, they may in fact be radically closed to their
experiences or project their own concerns, feelings, or experiences onto them.42 For
41

Of course, there is no absolute certainty in such cases; but then again, when is there?

42

Licia Carlson develops this concern in her book, The Faces of Intellectual Disability
(2010, 187, 190-1).
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example, returning to Ashley X, it is quite conceivable to interpret her parents’ concerns
as reflecting their own preferences more than an empathic imagining-with what her
preferences and interests might be. Another parent, Joann Hagen, expresses concerns
similar to those of Ashley’s parents, explaining that she wanted her daughter, who was
diagnosed with aphasia, to receive an “endometrial ablation,” the cauterization of the
uterine lining which prevents eggs from implanting. In discussing her reasoning, she
writes, “I did not even want to consider how she would conceive a child!” (Hagen 2009,
56). To be clear, I do not mean to comment on whether or not her daughter should indeed
be able to conceive, especially if she is indeed unable to communicate consent. Given her
discussion of the issue, however, it seems that Hagen’s understanding of what is in her
daughter’s interest is actually a result of her discomfort with thinking of her daughter
engaging in sexual activity. Thus, while it may be useful to think of epistemic justice for
persons with severe intellectual disabilities as including others on a spectrum of certainty,
it is important to remain cautious about such attributions, especially in cases where the
prejudices of the others are likely to influence their interpretations.
Third, the development of epistemic capabilities should be fostered to the greatest
possible extent. History is filled with examples of mentally disabled persons who,
because of assumptions about their epistemic capabilities, were subject to testimonial and
hermeneutical injustices which limited their development as epistemic subjects. The
practice of institutionalizing children with Down syndrome, as Michael Bérubé notes,
surely contributed to their limited epistemic achievements for decades as they were
confined to environments that did nothing to support the acquisition of knowledge and
epistemic skills. He writes,
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Right through the 70s, […] it was pronounced by the best-trained medical
practitioners in the world, who told families of kids with Down’s that their
children would never be able to walk, talk, dress themselves, or recognize their
parents. […] Only the most stubborn, intransigent, or inspired parents resisted
such advice from their trusted experts. […] It’s impossible to say how deeply
we’re indebted to those parents, children, teachers, and medical personnel who
insisted on treating people with Down’s as if they could learn, as if they could
lead ‘meaningful’ lives. (Bérubé 1996)
Being epistemically just in interactions with mentally disabled people requires an
openness to new epistemic capabilities, even if they do not develop on a “normal”
timeline. Speaking specifically of autism, Winter calls this “maximisation” to distinguish
it from normalization, because the goal, in her view, should be to develop the capabilities
of autistic persons as autistic persons, rather than forcing them to conform to non-autistic,
neurotypical standards (2012, 116). A similar caution is appropriate for all interactions
with mentally disabled persons: others should be open to their knowledge and
interpretations regardless of its limits and in as many communicative methods as
possible. If, for example, a person communicates through quotations, as in Grace’s
example discussed above, taking these attempts at communication seriously may result
not only in immediate forms of epistemic justice, but also the development of greater
epistemic and communicative capabilities. Persons who do not communicate orally may
be able to communicate through gestures or the use of communication devices, and
providing these options is a form of epistemic justice which allows them to provide
testimony, share interpretations of their experiences and develop these interpretations
with others, and to develop epistemic capabilities that would have otherwise remained
unattainable. Indeed, given frequent advancements in technology, the developments of
new forms of therapy, and other changes in understanding disability, it becomes more
and more likely that at least modest epistemic capabilities are possible for most persons,
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and to deny anyone access to these resources would constitute epistemic injustice. It is
important to resist institutionalization and recognize the limits of medical knowledge to
foster the development of epistemic skills for as many persons as possible.
That having been said, there are important qualifications that need to be made.
First, because of current models of service provision and inequitable distribution of
resources, following the imperative to foster epistemic capabilities is a thoroughly
political affair. If family members, legal custodians, or service providers are not provided
adequate resources, it is unrealistic to expect them to be constantly open to those they
care for as they will likely be overwhelmed with concerns about physical health,
finances, finding time to care for themselves, and so on. Thus, it is likely that wealthy
caretakers will be most able to act on this imperative. Fostering epistemic justice for
mentally disabled individuals, then, will surely require fighting for economic and
political justice, through myriad changes like higher standards for service provision,
better pay for caretakers, subsidized service provision and devices to increase access to
them, inclusive settings in schools and care facilities, and so on. Second, even with the
best means available, it is likely that there will still be persons who will not develop the
epistemic capabilities of others, such that they have no knowledge to share, form no
interpretations of their own experiences, and develop no epistemic virtues (or vices). So
while I want to suggest fostering the development of epistemic capabilities in all to the
greatest extent possible, it is also necessary to accept mentally disabled persons as they
are. Writing about her daughter, Sesha, Kittay criticizes the sole aim of independence,
writing,
I fear that the stress on independence reinstates Sesha as less than fully human.
With every embrace, I know her humanity. And it has no more to do with
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independence than it has to do with being able to read Spinoza. So when we think
of mothering a disabled child as enabling and fostering development, we must
also reconceive development, not only toward independence, but toward whatever
capacities are there to be developed. Development for Sesha means the
enhancement of her capacities to experience joy. (1999, 173)
We could easily replace “independence” in this quotation with “epistemic capabilities.”
Accepting mentally disabled persons as they are while remaining open to their attempts
to share information or interpretations is important to avoid the tentative understanding of
disability. As Campbell writes, “[P]ositioning disability as tentative conjures up the
notion of disability in waiting, disability standing in reserve for technologies that can
restore wholeness. This view of disablement has the potential to realign social planning
away from a focus on ‘care’ to that of ‘cure’” (2009, 44). Thus, emphasizing the constant
possibility of development may end up reinscribing the discourse of medicalization
which I have been at pains to reject in this chapter. It will be important, then, to balance
fostering epistemic capabilities with both a recognition that the development of epistemic
capabilities (and indeed, what counts as an epistemic capability) depends on influences
outside of an individual’s biology, and with an acceptance of individuals as they are at
the current moment regardless of their epistemic capabilities or signs of development.
But in emphasizing this last point I am moving beyond the realm of epistemic injustice, at
least on the narrow understanding developed by Fricker, and into the realm of finding
meaning in lives often thought to be meaningless. For this, I turn to Kristeva in the next
chapter.
Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that the framework of epistemic injustice can be
usefully extended to disabled persons, and that doing so is useful because it identifies a

97

unique form of oppression. But the framework is limited. Fricker’s understanding of
testimonial injustice focuses on the exchange of information rather than broader
epistemic practices (as Hookway suggests). And hermeneutical injustice as she develops
it—and indeed, the revisions made by those critical of Fricker’s account—emphasize the
social group as unified by a set of hermeneutical resources. In these ways, the framework
may be unable to describe injustices against persons who are limited in their capacities
for sharing information or for forming socially shared understandings of their
experiences. It also fails to provide an explanation of the deeper psychic reasons for why
epistemic injustice (and other forms of injustice) occurs. In my view, Kristevan
psychoanalysis provides a remedy. In particular, Kristeva’s theory of language helps to
reveal a form of hermeneutical injustice, and a corresponding form of attentiveness, that
occurs at the interpersonal level rather than the more broadly social level.43 Moreover,
her discussion of the narcissistic wound in relation to disability reveals a psychic
explanation for epistemic injustice, and, I will argue, it points toward “interaction” as the
form of resistance best suited to counter disability oppression.

Of course, the distinction between “interpersonal” and “social” is not a clear one. What
I have in mind, however, is that the form of hermeneutical attentiveness I develop in the next
chapter is an attempt to make and share meaning at the level of the individual in interaction with
others. When Fricker, Medina, and perhaps others discuss hermeneutical injustice, they are
concerned with interpretive resources of social groups with shared identities, even when these are
very particular, small, or marginalized groups. I want to argue, however, that there are
interpretations to be given to individuals’ lives and experiences which are not (necessarily) based
on social identities even if they are necessarily social (that is, interpersonal). Therefore, even
persons with severe mental disabilities (that is, those who cannot develop understandings of
shared group experiences) participate in forming these interpretations.
43
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Meaning: Kristeva and Interaction

The previous chapter aimed to develop an understanding of the epistemic aspects
of disability oppression, and to gesture toward forms of resistance to epistemic injustices.
In this chapter, I turn to the work of Julia Kristeva. By reading her recent work on
disability through her earlier texts, I aim to develop two threads to contribute to an
understanding of disability oppression. First, I argue for a form of listening that is
responsive to disabled persons, especially the severely mentally disabled that the
framework of epistemic injustice developed in the first chapter does not address. Second,
I argue for an account of disability oppression that reveals the psychic underpinnings of
the epistemic injustices discussed in the previous chapter.
In two essays, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and…Vulnerability” and “A Tragedy
and a Dream: Disability Revisited,” Julia Kristeva presents a novel view of disability and
the exclusions faced by disabled persons. Her self-described aim is to work toward a new
humanism, one that is not founded on the liberal (that is to say, autonomous, rational,
independent) subject, but on an understanding of subjects as vulnerable, heterogeneous,
and dependent. One way she expresses this aim is the source of her essay’s title: “By
adding a fourth term (vulnerability) to the humanism inherited from the Enlightenment
(liberty, equality, fraternity), analytic listening inflects these three toward a concern for
sharing, in which, and thanks to which, desire and its twin, suffering, make their way
toward a constant renewal of the self, the other, and connection” (Kristeva 2012, 42). In
other words, when the vulnerability of every human subject is taken seriously, the
political link, thought here in terms of liberty, equality, and fraternity will be changed.
Liberty and equality, for example, must take into account human dependence. In this
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chapter, I will discuss what it means to take vulnerability into account and the resistances
to doing so. Because the essays on disability are intended for more general audiences,
they make reference to concepts from Kristeva’s broader oeuvre without always
explicitly explaining them, so this chapter will draw from Kristeva’s other works where
necessary. Specifically, Kristeva’s concept of the “speaking being” will help explain her
contention that even severely disabled subjects are capable of sharing meaning, while her
concept of the “abject” will be helpful in understanding her view of disability, as will her
use of Freud’s concept of the “uncanny.” I will then assess certain criticisms of
Kristeva’s position made by Jan Grue in his sustained analysis, “Kristeva and the
Rhetorics of Disability,” and move on to articulate a Kristevan account of disability that
develops, in my view, the strongest reading of Kristeva’s essays. Before moving on to
these topics, however, I want to note that a handful of disability studies scholars have
recently sought to integrate psychoanalysis into a field that, for understandable reasons,
has been largely resistant to this discourse. These thinkers appeal to Lacan, however, not
Kristeva.
Lacanian Analyses, or Why Kristeva?
Dan Goodley and Margrit Shildrick have both recently given psychoanalytic
analyses of disability using Lacan. They draw especially on Lacan’s account of the mirror
stage to account for why disabled persons are experienced as sources of anxiety,
particularly to nondisabled others. According to Lacan, the infant’s body is fragmented,
chaotic, and undifferentiated from the mother (Shildrick 2009, 90); this is the “real” for
Lacan (Goodley 2011, 124). In the mirror stage, however, the child misrecognizes herself
and others in her mirrored reflection. This means that an external representation of the
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child becomes the fantasized unity of the fragmented body, and that the representation of
the child as distinct from the other in the mirror becomes the fantasized separation of the
child from others. These fantasies lead to a disavowal of the fragmented body and its
undifferentiated relation to its others (Goodley 2011, 125, Shildrick 2009, 90). But as a
result of these fantastic formations, the child forms an “alienating identity,” an image of
herself and her relation to her others that she can never really attain, as she is in fact
always fragmentary and never completely differentiated from others; she becomes, in
other words, an always lacking subject (Goodley 2011, 126). This is important for
disability studies because the result is rejection, avoidance, and disavowal of disabled
others because disability reminds subjects of the fragmentary and undifferentiated real
they repressed through the misrecognitions of the mirror stage, threatening the fragile
identities these processes established (Shildrick 2009, 92). Specifically, disabilities can
disturb this imaginary wholeness both through their lack of wholeness, autonomy, or
invulnerability or through excesses which threaten to disturb the boundaries of the
subject. Thus, these lacks and excesses are projected onto disabled others in an attempt to
shore up the identities of nondisabled subjects. And this double movement of projecting
lack onto disabled others while disavowing the vulnerability of nondisabled persons leads
to an ambivalence in responses: curiosity about and dismissal of disabled persons,
nurturing of and expressing aggression toward disabled persons, or sexualizing disability
and figuring it as grotesque (Goodley 2011, 130). In other words, disability is both
necessary to the identity of nondisabled persons as that which is disavowed and a
constant threat to the identity of nondisabled persons as the return of the repressed lack
that must remain repressed to stabilize that identity.
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Given that this work has been done, why look to Kristeva? First, I want to make
clear that I do not see these Lacanian accounts as being in direct conflict with the
Kristevan account I develop below. In other words, though I think each provides different
resources, I am not claiming that Kristeva’s should replace these accounts. However, I do
think that the account I develop here provides different resources for thinking about
disability and responding to the exclusion of disabled persons. First, this is because
Kristeva herself has written about disability. Second, her innovations in psychoanalytic
theory—namely her incorporation of the semiotic into her theory of language, her
development of the concept of abjection, and her re-theorization of the uncanny and
narcissism—offer tools for understanding disability oppression that the Lacanian
accounts do not. To see why, let us first turn to Kristeva’s account of language.
Sharing Meaning: Semiotic and Symbolic
In “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and…Vulnerability,” Kristeva discusses the
example of John, a schizophrenic person who is the subject of the film People Say I’m
Crazy. In this documentary, John’s art is made public, and the money he makes from
selling this art affords him things (a more independent living situation, for example) that
he did not have before. The story is sold as a success, one person’s journey from isolation
to integration. But Kristeva is skeptical of this supposed success. For her, John is
integrated into a system of exchange (of money and artistic objects), but he is not given
the opportunity to interact, to share meaning with others, and thus to be reborn.1 This
means, for Kristeva, that the “question of the subject is not raised” here (Kristeva 2012,
1

As will become clear below, for Kristeva, the subject is never stable, but is always
becoming, always being renewed through the interaction of the semiotic and the symbolic, the
unconscious and the conscious. Thus, to be reborn is to be renewed as a subject through a rearticulation of one’s psyche, especially in relation to others.
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31). Kristeva goes on to specify that a constitutive feature of the “subject” is its
remaining “open to a search for meaning and sharing,” a search which she claims is
possible even for persons with severe disabilities (2012, 32). Because interaction
acknowledges a subject, and a subject is capable of making and sharing meaning, it will
be necessary to briefly investigate what Kristeva means by “meaning” in order to
understand what is missing from integration.2
To better understand Kristeva’s use of meaning, let us turn to her much earlier
work, Revolution in Poetic Language. Her stated goal in this work is to develop a theory
of language that combines aspects of both a Husserlian phenomenological account of
language and a psychoanalytic account of language. This is accomplished by her
distinction between two poles of the signifying process, the semiotic and the symbolic.
The semiotic is the unconscious aspect of language, the irruption of drive energy into
signs. The symbolic is the realm of communicative language in which meaning is
explicitly intended and articulated. Especially in the context of the arguments here, it is
important to note that this language could take many forms, including spoken, written,
and sign language. Importantly, Kristeva tells us that the semiotic both “logically and
chronologically precedes […] the symbolic” (1984, 41). Though all language is the result
of a tension between the semiotic and the symbolic, the semiotic is what developmentally
precedes and makes symbolic articulation possible in each subject. It is through cries,
coos, flailings, and other gestures resulting from discharging drives that the subject will
eventually learn to communicate in symbolic language. The semiotic is what logically
It is important to note that the French intégration, like the English “integration,” is
closely related to “assimilation” in reference to social policy. Thus, Kristeva’s hesitancy about the
language of intégration parallels Medina’s concerns about integration discussed in the previous
chapter. Thanks to Mary Beth Mader for pointing this out to me.
2
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precedes the symbolic, because without semiotic drive energy there would be nothing for
the subject to communicate. (That is, if an infant had no frustrations or joys, there would
be no reason to enter into symbolic language.) Though there are certain modes of
expression that privilege one pole over the other (e.g., abstract mathematics is dominated
by the symbolic while music is dominated by the semiotic), all language is the result of a
tension between both poles. Semiotic drives find their way into symbolic language, and
the symbolic shapes and seeks to give meaning to the drives. Thus, while the semiotic
may be said to be “‘outside of’ or ‘prior to’ meaning proper,” it must be understood as
contributing to meaning (Keltner 2011, 22). In speech, one can imagine the difference in
meaning caused by intonation and speed of a symbolic statement like “I love this song.”
Stated slowly and in monotone, it would mean something very different (maybe boredom
or disingenuousness) than if it were said rapidly and with rising intonation (say,
enthusiasm). Noëlle McAfee provides a helpful example from a text, James Joyce’s
Ulysses. In the passage she considers, the character Molly says “after that long kiss I
nearly lost my breath,” but the text uses more than the conventional sense of the
colloquialism “lost my breath” to convey this meaning (McAfee 2004, 16-18). The text
itself contains no punctuation and changes topics and time periods rapidly. These
syntactical variations (or perhaps more properly, violations of commonly accepted
syntax) give meaning to the passage in a manner different from a simple semantic
meaning-conveyance. One feels breathless as they read the passage, more than simply
understanding that Molly felt out of breath because her words tell the reader so.
Meaning for Kristeva, then, is a production of the interaction of the semiotic and
the symbolic. The semiotic bursts into symbolic language; the symbolic gives shape to
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the semiotic and yet is incapable of fully capturing it such that there is always an excess.
This dialectical interaction is the site of the subject’s emergence and re-emergence, on
Kristeva’s view, which is why she refers to the subject as a “speaking being” and as a
“subject in process/on trial [le sujet en procès]”3 throughout her works. The subject is a
continual accomplishment and one formed through language. And importantly, this is
always achieved through relations with (real or imaginary) others. The subject articulates
itself in relation to others, and the symbolic is itself only possible because of a shared
social language.
What can this tell us, then, about the case of disability? Consider first the example
of John. One may think that because John was expressing himself in visual art, that he
had found an outlet for semiotic drives in his creative practices. The problem is that these
creations are treated as simply objects produced and sold, given no more meaning than
objects establishing his capacity for greater financial independence. For Kristeva,
allowing John to “speak of his anxieties and desires or the exclusion in which ‘people’
wall him up” would be to acknowledge him as a subject capable of creating and sharing
meaning (2012, 31). In other words, to share meaning would be to allow his semiotic
drives to generate new meanings by emerging in, and disrupting, the shared symbolic
which currently excludes his experiences. Instead, the symbolic is left secure by
integrating him only into the symbolic realm of exchange.
Kristeva’s theory of meaning is also helpful in explaining her conviction that even
persons with severe disabilities are capable of searching for and sharing meaning.

“Le sujet en procès” is translated as “the subject in process/on trial” because it has the
double sense of being in process—that is, undergoing change—and being “under legal duress,” or
in this case being subject to the Symbolic (McAfee 2004, 38).
3
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Consider the example of Sesha, Eva Kittay’s daughter who she discusses in Love’s
Labor. She writes of Sesha:
I am awakening and her babbling-brook giggles penetrate my semi-conscious
state. Hands clapping. Sesha is listening to ‘The Sound of Music.’ Peggy, her
caregiver of twenty-three years, has just walked in and Sesha can hardly contain
her desire to throw her arms around Peggy and give Peggy her distinctive kiss
[…]. The starry-eyed far away look as she listens to Elvis crooning ‘Love Me
Tender,’ the excitement of her entire soul […] in the choral ode of Beethoven’s
Ninth Symphony, and the pleasure of bestowing her kisses and receiving caresses
in turn. (1999, 150-151)
Sesha cannot use symbolic language in any of its normally acknowledged forms (i.e.,
written, spoken, or sign language), and yet given Kittay’s description it would be difficult
to say that she does not convey meaning. I would like to argue that this is because Kittay
has learned to listen to the semiotic—the giggles, the claps, the hugs and kisses that burst
forth, the calm longing that overcomes her, the echolalias and tones that, for Kristeva,
precede the development of the symbolic even in the “normal” subject. And in this way,
Sesha, Kittay, Peggy, and others close to Sesha have together constituted Sesha’s
gestures as a limited version of symbolic language. After all, hugs and kisses and to some
extent even clapping are learned gestures with fairly clearly delimited meanings.
Moreover, if this were not the case, then it would appear that Sesha could not be a subject
on Kristeva’s view, insofar as a subject emerges in the dialectical interaction of the
semiotic and the symbolic. It seems to me, however, that Sesha does have a very limited
symbolic capacity, while her communication is largely constituted by the semiotic (as is
every human’s prior to the development of complex symbolic capacities and in certain
practices like poetic language). Thus, while Sesha’s meanings may be dominated by
drives and affects, she can still be said to be creating and sharing meanings. Indeed, those
meanings result from a semiotic origin that many fail to listen to, a semiotic discourse
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that we in the West may have largely lost with the focus on the symbolic. Thus, I am
arguing that looking to examples like Sesha’s prompt both (a) a widening of the symbolic
to include those expressions with clearly delineated meanings even if they are, say, nonpropositional or non-verbal, and (b) a sensitivity to the meaning of semiotic expressions4
often lost in the focus on and reliance upon verbal communication. Indeed, this reveals
the fluidity of the boundary between the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic is
already interpretable, and the symbolic brings the semiotic into shared language.
By bringing the body and unconscious into the process of meaning creation and
sharing, Kristeva is able to include even severely disabled persons in the realm of
subjects as speaking beings. In this way, Kristeva’s theory of language helps to reveal a
specific form of epistemic injustice that goes beyond the concepts summarized in the first
chapter. This is a form of hermeneutical injustice, I want to claim, because it involves
interpretive resources. But unlike the treatment of hermeneutical injustice in the literature
discussed in Chapter 1, the interpretive resources at issue are not those of a whole society
or subgroups within that society; rather, they are the resources at work in interpersonal,
intimate relations. I will discuss Kristeva’s use of the term “intimate” in the next chapter
in greater detail, but for now it will suffice to say that “intimate” for Kristeva signifies the
relationship between the unconscious and consciousness as it is articulated in relation to
particular others. Thus, I will call the type of epistemic injustice discussed here intimate
hermeneutical injustice, which is the injustice committed by those who are inattentive to
the semiotic dimension of communication, particularly when there is a prejudice at work
Here I want to play on the ambiguity of the term “expression.” Used on way, expression
refers to a putting into words, that is, verbal articulation in the symbolic. Another sense, though,
is that of revealing, especially affects, through non-verbal means, as in “facial expression” or
“expressing sadness” in music or moans.
4

107

about the meaninglessness of the speaker’s behaviors. To be sure, the victims of this type
of injustice are not only those with severe mental disabilities—all communication on
Kristeva’s view has a semiotic component. Because the symbolic language of such
persons is limited, however, and they are therefore left out of other accounts of epistemic
injustice, the severely mentally disabled have been the illustrative case.
But I find in Kristeva another resource for understanding disability oppression. In
her essays about disability, she provides a psychic explanation for why the nondisabled
exclude disabled persons, and thus an explanation for the types of epistemic injustice
discussed so far in this dissertation. To understand her thesis, it will be helpful to
interpret her essays on disability with the resources of her earlier works. This is what I
turn to in the next section.
Disability: Abject or Uncanny?
Kristeva begins “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and…Vulnerability” with a
discussion of the singularity5 of disabled subjects. There are multiple and diverse
disabilities, she notes, and each disabled person is singular because he or she experiences
“his or her situation in a specific, different, unique way” (Kristeva 2012, 30).6 And yet,
disabled persons “confront us with incomparable exclusion” because “the disabled person
opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled; he inflicts a threat
of physical or psychical death, fear of collapse, and beyond that, the anxiety of seeing the
I discuss Kristeva’s understanding of “singularity” in relation to “genius” in the next
chapter. For the purposes of this chapter it should be sufficient to understand singularity as the
specificity of each subject. Each subject has a unique history, for Kristeva, but each subject is
also composed of a shared psychic structure that makes this absolutely unique history sharable or
communicable.
5

6

This, as I discuss below, is worth remembering especially given the criticisms made by
Kristeva’s critics, especially Grue, who claims that Kristeva makes disability monolithic.
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very borders of the human species explode” (Kristeva 2012, 30 original emphasis). That
is, what allows us to refer to this multiplicity of singular subjects as “disabled” is their
shared experiences of exclusion, and this exclusion results from the threat of a narcissistic
wound others experience in encounters with them. Here, Kristeva does not detail what
she means by this “narcissistic identity wound,” but it resonates with Kristeva’s concept
of the “abject” and her use of Freud’s “uncanny.” It may be helpful, then, to make a brief
digression to better understand Kristeva’s insights.
Kristeva introduces the concept of abjection to offer a pre-Oedipal account of
splitting that must occur before the formation of a stable subject and its stable objects.7
Whereas an object supports a subject—that is, it reveals the subject’s detachment and
autonomy—“[t]he abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I”
(Kristeva 1982, 1). In other words, the abject is a non-object splitting from (but never
completely split from) the subject-to-be. There is no relation to the abject other than
differentiation (via expulsion or rejection). Developmentally, abjection is the “violent,
clumsy breaking away” from the “maternal entity” upon which the not-yet-I depends for
life, and yet from which it must separate to become a subject (Kristeva 1982, 15).8 That
is, abjection is a transitional stage of differentiation between the non-differentiation of the
not-yet-subject9 and the not-yet-object (the maternal), and the differentiation of the

7

There is not space here, nor is it necessary to my project, to detail the Oedipal figure of
psychoanalysis and Kristeva’s departure from it. What is important for my purposes is the
distinction of the abject from the desired object finally achieved through the Oedipal negotiation.
8

See also Beardsworth 2004 and Oliver 1993a for clear and helpful discussions of
abjection as a developmental necessity in the constitution of the subject. Both also provide clear
explanations of how Kristeva’s abject differs from the Freudian and Lacanian Oedipal stories.
9

I use subject-to-be and not-yet-subject interchangeably, here.

109

subject and its objects. The subject-to-be is struggling to make a space for itself within
the maternal which encompasses it. Because the subject has not yet emerged at this stage,
the motor of abjection is the drives, those somatic forces that will later exist on the border
between the unconscious and the conscious and that will only then be able to be
sublimated.10 What is abjected is also part of the not-yet-subject, as is the case for vomit
and excrement, two figures of abjection for Kristeva. Thus, in abjection one also abjects
oneself. As such, it blurs boundaries, and this is the central quality of the abject: it
“disturbs identity, system, order,” and “does not respect borders, positions, rules”
(Kristeva 1982, 4). Thus abjection is not a process that ends once a subject emerges; it is
present in the life of the subject wherever its boundaries are threatened, whenever “the
object world collapses” (Beardsworth 2004, 84). Even for adult subjects, then, corpses
are abject as are figures like those who commit premeditated crimes. The latter reveal
how the law, which we consider necessary to our existence in society, is fragile. The
former reminds us of the precariousness of life, that life is always in fact on the border of
death, that the body which we recognize as human can in fact cease to be a living human.
Another way of understanding the abject is through its relation to narcissism. In
“On Narcissism,” Freud posits the existence of two modes of narcissism. In primary

Sublimation for Kristeva has a specific meaning. It is “the possibility of naming the
pre-nominal, the pre-objectal […]. Through sublimation, I keep [the abject] under control”
(Kristeva 1982, 11). Later, she writes that sublimation is “the mere fact of naming affect […] that
mitigates its death instincts, and renders them bearable, livable, perhaps even agreeable”
(Kristeva 2000, 778). That is, to sublimate is to bring a drive, especially the death drive, into
representation. For Freud, on the other hand, sublimation refers to the change in the aim of a sex
drive to a non-sexual aim, or the change in the aim of an aggressive (death) drive to a nonaggressive aim. A succinct explanation of Freud’s use of sublimation is provided in The
Language of Psychoanalysis (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 431-433).
10
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narcissism, the ego develops through a libidinal11 investment in itself. From a state of
autoeroticism in which the not-yet-ego is not differentiated from its objects (namely its
mother), the child’s untamed drives begin to focus on itself, before becoming cathected
(that is, invested) in an object/mother. Thus, Freud writes, “We say that a human being
has originally two sexual objects—himself and the woman who nurses him—and in
doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone” (Freud 1957a, 88). Once
the individual takes objects and thus cathects objects with libido, secondary narcissism
becomes possible. In this form of narcissism, libido is withdrawn from one’s objects back
to the ego. (It is this form of narcissism that can become pathological, on Freud’s view).
To be clear, for Freud primary narcissism can never be completely overcome; that is, we
always retain a portion of libidinal investment in our own ego. Indeed, to do otherwise
would be to dissolve the ego. It is precisely this threat of dissolution that abjection poses,
for Kristeva, even while abjection serves as the precondition for narcissism. In its
developmental iteration, abjection is the process through which the not-yet-subject
separates itself from the maternal. It is only thus separated that this subject-to-be can be
invested with its own drives. But the abject continues to be present throughout life as that
which threatens borders, namely the border between the subject and its objects, and as
such it serves as a threat to, and reveals the fragile nature of, the narcissistic enclosure of
the subject. Whereas narcissism attempts to maintain the border of the subject against its

11

I use libido and drive interchangeably, here, usually adopting the language of the text
from which I am most immediately drawing.
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objects, the abject reveals the permeability and instability of that border. Thus, abjection
is, for Kristeva, a “narcissistic crisis” (Kristeva 1982, 14).12
As a final point in this discussion of abjection, it is important to note that despite
the fact that the “abject” is a term in the language of psychoanalysis, abjection is a
historically variable phenomenon. Though Kristeva maintains that abjection is a necessity
for the formation of any human subject, what is taken to be abject depends upon the
individual’s cultural location. Thus, in Powers of Horror, she is at pains to trace a history
of abjection through various religious formations of the West, notably drawing out the
difference between the Judaic and Christian figures of abjection. Thus, the figures of
abjection mentioned above, like corpses or certain crimes, may not be abject in other
times or places. Kristeva says as much in her discussion of the corpse: “The corpse, seen
without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection” (1982, 4 my emphasis).
With certain religious faiths, for example, may come the understanding of the corpse as a
shell devoid of a soul such that the corpse does not present a threat to the distinction
between life and death. Or a scientist could, in a detached, experimental way, sublimate
an abject corpse by seeking to understand it as a static entity, rather than being affected
by it as a revelatory of the precariousness of life. It is thus conceivable that any number
of relations to the corpse are possible, and thus, that its status as abject (or not) is
contingent.

12

My discussion of narcissism, here, is meant only to bolster an understanding of the
narcissistic identity wound proposed by Kristeva. In Tales of Love, Kristeva develops an account
of narcissism that departs from that of Freud and helps to explain the way in which the subject is
always already other (1987). I will discuss this later in the same chapter. Oliver 1993, Beardworth
2004, and DeArmitt 2014 provide helpful discussions of her account.
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Having briefly outlined Kristeva’s concept of the abject, we can return to her
discussion of disability. It is surprising that Kristeva does not use the terms “abject” or
“abjection” in either of her articles on disability because her language in these essays has
a strong resonance with the first chapters of Powers of Horror. She says, for example,
that disability presents the other with “the anxiety of seeing the very borders of the
human species explode” (2012, 29) and that the “‘mortality of life,’ from birth or
following from these ‘unpredictable biological genetic variabilities’ that can generate
disabilities” remains unthinkable to us (2013, 225). This threat to one’s boundaries and
the boundaries of the species would seem to be clear indications of abjection. Indeed, if
the corpse is abject as “death infecting life” (1982, 4), it seems that the disabled person
who “inflicts a threat of psychical or physical death” (2012, 29) would also be abject.
Perhaps because these essays are intended for more general audiences Kristeva avoids the
use of psychoanalytic jargon. Still, abjection may help us better understand Kristeva’s
discussion of disability.
First, recall that abjection is accomplished by the drives. Thus, the exclusion to
which disabled persons are subject is not the result of conscious reflection; rather, it is an
affective response intended to shore up the narcissistic boundaries of others in their
interactions with disabled persons. Subjects who feel their narcissistic integrity
threatened by disabled others experience a visceral anxiety that calls forth avoidance,
expulsion, and even violence. Second, it is important to note that Kristeva’s account of
the narcissistic crisis experienced by the person who encounters a disabled person not
only reveals the latter as an abject, but also inverts the relationship between narcissism
and disability present in much psychoanalytic thought. As Tobin Siebers explains,
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psychoanalysis has tended to associate narcissism with disability. As early as “On
Narcissism,” Freud argued that persons with illness or injuries invest their libido in their
egos and thus withdraw it from their love objects. He writes, “the sick man withdraws his
libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out again when he recovers”
(1957a, 82). According to this logic, persons with chronic illnesses or disabilities would
never cathect objects, and would thus be incapable of establishing love relationships.
Siebers argues that this claim has been taken up into the practice of psychoanalysis to the
detriment of disabled persons. As analysands, disabled clients have often been assumed
to be unable to accomplish transference13 (a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic process)
because of their supposed narcissism and thus are thought to be untreatable. On the other
hand, disabled persons have been denied access to the profession of psychoanalysis
because they are thought to be incapable of countertransference, again because of their
supposed narcissism, and thus incapable of establishing therapeutic relations with others
(Siebers 2008, 38-44). Kristeva rejects this logic, writing, for example, that disabled
persons are capable of the “search for meaning and sharing,” which for her defines the
subject, “[d]espite the limitation, and sometimes even in cases of great dependency
brought on by multiple disabilities” (2012, 32). Indeed, she does not just reject the
“standard” psychoanalytic line regarding disability, she reverses it; it is not the narcissism

13

Transference, as Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) explain, is a notoriously difficult
concept to define, but the important central component of transference is displacing cathexes,
affects, or behaviors associated with one object onto another object. Countertransference refers,
then, to “the analyst’s unconscious reactions” to the analyzand’s transferences in the therapeutic
setting (1973, 92).
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of disabled subjects she is concerned with, but the narcissistic identities of the
nondisabled.14
Finally, because Kristeva tells us that the figures of abjection are culturally
contingent, this may help us to understand the recommendations she makes at the level of
culture to address the exclusion of disabled persons, especially in France. She traces a
brief (European) history of disability.15 Throughout the Middle Ages, for example,
“‘houses of God’ […] excluded lepers and, sometimes, the paralyzed and the incurable,”
with only a handful of exceptions (2012, 35). Even when disabled persons were more
fully integrated into religious charity, the result was a de-politicization of disability. On
Kristeva’s view, charity neglects the rights that disabled persons have to compensation.
Paraphrasing the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Kristeva says that “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (2012, 33).16 Charity,
however, treats disabled persons as the beneficiaries of others’ generosity and not citizens
with a right to compensation based on the harms, obstacles, and exclusions to which they
are subject in various ways. In this way, it threatens to infantilize disabled persons rather
than treating them as subjects with whom others should interact.17 The twentieth century
did bring greater legal protections for disabled persons. Kristeva is disappointed with

14

In a similar manner, Siebers argues that the failure of therapy with disabled clients is
not the result of the analysand’s narcissism, but of the countertransference with which the analyst
is unable to cope (2008, 42).
15

This history is derived from Henri-Jacques Stiker’s A History of Disability (2000).

16

Kristeva gives a sustained analysis of this Declaration in Strangers to Ourselves (1991)
and, to a lesser extent, Nations without Nationalism (1993). These works will be discussed in
relation to disability below.
I will discuss Kristeva’s distinction between “interaction” and “integration” in greater
detail below.
17
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France, however, for failing to provide concrete supports for disabled persons, such as
education, well-trained service providers, “benefits payments, access to jobs, accessible
public transportation and public places” and for failing to move beyond the model of
disability that, on her view, treats disabled persons as “objects under treatment,” to a
model which accounts for both individual limitations and social obstacles (2012, 37).18
Underlying all of these moments in history, according to Kristeva, is a “culture that posits
human beings as creatures capable of excellence, pleasure, and achievement in the image
of an all-mighty Creator,” a culture that despite the death of God “continues to inhabit us
[…] by continuing to deny the lack of being essential to the human condition” (2012, 33).
That is, disabled persons have presented and will continue to present a narcissistic threat
to nondisabled persons19 as long as the narcissistic illusion of wholeness which our
culture expects (e.g., expectations of independence or our supposed meritocracy) and
upon which our culture is largely based (e.g., the autonomous rational agent of social
contract theory) is maintained.
In opposition to this culture, Kristeva suggests a humanism based on
vulnerability, a culture in which the socio-political link is conceived in terms of
vulnerability, and thus, a view of disabled persons as singular subjects rather than as
persons with privations of certain qualities. Such a change needs to involve more than
mere integration. On Kristeva’s view, the United States holds out an exemplary model of
integration, a process by which disabled persons are reduced to “either patients or

18

This distinction parallels the difference between the medical and social models of
disability which I summarize in the introduction.
19

And, I think, anyone who does not share the particular limit or exclusion her disability
presents, including other disabled persons.
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workers” (2012, 40).20 Here, the experiences of John, the schizophrenic person discussed
above, may be helpful. Recall that John’s sister begins to film him, and as a result his
works are exhibited and sold, and he gains a certain financial independence as a result.
Presented as a success story, the film worries Kristeva because John’s voice is rarely
heard. His success is not a success in sharing his thoughts or emotions with others, nor is
it an overcoming of exclusion; after all, those we make into spectacles can be just as
excluded as those who are never filmed. There is, in Kristeva’s words, no sharing that
takes place here, and as such John is treated as an object of treatment (and entertainment),
a producer of goods, but not as a subject, that is, not as one capable of making and
sharing meaning. Kristeva writes, “I saw an exhibition, and commerce, but no interaction
between the disabled and the able” (2012, 31). Interaction is best understood, then, in
contrast with integration. In integration, the disabled person is expected to change, to
assimilate to the standards (social, economic, etc.) of her community such that she is
accepted by the grace of her society. The threat to nondisabled subjects’ narcissistic egos
remains unchallenged and thus intact. In interaction, the disabled person is encouraged to
make and share meaning, and thus those with whom she interacts will transform through
this sharing as well. That is, in interaction nondisabled subjects confront the narcissistic
threat disabled persons pose. Furthermore, through interaction, changes can occur within
a community which take into account the feelings, perceptions, and desires of disabled
persons. This is in contrast to integration in which any changes at the social level are
prescribed by the nondisabled, failing to take into account the concerns of disabled
20

Even this integration is poorly achieved, however. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, for example, 26.0% of disabled persons ages 16-64 in the United States were employed
in 2014, compared to 71.7% of nondisabled persons of the same age range in the same time
period (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).
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persons themselves. And yet, unless there is a cultural shift of the kind Kristeva
advocates, integration, not interaction will be the most likely outcome of any reform in
the treatment of disabled persons because disability is still a figure of abjection.
While she does make concrete recommendations for broad social changes in the
perception of disability, from education and training to greater media presence, Kristeva
suggests that psychoanalysis is the privileged site of the changes she envisions. This is
because any broad social changes will depend upon individuals negotiating with the
narcissistic wound with which they are threatened in encounters with disabled others. To
understand Kristeva’s psychoanalytic prescription for changing this situation, it will be
helpful to review her works on foreigners, Strangers to Ourselves and Nations without
Nationalism.
In Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva draws upon Freud’s concept of the uncanny,
which he develops in his essay, “The ‘Uncanny.’” His reflections, here, begin with a
linguistic analysis. He notes that in German, the word heimlich (canny, familiar) has
developed such an ambivalent meaning that it at times becomes its opposite, unheimlich
(uncanny, strange), which is an indication of the true nature of the uncanny (1957b, 226).
This reveals that the uncanny is that which is strange because it is in fact familiar. So, for
example, a story by E. T. A. Hoffman in which there is a character known as the SandMan that threatens to steal one’s eyes is experienced as uncanny not because it is strange,
but because it recalls a common fear of having one’s eyes harmed or destroyed in
childhood, a fear that is “often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated”
(1957b, 231). That is, the story is uncanny because it recalls a fear that is familiar, but
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which has been repressed and thus alienated from consciousness.21 We experience death
as uncanny, Freud says, because we have ceased to believe in an afterlife by repressing
our ideas that the dead (our own death included) live on as ghosts or spirits and are
capable of interacting with the living, but this does not rid our unconscious of such ideas.
Others viewed as mad or without the control of their bodily movements are experienced
as uncanny because they remind us of the operations of the drives, forces we never
completely control within ourselves.22 And female genital organs are experienced as
uncanny by some men because they are strange reminders of the womb which used to be
home (1957b, 242-245).23
Freud’s analysis, on Kristeva’s view, helps us recognize the fragility of
repression. And because repression is formative of both our unconscious and our
conscious (by directing psychic contents between these two structures), the uncanny
helps us to see the fragility of ourselves. Kristeva writes, “uncanniness […] is a
destructuration of the self [that] surely manifests the return of a familiar repressed [but
also] requires just the same the impetus of a new encounter with an unexpected outside
element” (1991, 188). Thus, there is a sort of double destructuration involved in the

21

Repression is a psychical operation that involves the denial of a certain content to
consciousness, which requires a change in the representative of a drive and the drive itself. The
idea, the representative of the drive, is simply denied access to the unconscious. The drive energy,
however, is withdrawn from its object and must either be suppressed, find expression as an affect,
or be transformed into anxiety. In any case, the return of the repressed is a constant threat both
from external reminders of repressed contents and from failures of the psyche to repress these
contents, an effort which requires a constant expenditure of psychic resources (1957a, 151-155).
It is interesting to note, as Shildrick does (2009, 90), that many of Freud’s examples of
the uncanny are either of disability (like persons who cannot control their movements) or figures
that call forth disability (like dismembered limbs).
22
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I highlight these examples because they are the instances favored by Kristeva in
Strangers to Ourselves.
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uncanny. On the one hand, the uncanny reveals that there are repressed parts of our own
psyches which are outside of conscious awareness but which can easily break through the
precarious boundary of repression into consciousness. In other words, the uncanny
reveals repression itself (Beardsworth 2004, 186). We are other to ourselves, then,
because we are assymetrical beings; we have unconscious drives and conscious ideas
which exist in a constant state of dynamic interaction. We are not, on the psychoanalytic
view, unified subjects.
On the other hand, that which gives rise to feelings of the uncanny, especially
other persons, reveals the extent to which we are affected deeply by others. This is
because the subject emerges, for Kristeva, only through others. To see the profound way
in which we are formed through others on Kristeva’s view, we will need a digression
through her reconception of narcissism. The subject’s earliest attempts to emerge consist
of a vacillation between abjection of the maternal (as discussed above) and identification
with a third. This triad (the maternal, the not-yet-subject, and the third) forms the
“narcissistic structure” (Kristeva 1987, 48). The subject-to-be must abject the maternal in
order to differentiate itself, and yet it is also still dependent on the maternal. This
establishes a vacillation between repulsion of and returning to the maternal. But this, on
Kristeva’s view, is insufficient to account for the development of the subject, especially
the psychic space necessary for the formation of an imagination (24). The opening of this
psychic space requires that the mother-figure desires an other, the “imaginary father”
(26).24 Because the not-yet-subject experiences the maternal desire for this “not I” (41)—
This figure takes on several interchangeable names, as DeArmitt notes, including “the
third […], primary thirdness […], the third pole […], the father of individual prehistory […], the
Imaginary Father […], and the father-mother conglomerate” (2014, 70). I will use “imaginary
father” for the sake of simplicity.
24
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a desire which “assist[s] the infant in the process of individuation by fracturing its fantasy
of autoeroticism” (DeArmitt 2014, 68)—the imaginary father becomes a site of
identification25 for the subject-to-be. To be clear, this imaginary father is not an
individual person—after all, the subject-to-be, without objects, could not recognize it as
such. Rather, it is the “speech of the other—precisely a non-object, a pattern, a model,”
speech which is not imitated by the not-yet-subject (which would assume the
imagination’s ability to compare its own speech with that of another), but repeated,
echoed (Kristeva 1987, 26).26 In this way, the subject-to-be identifies with the imaginary
father; it becomes like this figure, a “subject of enunciation,” a speaking subject (26).
This is the formative instance of transference (or as Kristeva understands it, love),
because the subject-to-be attempts to occupy the place of the imaginary father. This, then,
becomes the model for continual identification throughout one’s psychic life.
This narcissistic structure, composed of the (abjected) maternal, the imaginary
father (of identification), and the subject-to-be, differs from the Freudian picture,
discussed above, in which primary narcissim is described as the investment of the notyet-ego’s drives in itself such that it can emerge as an ego.27 The emergence of the
subject, on Kristeva’s view, is dependent on others, establishing the deeply social nature

25

Identification is the process by which a subject takes on an attribute of the other and in
so doing becomes transformed him or herself (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 205). It may be
inaccurate to refer to this primary identification as an identification because there is properly
speaking no subject to assimilate characteristics and no object whose attributes can be adopted.
Still, we see in this movement the not-yet-subject (1) assimilating an attribute, namely
vocalization, and (2) being transformed by this assimilation.
26

This feature of the imaginary father is clearly explained in Oliver (1993, 72) and
DeArmitt (2014, 73).
27

Though it should be noted that Kristeva understands herself to be giving a reading of

Freud.
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of the subject even before it emerges and takes objects. The combination of abjection and
primary identification forms what Ewa Ziarek calls “a double operation of displacement
consitutive of the narcissistic self,” in which “the other becomes a metaphorical
destination of sorts” through identification, even while “the unnamable otherness of the
abject turns the fragile position of an I into a permanent exile” (Ziarek 1995, par. 25).
The subject is not a stable entity, but is constantly displaced in its interactions with others
in which one may identify with the other or be challenged by and thus reject the other.
This brings us back to Kristeva’s discussion of the uncanny foreigner. Encounters with
foreigners, according to Kristeva, are uncanny precisely because they reveal the other
within ourselves. That is, we are subjects constituted by heterogeneous levels
(conscious/unconscious, semiotic/symbolic) and through identifications, abjections, and
projections (i.e., relations to others), and are thus subject to a double-destructuration of
the self as unified and as autonomous. In Kristeva’s words, we experience the encounter
with the foreigner as a loss of boundaries, signalling “the difficulty I have in situating
myself with respect to the other [such that I] keep going over the course of identificationprojection that lies at the foundation of my reaching autonomy” (1991, 187). Projection,
resembels abjection, in that it is an expulsion of an aspect of oneself that is then located
in another person,28 but it occurs only once the subject has emerged and thus can have
objects upon whom these aspects can be projected. Thus, the foreigner is a challenge to
the narcissistic subject, calling forth responses which seek to restore the latter’s
boundaries, responses which resemble the subject’s initial emergence through
identification-abjection. This destructuration of the self can thus result in “a psychotic

28

A detailed discussion of the concept is offered by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 349).

122

symptom”29 in which the subject attempts to strengthen its identification with its fellow
citizens and abject the foreigner, constantly reacting to the threat of depersonalization, or
it can result in “an opening toward the new” (Kristeva 1991, 188).
In what would this opening consist? It is “the courage to call ourselves
disintegrated in order not to integrate foreigners and even less so to hunt them down, but
rather to welcome them to that uncanny strangeness, which is as much theirs as it is ours”
(1991, 192). Each subject is a being with an unconscious, a psychic realm that is never
wholly accessible for any subject. And each subject is the result of a history of abjections,
projections, and identifications, such that who she is is a composite of interactions with
others. Thus, in acknowledging ourselves as dis-integrated, as strangers to ourselves, we
may realize that every person is a foreigner, with the paradoxical result that no one is a
foreigner. Importantly, as the quotation above specifies, this does not mean that our
reaction to foreigners should be to integrate them, to expect them to assimilate. Indeed,
this would be to assume that our own foreignness is somehow less foreign. Nor should
we treat foreigners as national abjects, excluding them, projecting our fears onto them.
Either of these paths, for Kristeva, would not only be unjust, given our own foreignness,
but they would also amount to psychic ossification in which we remain unchallenged and
unchanged in our narcissistic identities (1991, 192). In other words, either of these
options would deny that both oneself and the foreigner are, in the language of Tales of
Love, “open systems” capable of renewal, a necessity for psychic life, only through
connections with others (1987, 15). On Kristeva’s view, it is precisely this renewal that
29

I quote this phrase as a reminder of the potential for psychoanalytic discourse to
medicalize, a tendency that disability studies needs to be cautious of. Throughout, I attempt to
emphasize the non-normalizing potential of Kristeva’s work, but it is worth bearing in mind the
conservative tendencies of adopting psychoanalytic theory.
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psychoanalytic practice accomplishes, through “stabilizing-destabilizing” transference
(15), so it should come as no surprise that she sees in psychoanalysis a third way to
approach the foreigner. This would involve a working-through, 30 in which we “must
come back to [the uncanny experience], clear it up, give it the resources our own essential
depersonalizations provide, and only thus soothe it” (1991, 190). We should sit with31 the
uncanny feeling aroused by foreign others, use this opportunity to recognize ourselves
and others as open systems, strange to ourselves and to one another, and thus soothe the
(often violent) reactionary tendencies of projection and exclusion, or fascination and
integration. Ideally, transference in our interactions with the other could move us toward
reconciliation with our strangeness to ourselves. Even though psychoanalytic practice is
the privileged space of this working-through, as Marilyn Edelstein notes, practices
outside of the psychoanalytic couch could achieve this aim (1993, 206). For Kristeva,
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Working-through is an important term in psychoanalysis, but one that is never given
extensive explanation by Freud. In “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” Freud
specifies that to work through a psychic resistance to acknowledge one’s repression is to
overcome it by coming to terms with the repressed contents which create the resistance (1957a,
155). Psychoanalysis is the privileged site of working-through because it allows for two
techniques helpful to (if not necessary for) working-through to take place: transference and
interpretation. Transference occurs when the analysand takes the analyst as her object and thus
transfers her resistances, cathexes, etc. to the analyst. In transference the resistance becomes an
“artificial illness,” which allows the analyst and analysand to discover the repressed contents
driving the resistance, and thus to reinterpret the resistance (1957a, 154). Transference and
interpretation, then, are the techniques to working-through a resistance. Finally, it is important to
note that the aim of working-through is more than an intellectual acceptance; working-through is
successful when it results in a lived (i.e., intellectual, affective, sensory) conviction of the
repressed content. A rather detailed exploration of the topic is provided by Laplanche and
Pontalis (1973, 488-489).
By “sit with” I mean an alternative process to immediately acting upon an affect. For
example, this may take the form of feeling an affect and letting it pass, bringing attention to the
bodily manifestations of affects to soothe them, or turning one’s attention to the affect in order to
analyze it at a more conscious level. What is important is reacting to affects without immediately
seeking to rid oneself of them through the exclusion of or fascination with the other who brings
the affects about.
31
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working-through can take place in writing, art, and interactions with others outside of
strictly therapeutic settings, insofar as these practices facilitate the interaction of the
unconscious, semiotic drive with the symbolic, allowing for the subject’s renewal.
Before returning to discuss the relation of Strangers to Ourselves to Kristeva’s
work on disability, I would like to discuss two thinkers who engage with her use of the
uncanny: Sara Beardsworth (2004) and Sara Ahmed (2005). The arguments of both
Beardsworth and Ahmed potentially relate to Kristeva’s thought on disability, and thus
discussing them may shed some light on both the uncanny and disability. Let us take each
in turn. In Julia Kristeva: Psychoanalysis and Modernity, Beardsworth argues that the
uncanny can found neither an ethics nor a politics as Kristeva would like to claim.
Kristeva’s ethics, she says, “makes the other an integral part of the same […], and so
must remain without real otherness” (2004, 203). Just as Kristeva claims that the psyche
“integrates within the assumed unity of human beings an otherness that is both biological
and symbolic and becomes an integral part of the same” (1991, 181), Beardsworth
worries that working-through one’s strangeness with the foreigner will reduce the
singularity of each into the same. In other words, once we are all foreigners, are we not
all the same? I believe this conclusion can be avoided for two reasons. First, if it is the
case that we are all the same as strangers, this does not imply that we are all the same as
subjects. In Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva establishes a sort of formal similarity
between subjects; we are all composed of heterogeneous psychic elements and of
interactions with others (abjections, identifications, projections) through which we are
transformed. Thus, anyone who imagines herself to be a unified, autonomous subject
must acknowledge that she is in fact a stranger to herself. This does not mean, however,
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that the contents of my conscious or unconscious are the same as yours, nor does it mean
that the interactions through which I have been formed are the same as yours. Indeed, we
will see that for Kristeva this formal similarity is the foundation which allows us to share
our radical singularities, singularities which result from our unique developments as
subjects (i.e., the contents and interactions refered to above).32 Second, we would do well
not to imagine this “same” (we are all foreigners) as static. For Kristeva, the subject is a
hetergenous and dynamic being, in which unconscious drives and conscious ideas (in
other words, the semiotic and symbolic) are in a constant interaction through which both
are transformed. Similarly, we as foreigners are constantly interacting and transforming
in the process. We need not imagine that the result of Kristeva’s vision would be a
movement toward a flattening, static same. It is rather a movement toward a recognition
of structural similarity (foreignness) such that the singularity of each person can become
a source for renewal in others, rather than being covered over by the projections of
others.33

A similar form/content distinction is present in Kristeva’s discussion of feminine
genius (Kristeva 2004, 426).
32

Beardsworth’s full argument is more complex than the one I am presenting here.
Through a reading of Freud’s later works, she argues that the uncanny can give us neither alterity
nor futurity. This is because the uncanny calls the (unconscious) past to the present, thus no future
is involved. Another way of putting this is that the uncanny depersonalization cannot think the
future because the destructured subject exists in the non-time of trauma, not the linear time of the
narcissistic subject. What trauma brings forth is the already past and thus it can lead to neither
otherness nor a future (Beardsworth 2004, 202-3). I am not convinced, however, that we should
think of the uncanny experience as traumatic, however. Rather than accomplishing a
depersonalization, Kristeva says that the uncanny “leads the self […] toward depersonalization”
(1991, 188 my emphasis). And rather than saying that the uncanny, unresolved, will lead to
psychosis, she says it may “remain as a psychotic symptom” (188). In other words, the uncanny
experience, if my reading is correct, is not a trauma which disintegrates the subject; rather it is a
threat of such disintegration, a challenge to one’s unified and autonomous self-image, a
depersonalization as a process. There remains in the experience of the uncanny, then, a
temporality open to the future, and a subject (contested though she may be) capable of opening
herself to the singular other. I note this here because I think substantiating this defense would take
33
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While Beardsworth worries about the integration of others into the same, Ahmed
worries that Kristeva has underestimated the problem. In Strangers to Ourselves,
Kristeva claims that her “ethics of psychoanalysis implies a politics” (1991, 192), but
aside from a few sparse recommendations in the final few pages, she leaves a discussion
of these political implications to her later Nations without Nationalism. Her concern here
is with the fact that, in the wake of globalization, immigration, and the integration of
Europe, certain Western countries are suffering from identity crises, such that Western
individuals seek to bolster their identifications with national origins. An U.S. American,
for instance, may experience waves of immigration as threats to the national identity and
thus seek alliances with American citizens, protest or reject immigrants, or become
dogmatically patriotic.34 On the one hand, Kristeva recommends a meditation upon “the
fascination and horror that a different being produces in us,” similar to her ethics
proposed in Strangers to Ourselves (1993, 30). On the other hand, she argues that we
should conceive of the nation as a transitional object, an object with which we can
identify but which is dynamic, open to change (41-3). But there is a particular unsettling
instance of claim that “we are all foreigners” in Nations without Nationalism. Here,
Kristeva writes that “recognition of otherness is a right and a duty for everyone, French
people as well as foreigners, and it is reasonable to ask foreigners to recognize and
respect the strangeness of those who welcome them” (31), a vague reference to her later
claim: “It is possible that the ‘abstract’ advantages of French universalism may prove to
more space and constitute more of a digression than this dissertation affords. It remains an
argument to follow through.
34

Importantly, Kristeva claims that this amounts not only to a hatred of the rejected
other(s), but also a hatred of oneself, because in identifying first or most strongly with a group or
national identity, one denies her own singularity (1993, 2-3).
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be superior to the ‘concrete’ benefits of a Muslim scarf” (47). What these juxtaposed
claims reveal, for Ahmed, is that Kristeva has underestimated the problem.
Acknowledging that we are all strangers does not seem to deal with the uncanny response
to the foreigner, because “some others are recognized as stranger than others and as
already not belonging to the nation in the concreteness of their difference” (Ahmed 2005,
99). The other that evokes an uncanny response is not just any other, but one already
prefigured as different (concretely) from the (abstract, universal) host. Moreover, the
concrete figure of the veiled woman is in fact no more concrete than the persons who are
considered hosts, though they are not recognized as such by those French persons aligned
with Kristeva’s position. In other words, veiled women are marked in a way that those
without veils are not.
If the nation is a transitional object, one capable of contestation, why can it not
survive the contestation of the veil? And why is it that the strangeness of the French
citizen is figured as universal while the strangeness of the Muslim immigrant is figured as
concrete? To answer this question, Ahmed turns to emotion. Through a linguistic analysis
and several examples, she notes the complexity of emotion. First, emotions both attach us
to others and move us (either toward or away from others). We are moved by emotions at
the same time as we are connected by them. Second, they constitute, and continually
reconstitute, the borders of the self. To use Ahmed’s example, when I stub my toe on a
table, “I become aware of my body as having a surface” through the pain caused by the
impression upon that surface by the table (2005, 101). This border is neither inside nor
outside; it is continuously reconstituted through impressions and their resulting
sensations. (Note that this need not be a painful impression. Pleasure, for example, could

128

work in the same way.) What’s more, the ways in which this border is affected (and thus
effected) alter one’s “bodily space” (2005, 101). To return to the example, I may move
away from the table as a pain-causing object, and I may alter the way I move about this
space in the future, perhaps keeping farther away from the table, or perhaps turning on
the light in the room when it is dark. Thus, through the impression on this border, my
body (now fearful, avoiding, or more careful), the table (now a pain-inducing object, or
object of fear), and the relation between the two (the movement of my body relative to
the object) are all altered. On her view, the “skin of the community” is constituted (and
re-constituted) in a similar way—it is “an effect of the alignment of the subject with some
others and against other others” (2005, 104 original emphasis). To clarify her account,
Ahmed discusses an example drawn from the writing of Audre Lorde in which she
experienced a white woman’s disgust when she, a black girl, sat next to her on a train.
Here, the emotions of disgust and hate effect a movement. The white woman first pulls
her coat away from Lorde so that it does not touch her. When Lorde does not move, the
white woman stands on the moving train rather than sitting so close to her. This allows
Lorde’s mother to sit next to her. Notice the movements brought about by emotion here.
Disgust results in a movement away, an expulsion; consideration or love for the mother
results in a moving closer, a touching. In this scene, the skin of the white community is
reconstituted as it recoils from black others, and the skin of the black community (and
perhaps the family among other communities they share) is reconstituted as Lorde and
her mother move closer. This is a microcosm of larger social phenomena in which white
communities feel fear (for financial stability, safety, etc.) when persons of color
“impress” upon their collective “skin,” in which white persons feel disgust or fear upon
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entering communities of color, and so on. Why then are some others objects of fear or
rejection while other others are objects of love or attachment? Ahmed argues that
“particular histories are reopened in each encounter, such that some bodies are already
read as more hateful and disgusting than other bodies” (2005, 106). In other words, we
inherit histories of our communities in which this skin is already in place. And this skin is
constituted and maintained primarily by metonymy, which for Ahmed is the “contact and
proximity between bodies and signs,” but also by metaphor, in which one “stand[s] for or
stand[s] in for others” (106). So while it may be the case that immigrants come to stand
for some particularly threatening individual (a feature on the nightly news, for example)
in the perception of a white community, it is more common that the physical proximity of
immigrants, the slippery associations of immigrants with strange languages, smells,
habits, and perhaps even with the destruction of the national identity constitutes and
reconstitutes the movement of white bodies away from immigrant bodies that maintains
the skin of the white community.
This account, Ahmed writes, is inspired by Kristeva’s own writings on abjection.
Recall that the primary instance of abjection is the subject-to-be’s attempts to emerge
from its maternal surroundings. As such, abjection constitutes a first and fragile boundary
for the subject. What’s more, the feeling of disgust associated with abjection is the result
of impressions upon that boundary by the abject (perhaps the proximity of a corpse, or
the smell of spoiled milk) which result in an expulsion (vomiting) or a movement away
from this abject (fleeing).
It appears, then, that we may have come full circle. Let us review the ground we
have covered and its relation to disability. This section began with the suggestion that
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abjection may be a model for disability because both are associated with death and the
transgression of boundaries. If abjection constitutes a natural response, then it appears as
if there is no hope for the interaction of disabled persons within our communities as
Kristeva calls for. But the figures of abjection are in fact culturally contingent.
Redrawing the boundaries of communities (or the human community as it is understood
in the West) could result in a shift in the figures of abjection such that disabled persons
would no longer be perceived as transgressing boundaries because all would be united by
vulnerability, for example, rather than imagined autonomy.35 The obstacle to this societal
re-conception, however, is the narcissistic threat experienced by individuals who
understand or imagine themselves to be whole, independent, or autonomous. If
individuals cannot confront their own inherent vulnerabilities, it is unclear how the social
link itself could be thought in terms of vulnerability. This prompted a discussion of
Kristeva’s use of the uncanny in Strangers to Ourselves. Here, we saw that the uncanny
experience of the encounter with the foreigner manifests itself as a “fascinated rejection,”
because the foreigner reminds the citizen of her foreignness to herself, that is, her
heterogeneous constitution as a being with an unconscious, a fragilely bounded being
composed through interaction with others. The immediate response to this is to reject the
other in an attempt to shore up the narcissistic image of oneself as unified and
autonomous. But Kristeva calls upon her readers to respond in a different way, to sit with
the uncanny experience, recognizing ourselves as strangers to ourselves and thus no more
foreign than the foreigner who brought about the uncanny feeling in the first place. In this
way, not only will we be better able to live with foreigners, but we will free them from
It is important to remember, however, that as a developmental necessity, on Kristeva’s
view there will always be figures of abjection.
35
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the ossifying projections to which they are often subject such that each foreigner can be
recognized for her dynamic singularity because we will no longer reject foreigners but
instead be better able to interact with them. Also, we will free ourselves from the
petrifying self-conceptions which freeze us in place and hinder our own selfunderstanding and dynamic potential.
Before seeking to apply these lessons to the case of disability, however, we took a
detour through two criticisms of Kristeva’s use of the uncanny. First, we were led to ask,
by way of Beardsworth, if Kristeva’s insistence that we are all foreigners reconciles
alterity within the same, and thus neglects the singularity of each subject. I argued,
however, that the similarity of our foreignness, for Kristeva, is a formal one. Thus, in
recognizing oneself and the other as foreigners, we are acknowledging ourselves as
necessarily socially constituted (and thus permeable) and as beings bearing an
unconscious. This does not tell us anything about any one subject’s unconscious contents
or formative social interactions. Indeed, for Kristeva it is only when we recognize the
foreignness of ourselves and others that we can cease rejecting foreign others and
acknowledge the singularity of each subject. This led to the second question: If we are all
foreigners, why are some perceived as more foreign than others. This is because of
personal and community boundaries formed by the (e)motion of some subjects with
regard to others. In other words, some others form an abject boundary of oneself or one’s
community, while we form attachments (or identifications) with other others. This
circuitous path has led to what I believe is the solution to Kristeva’s problem: a doublemotion of working through the experience of the uncanny on the one hand, while
“moving toward” (becoming attached to, identifying with) those who constitute a
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person’s or community’s abject boundary in order to refigure abjection on the other.
Neither one of these can work alone. Working through the uncanny experience of
destructuration brought upon by the foreigner can allow us to come to terms with
ourselves and to acknowledge the singularity of the foreigner, but this acknowledgment
can only be accomplished if we form attachments or identifications with that other such
that we no longer experience that other as abject. Conversely, we can refigure the
boundary of our community by moving toward abject others, but this will only be
possible once we learn to sit with and work through the uncanny feeling such movements
bring about. What, then, are the lessons of this discussion for the case of disability?
Recall that Kristeva urges her readers to rethink the social link in terms of
vulnerability, to reconceive of humans as vulnerable, dependent beings rather than
independent, autonomous, or productive. The obstacle, however, is the threat to
individuals’ narcissistic identities presented by disabled others. Insofar as the identities of
nondisabled persons are based on invulnerability, they will be unable to rethink the social
link and the human community in terms of vulnerability. And insofar as the nondisabled
reject and exclude disabled others because of this narcissistic threat, they will lack the
impetus to conceive of themselves as inherently vulnerable. Here we see a parallel with
the circularity of Kristeva’s problem of the foreigner. The nondisabled conceive
themselves as such by excluding the disabled community, and this conception can be
challenged only by recognizing their own vulnerability, specifically through interactions
with disabled persons. Thus, to truly interact with disabled others will require a similar
double movement. First, nondisabled persons must encounter disabled persons and work
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through36 the resulting narcissistic threat to acknowledge themselves as vulnerable.
Because one’s narcissistic self-image is always emotionally invested and because we are
constituted by an unconscious, identifications, and relations to others, this workingthrough (like all processes of working-through) must be more than a conscious reflection
or recognition. It will be a piecemeal work of thinking (especially with others), of sitting
with emotions (and feeling and responding to emotions with others), of dissolving old
identifications and forming new ones, of coping with the shock of that which has been
repressed and integrating it, if possible, into their conscious lives. Importantly, this
process by which the nondisabled may transform their “fear of castration, narcissistic
injury, defect, and death” into “attention, patience, and solidarity” will contribute not
only to allowing true interactions with disabled persons, but will also result in a greater
understanding of themselves as inherently vulnerable (Kristeva 2012, 44). This is to work
through disability as a figure of the uncanny, that is, as a return of one’s repressed
vulnerabilities. Second, the nondisabled must stop excluding disabled persons, move
toward them (in the full sense adopted from Ahmed above), and thus refigure the
boundaries of the community. This is to engage and transform disability as a figure of
abjection, in other words, as that which challenges the boundaries of the “nondisabled”
community. The former will only be possible through an exposure to disabled persons
36

The fact that working-through is necessary for interaction with disabled others is most
clearly stated in “A Tragedy and a Dream,” where Kristeva states that love, or “continuously
clarified transfer,” is necessary for “the singular [to] clarify, be recognized, and develop in
sharing its own singularity” (2013, 228). Recall that working-through has two moments for
Freud, transference and interpretation. Thus, love, as continuously clarified (i.e., continuously
reinterpreted) transference, does the work of working-through. Solidarity, on the other hand, is
important for working toward the rights of disabled persons, but this fails to acknowledge the
singularity of each disabled person and thus tends toward integration. Only working-through
allows the singularity of each disabled subject to express itself and be heard; in other words, only
working-through allows for interaction.
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brought about by the latter, and the latter will be possible only insofar as nondisabled
individuals perform the work of the former. Thus, it is only through a vacillation between
these two movements that Kristeva’s dream can be accomplished.
Kristeva’s Rhetoric of Disability
Jan Grue’s helpful paper, “Rhetorics of Difference: Julia Kristeva and Disability”
analyzes Kristeva’s discussion of disability in “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity
and…Vulnerability.” He provides important criticisms of Kristeva which must be taken
seriously to avoid a potential reification of disability. In discussing Grue’s insights,
moreover, we may be able to refine the aspects of Kristeva’s work that I am adopting,
here. The first of Grue’s criticisms with which I will engage involves the use of disability
in Kristeva’s thought. Recall that Kristeva calls on her audience to interact with disabled
others, and in doing so to transform our narcissistic fears into “attention, patience, and
solidarity” (2012, 44). That is, in their interactions with disabled persons, nondisabled
persons will themselves be changed for the better by reconciling themselves to their own
vulnerabilities. Grue’s concern, then, is that for Kristeva the “main purpose” of disabled
persons “is to induce therapeutic change in others” (2012, 53). Furthermore, he worries
that beyond interpersonal interactions, Kristeva simply uses disability as an exemplary
figure to argue for the utopian vision of a social link based on vulnerability. As he writes,
“It is only because disability and vulnerability are already closely identified that disability
enters into Kristeva’s argument, and this connection is used to warrant the general point
about how we organize society, not in order to explore the topic of disability itself”
(2012, 54). One can see why Grue draws this conclusion. After all, Kristeva herself
writes “I am convinced that humanism […] can find a chance to revitalize itself in the
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battle for the dignity of the disabled by constructing what is still sorely lacking: respect
for a vulnerability that cannot be shared” (2012, 30 my emphasis). I believe, however,
that this is an ungenerous reading of Kristeva’s position.
First, it is the case that Kristeva believes that true interaction with disabled
subjects will lead to personal growth for the nondisabled. This does not mean, however,
that this is Kristeva’s reason for urging nondisabled persons to engage with disabled
persons. We see this, for example, in her insistence that “the training of those capable of
interaction with the disabled must be improved: from pyschiatrists to instructors, […] all
should feel valued and able to provide optimal care” (2012, 38, original emphasis). Note
that the reason that these professionals should learn to interact with disabled persons as
subjects is in order to give the best possible care to their disabled clients. Second, it is the
case that Kristeva hopes for a new humanism which understands the social link to be
based on vulnerability, and that she envisions an engagement with disability as the
avenue to this humanism, but it does not follow that Kristeva would be unconcerned with
disability if it were not connected with this utopian vision. Rather, Kristeva is largely
driven by her passion to reform the treatment of disabled subjects in France and to protect
them from the consumerist integration of the United States. She writes, for example, “I
envisioned the need to start a true ‘cultural revolution’ to change the way the disabled are
viewed—based on real interaction between the able and the disabled—to allow for
political interventions that would finally be effective” (2012, 39 my emphasis). Here it is
the revolution in humanism that is presented as a means to the end of true interaction
between the disabled and the nondisabled to the benefit of both groups. Furthermore,
other cultural theorists have developed theories of vulnerability starting from other social
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phenomena. Judith Butler, for example, takes war as one starting point to a theorization
of vulnerability (Butler 2010). On the other hand, Adriana Cavarero, largely inspired by
Hannah Arendt, discusses the vulnerability of subjects based on their reliance on
narration (Cavarero 2000).37 Clearly, then, there are other aspects of social life that could
serve as media for infusing humanism with a discussion of vulnerability. Kristeva,
however, has a sincere interest in social and political changes that would allow disabled
persons to interact as subjects with nondisabled persons and to be freed from the isolation
to which French society relegates them. This is why it is a privileged site for entering a
discussion of vulnerability for Kristeva.
A more troubling criticism Grue presents is the claim that Kristeva’s rhetoric of
“we” and “they,” the disabled and the nondisabled, reifies rather than contests our
understanding of disability (2012, 53). This is a criticism potentially available in any
discussion of identity politics, and one way Kristeva could reply would be to say that the
terms “disabled” and “nondisabled” are political expedients—the categories themselves
may be fluid, but it is helpful to talk in this way in the contemporary environment, first,
to facilitate solidarity between the particular individuals labelled as disabled, or second,
to point out to those who are not considered disabled that there is an aspect of the social
world that they are radically unfamiliar with and in part responsible for. But Grue takes
issue with some more specific elements of the dichotomy Kristeva accepts. First, the
audience is assumed to be composed entirely of nondisabled persons who live in a
separate world from disabled persons. The problem is that disability is “a fundamentally
situational phenomenon” (2012, 49). As Siebers discusses, for example, the United States
37

Cavarero also takes up war and terrorism in her more recent Horrorism: Naming
Contemporary Violence (2011).
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Supreme Court decided that the need for glasses is not a disability, revealing the legal
contingency of the category (2008, 69). Michel Foucault traces an interesting history of
what came to be known as mental retardation in his Psychiatric Power lectures, noting
the changes in scientific understanding and institutional arrangements that formed the
conditions for the emergence of mental retardation (2007, 201-223). Brendan Gleeson’s
Geographies of Disability demonstrates the structural and economic differences that the
shift from feudal society to capitalist industrial society made for persons with
impairments (1999). Thus, when Kristeva speaks of the “world of disability cut off from
the world” (2012, 32), the former must be understood as a contingent world, and the
nondisabled to whom she speaks must be thought of as nondisabled in their particular
circumstances. But this seems to be precisely Kristeva’s goal. She hopes for “[n]ew
worlds […] open to our listening, […] neither normal nor disabled, […] worlds finally
returning to their plurality” (2012, 45).
And yet, another worry remains that Kristeva may misrepresent the varied
experiences of disabled persons in her discussions of the pain caused by disability, the
silence imposed upon disabled persons, and the failure of the nondisabled to share their
lives with disabled persons. For Grue, this is problematic because “the more disability is
represented as a uniquely horrifying predicament, the more improbable social change
appears” (2012, 50). This is in part because it does not offer a realistic representation of
the concrete circumstances of disabled persons’ lives. Disabled persons live in varying
settings, such that their disabilities may actually be the source of a sense of community
rather than exclusion; their disabilities may not be a source of pain (or be only
intermittently so); and they may have others in their lives, disabled or nondisabled, who
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do listen to them. Moreover, Kristeva’s emphasis on the suffering of disabled persons
makes their lives all the more unimaginable to the nondisabled audience. In other words,
not only does Kristeva exaggerate the suffering of many disabled persons, but in doing so
she also creates a greater rhetorical distance between her nondisabled audience and the
disabled persons she calls on them to interact with.38
While Kristeva’s broader theoretical statements may lead one to these
conclusions, I think there is evidence of a more nuanced position in Kristeva’s essay,
especially her examples. Claire, for instance, is the mother of a daughter diagnosed with
autism named Marie. She struggled greatly with her daughter’s care but finally sought
therapy for herself, and in the end she reports that “Marie and I were no longer two
people with a single body. And Marie found a job; she makes photocopies at a law office
where everyone respects her as she is. She even has a boyfriend now” (Kristeva 2012,
32). This reveals Kristeva’s recognition that disability, even in contemporary French
society, need not result in an isolating, silent, painful experience.39 Indeed her concern for

Indeed, in Kristeva’s later piece, “A Tragedy and a Dream: Disability Revisited,” she
ends up carrying this aspect of her thought to a greater extreme. She writes, “The so-called
solitude of the disabled person has inevitably an absolute companion […]: the pain of mortality.
Even if this person is not sick, even if they do not feel specific pains, their disabilities remind
them permanently—them or at least those around them if the deficit deprives them of this
consciousness—that they are not like others, who are able not to will to know that they are
mortal” (2013, 225). I have met many disabled persons, however, who have expressed no
preoccupation with death, who do not appear to be permanently reminded of their own mortality
by their disabilities. I think that the greater truth in this passage, and one that I will develop
below, is found in the parenthetical remark where she notes that the nondisabled persons who are
close to disabled persons are permanently reminded of their own mortality. In other words, it is
my position that Kristeva, in passages like these, projects onto disabled persons the suffering of
nondisabled persons who encounter them.
38
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To be sure, Kristeva is well aware of the obstacles to this type of life. She writes
immediately after the previously quoted sentence: “I knew, as Claire did, that nothing had really
been resolved, and yet I shared her joy, wondering: will it always take psychoanalysis and the
help of a kindly attorney to ‘deinsulate’ disability?” (2012, 33). The types of lives Grue thinks
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Claire, here, suggests that the vulnerability of disabled lives can be shared, at least by
those who care for disabled persons. Claire, too, needs to be freed from isolation.
Kristeva is also concerned to resolve the guilt that caretakers feel as a result of being
powerless to help make those they care for healthy (2012, 33). Thus, in her examples,
Kristeva does present a more nuanced view of disability. As for the rhetorical effect of
Kristeva’s writing, Grue’s assessment may be correct—that is, her discussion of the
difficulties of living a disabled life in contemporary Western society may drive
nondisabled people away from coalitions with disabled persons rather than towards them.
If this is the case, however, it is a rhetorical fault and not a philosophical one. Indeed,
while it would certainly be best to give an accurate portrayal of the lives of disabled
persons, it may be preferable to exaggerate the difficulty of the obstacles presented by
disability rather than to underestimate them.
A Kristevan Account of Disability Exclusion
Thus, Kristeva’s discussion of disability does appear to be more nuanced than
Grue claims. Still, there is textual evidence for Grue’s position. I believe that this is a
result of Kristeva’s own ambiguity. She says that the vulnerability of the disabled person
“cannot be shared,” and then states that her aim is to show that “it can be shared” (2012,
30).40 This contradiction appears to be resolved when Kristeva writes: “To share: to take
part in a distinctiveness beyond the separation imposed on us by our fates; to participate,
without erasing the fact that each is ‘apart’ and recognizing the part that cannot be shared,

Kristeva neglects are possible, but this does not mean that they are without obstacle, especially in
contemporary France.
40

This is not simply a translation problem, either. In the first instance the French is
“impartageable” and in the second the translated term is “partageable” (Kristeva 2005, 95-6).
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that is irremediable” (2012, 43). Here, what is shared in Kristeva’s sense cannot strictly
be shared because of the singularity of each subject. A person with 20/20 vision cannot
share the experiences of a blind person, and yet she can be open to the blind person
sharing her experiences. The irremediable, here, would then be the singularity of each
individual. But at the end of the essay, Kristeva introduces a problem for this
interpretation: “If every speaking being is constructed around a central deficiency,
disability inflicts a very different trial: the disabled subject is confronted with the
irremediable, lacks or insufficiencies that evolve within certain limits, when they don’t
stagnate or worsen” (2012, 44). Thus, the irremediable, she seems to be claiming,
uniquely characterizes disability. And yet, the very next sentence states that “the
analysand who has not confronted the irremediable in himself has not completed his
journey to the end of the night” (2012, 44). This dizzying movement appears to be the
result of a desire to resist reducing disability to vulnerability, which would risk
underestimating the challenges faced by disabled persons, while at the same time
upholding the utopian vision of shared vulnerability.
From this tangled web, I would like to suggest what I believe to be the most
generous reading of Kristeva’s thought, one that takes into account various insights of
disability theory but which provides a helpful supplement to theorizing disability.
Returning to Kristeva’s goal may help us achieve this reconciliation. Kristeva encourages
the nondisabled to recognize that they are all essentially vulnerable, that psychoanalysis
can reveal that vulnerability, and that an analysand has not truly confronted the depths of
her psyche unless she has discovered the irremediable within her. At the same time,
Kristeva warns against reducing disability to vulnerability (in the sense that we are all
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vulnerable), precisely because the experience of disability is irremediable. How can these
two statements be reconciled? It is not simply that the limitation of the disabled subject is
irremediable, but that this irremediable limitation results in a unique “exclusion that is not
like others,” because of the narcissistic wound it inflicts upon those without the same
limitation (2012, 44). It is not just the suffering of the limitation, but the suffering of the
exclusion caused by this limitation which sets disability apart from other forms of
incurable vulnerability. In other words, disability differs from other narcissistic threats
(e.g., the figures of the uncanny) in revealing the subject’s vulnerability; and it differs
from other forms of vulnerability in that it results in profound social exclusions based on
the narcissistic wounds they inflict. This means, first, that persons with different
disabilities may be narcissistically wounded by and therefore exclude others. A person
with a physical disability may reject a person with an intellectual disability, for example,
especially if the physically disabled person’s intellectual prowess is central to her selfimage. This explanation, then, is helpful in reminding us of the variability and
contingency of what counts as a disability. Thus, Kristeva can talk about disability in
broad terms like “vulnerability,” but still acknowledge the particularity of each disability
and the singularity of each disabled subject. Secondly, this means that who is disabled is
contingent upon the narcissistic denial of various vulnerabilities by others. Thus, this
reading of Kristeva is amenable to those positions that hold disability to be radically
situational. In a group of friends, colleagues, or family members who lack or have
worked through their narcissistic fears of vulnerability, a person understood to be
disabled in other settings may not in fact be disabled.41 A mass acceptance of certain
41

This needs to be distinguished, of course, from the specious claims nondisabled people
sometimes make, like “I don’t see you as disabled” which deny disability as a part of one’s
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human limitations, if incorporated into individuals’ psyches, would completely alter who
is disabled. To be sure, this cannot serve as a stand-alone definition of disability.
Structures like stairs or the absence of audible signals at crosswalks, scientific and
institutional standards like certain school curricula and exams, and so on are also
disabling. But it is also the case that these disabling social structures may be, in part,
addressed by Kristeva’s theory of the exclusion of disabled subjects. If, for example,
individuals in a community who are regularly capable of walking worked through their
narcissistic defenses and interacted with wheelchair users, this would likely facilitate
structural changes in the community, like making spaces more accessible to those in
wheelchairs. Thus, meliorating disabling exclusions requires the oscillating movement
described above between working through narcissistic defenses at the interpersonal level
and greater social interaction (moving toward, creating spaces and systems that allow for
this moving toward, and thus refiguring boundary of the community created and
maintained by abjection).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I aimed to develop a Kristevan account of disability as a
contribution to the field of disability studies and to Kristeva scholarship. First, following
upon the limits of the epistemic analysis of disability oppression in the previous chapter, I
argued that Kristeva’s theory of signification, as the interaction between the semiotic and
symbolic, provides a form of listening that is responsive to all persons’ making and
sharing of meaning, even those with severe mental disabilities. I named the prejudicial
neglect to be attentive in this way intimate hermeneutical injustice. Second, reading her
identity and reinforce the difference between “normal” persons (“you”) and disabled persons.
Rod Michalko (2002, 11-2) gives a helpful discussion of such an example.
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recent essays on disability through her previous work on abjection and the uncanny, I
offered an interpretation of Kristeva as providing a unique account of disability and a
promising proposed response to disabled persons’ current social exclusion. Specifically,
this account is helpful in revealing the psychic roots of the types of epistemic injustice
discussed throughout the dissertation so far. In the following chapter, I return to Kristeva,
this time her writings on genius, to develop an account of extraordinary disabled subjects.
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Subjectivity: Kristeva and (Disabled) Genius

The previous chapters sought to reveal the epistemic aspects of disability
oppression, and then looking to Kristeva, to understand the psychic source of the
exclusion of disabled persons and develop a response to this exclusion through a listening
attentive to disabled persons’ meanings and a double movement that constitutes what I
have called, following Kristeva, “interaction.” In this chapter I return to Kristeva, this
time to understand the potential for disabled subjects to develop a specific form of
subjectivity Kristeva calls “genius.” Because the genius is extraordinary even while she is
common, disabled genius has the potential to challenge notions of disabled persons as
limited or lacking. To better understand what Kristeva means by “genius,” I will first
look at her Oedipal account of psychosexual development as it relates to her argument for
the existence of a uniquely feminine genius. Specifically I will consider Kristeva’s
arguments in The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, where she discusses and revises the
Freudian view of psychosexual development in order to argue for a unique aspect of
feminine experience, the illusoriness of the phallus. Then I will turn to her conclusion to
the Feminine Genius Trilogy where she takes up this developmental picture again, this
time to support her view that there is a uniquely feminine genius. After reviewing these
two texts, I will argue that Kristeva’s position on feminine genius does not require her
Oedipal account of psychosexual development, and indeed that this account provides a
hurdle to developing other forms of genius among marginalized groups. Instead, I suggest
that we conceptualize feminine genius as a form of marginalized intimate revolt, as she
develops “revolt” in The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt and especially Intimate Revolt.
Developing this understanding of feminine genius may seem like a digression from the
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thread of this dissertation, but it is important, I believe, to determine whether or not an
account can be given without inheriting the heteronormative and otherwise oppressive
foundation of the Oedipal account. Having established the second interpretation of genius
as a form of intimate revolt, I then argue for a uniquely disabled genius through the lives
and works of Susan Wendell, a feminist philosopher, and Sesha Kittay, Eva Kittay’s
daughter.
Whence Feminine Genius?
The final chapter of the Female Genius Trilogy, “Is There a Feminine Genius?”
develops Kristeva’s account of feminine genius via her work on psychosexual
development which will be discussed below. Before this connection can be made,
however, it will be necessary to gain an understanding of what Kristeva means by
“genius” in general. Kristeva begins her trilogy with a brief history of the concept of
“genius,” which, as she later writes, is “the most fertile version of singularity at a given
historical moment” (Kristeva 2004, 404). Uncovering the singularity of each subject is
one of the main concerns that runs throughout Kristeva’s corpus. Specifically, she rejects
feminisms that cannot acknowledge the singular differences between each woman, and
more recently, she has insisted upon the singularity of all disabled subjects. She takes her
inspiration to be Duns Scotus’ notion of haecceity, or “thisness.” Reality is to be found
not in universals, for Scotus, “but in ‘a this one,’ this man here, this woman there; […]
the demonstrative indexing an unnamable singularity” (Kristeva 2013, 224). Scotus
sought to explain both the priority of the individual to the universal, and how these
individuals can still be thought of or conceived in terms of universals.1 Thus, we can see
A helpful discussion of Scotus can be found in Mary Beth Ingham’s and Mechthild
Dreyer’s The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, especially in section 4.5, “The Principle
1
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why Kristeva is interested in Scotus, for she too seeks to reveal the singularity of each
subject beneath the categories through which we understand them (man, woman,
disability, and so on). Her solution is that there are structural similarities shared by all
subjects, and yet there are specific histories, or particular developmental paths followed
by each individual. As Kristeva writes, “psychic bisexuality [is] characteristic of both
sexes, with dominant traits differing from one sexual identity to another and from one
individual to another,” such that “every sexual identity specific to a given subject is, as a
result, constructed as a variation on a dominant trait” (Kristeva 2004, 426).
To be clear, what Kristeva has in mind here when she speaks of sexual identity is
not just the sex to which one is attracted or the sex with which one identifies. Instead we
should hear, here, her consistent refrain that thought and sexuality, meaning and desire,
are co-present. In other words, each individual has navigated through relationships, first
with the care-giver and then gradually with others, based on abjections,2 identifications,
projections, idealizations,3 and so on, through which one is formed. And yet, each subject
is composed of a conscious and an unconscious and articulates its (maternal) semiotic
through the (phallic) symbolic. Thus, our individuating, but never solitary, histories are
capable of being shared because of the shared structuring of all subjects in relation to the
symbolic and semiotic. As in the case of foreigners discussed in the previous chapter, the
of Individuation.” There they explain that for Scotus, what makes something an individual is not
form or matter or even their composite, but where an entity’s “matter is this, the form is this, and
the composite is this” (Ingham and Dreyer 2004, 116).
2

For a discussion of abjection, see the previous chapter.

3

In identification, the subject takes on an attribute of the other with whom she identifies
and is thus transformed. Idealization occurs when the subject inflates the value of her object. In
projection, a quality or an affect of the subject is displaced onto an object such that it is expelled
from the subject. For detailed discussions of these psychic processes, see Laplanche and Pontalis
(1973).
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shared structure of each subject is what makes the singularity of each subject
communicable.
Given this understanding of singularity, what is genius, for Kristeva? First, genius
“pushes [sexual] variation to the limit, to the point of a maximum singularity, which can
nevertheless still be shared” (Kristeva 2004, 426). That is, within psychic bisexuality, the
genius creates such a unique identity that normal variations are challenged. Indeed, one
thing that Kristeva notes about the feminine geniuses she studies, Hannah Arendt,
Melanie Klein, and Colette,4 is that each assumes in her own way a certain phallic
assertiveness that is used to formulate and communicate “essential elements of the female
experience that correspond to their psychosexual difference” (425). They assume a
phallic position without seeking to become masculine.5
Second, a genius is one whose work is connected to her life to such an extent that
one cannot be discussed without the other (Kristeva 2001, xi). This means that the effects
of a genius’s works depend upon our response. The work must create an excess which
invites our response, but it remains up to us to discuss the person’s biography, or rather,
to give the person a biography in terms of her work. This biography, by its very nature
will be deflationary; that is, it cannot capture the entirety of the life or the profundity of
its excess. Yet we feel compelled to write or tell these stories anyway. And in so doing,
we realize that “they are geniuses for us,” that is, they are not extraordinary in some
Hannah Arendt was a political thinker, whose notion of the “who” and whose political
and narrative theories have profound influences upon Kristeva. Melanie Klein was a
psychoanalyst whose innovations in child psychotherapy were influential, especially upon object
relations theory. Colette was a writer, most well-known for novels like Gigi and Chéri.
4

As we will see below, the woman’s rejection of her psychic bisexuality in seeking to
become masculine is one of the fears Kristeva mentions for those women who overly invest the
phallic symbolic.
5
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questionable objective sense, but in relation to their biographers (xii). Moreover, they
make us realize we too are potential geniuses, as we too have stories to be told and are
capable of making creations to wonder at.6,7
We may then ask, with Kristeva, “And what role do women play in all this?”
(Kristeva 2001, xii). In other words, why think there is a feminine genius? Kristeva
claims to find three “resonance[s]” [résonance] (Kristeva 2001, xx) between the three
women she discusses in the Trilogy. The first trait is a singularity founded in
relationships. Arendt’s “who” is revealed only in a web of relationships, Klein’s ego
always has an object, and in Colette’s writing, the ego is fulfilled in the plurality of its
relationships.8 The feminine genius, then, is reconciled with, and does not seek to deny,
the constitutive nature of relationships with others for her own existence, but nor does she
deny the singularity of the individual subject who is allowed to flourish precisely because
of and through her relations with others.
Second, for feminine geniuses thought is immanent to life. Thus, Arendt is
adamant that life as bios, as a life with meaning, a life that is given sense, must be
elevated above bare zoe, or biological life. It is only thought in its myriad manifestations,
not simply thought as calculation, that can save us from totalitarianism on her view.
I take this passage as evidence of this claim: “Like the ancient Greek heroes, my
geniuses displayed qualities that, while no doubt exceptional, can be found in most of us. […]
What distinguishes these geniuses from us is simply that they have left us to judge a body of work
rooted in the biography of their experience” (Kristeva 2001, x).
6

7

Another way of stating this would be to say that geniuses are not exemplars but
examples. I thank Marygrace Hemme for pointing me to this distinction.
8

I phrase this ambiguously because Kristeva finds these traits in the works and lives of
these three geniuses. This reveals the connection between the genius’s life and works. So, for
example, Arendt’s own “who” is revealed in a web of relationships, as Kristeva endeavors to
show throughout the Arendt volume, and Arendt’s theoretical claim about the “who” is that it
emerges only in a web of relationships.

149

Similarly, Kristeva reads Klein to be concerned with the emergence and fostering of the
capacity of thought. Her researches aimed at avoiding or curing infantile psychosis were
meant not to normalize, but to defend thought and the conditions that make it possible.
Colette, on Kristeva’s reading, creates and recreates lives through her writing which
makes “thought become flesh” (Kristeva 2004, 422). Thinking is not an abstract activity,
for Colette, but that which engenders new forms of sensuous writing, creating new lives.
For each of these geniuses, then, life is the life of the mind, and thought is living-thought.
Finally, the feminine genius emphasizes cyclical temporality, re-creation, or
rebirth. Arendt finds in natality the source of freedom, as each birth is a “new beginning,”
the creation of a new world (Kristeva 2004, 423). Klein was herself reborn, Kristeva tells
us, as a result of her own analysis which led her to become an analyst. Moreover, in her
work with children, Klein emphasized the importance of the analyst entering the world of
the child (later understood as using counter-transference); in other words, she endeavored
to become a child again. This led to later developments of psychoanalytic theory in which
analysis is understood as perpetual rebirth, of new beginnings (424). And Colette sees in
writing an opportunity for re-creation and rebirth.
Finding these traits to be common to three women, however, is hardly sufficient
to deem them aspects of a uniquely feminine genius. To fully answer our initial question,
then, we need an account of why we should think of them as feminine traits. I believe
there are two possible answers to this question in Kristeva’s work, answers which may be
connected on her own view, but which I think can be beneficially separated. First,
Kristeva provides an Oedipal account of the traits of feminine genius. Second, Kristeva
often discusses the margin as a privileged site of what she calls (intimate) revolt. Below, I
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will discuss both accounts, and argue that the latter is preferable. Indeed, her emphasis on
the former, I will contend, limits Kristeva from developing other forms of marginalized
genius.
Oedipus2 and the Illusory Phallus9
In order to approach Kristeva’s thought with clarity, I first give an exegesis of her
Oedipal account of psychosexual development, and then turn to my critical remarks in the
following section. Kristeva’s theory of psychosexual development builds upon Freud’s
own account, and thus takes up several important aspects of Freudian theory. First,
Kristeva accepts that phallic monism characterizes infantile sexuality. (It is important for
her that this characterizes only infantile sexuality, and that the ideal is a move toward
adult sexuality which acknowledges both sexes.) The penis is primary in infantile
sexuality because it is visible, and because it is eroticized (that is, it undergoes erections,
feels pleasure, and so on). Unlike the vagina and clitoris, then, it becomes a signifier of
presence and absence. The child with a penis can imagine it being removed, and can see
its absence in the female’s genitals. The child without a penis sees and experiences its
lack in her own anatomy, and its presence in the boy’s. It is this (real and/or imaginary)
lack which positions the penis to become the symbolic phallus, as it comes to signify
lack, and thus “all that signifies” (Kristeva 2000, 73). The penis’s visible presence and
absence sets up symbolic difference, that between marked and unmarked, present and
absent, which “founds all systems of meaning” (97). As a result of the primacy of the
penis, infantile sexuality in all children is characterized by “phallic monism,” the

Throughout this chapter, Oedipus 2, read “Oedipus double-prime,” refers to a
developmental stage theorized by Kristeva. The superscript “2” should not be confused with a
footnote.
9
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fantasy10 that all other persons have penises and that lacking a penis is a form of
punishment (especially by the father). Though phallic monism characterizes only
infantile genital organization, Kristeva says, it is repressed and comes to characterize the
unconscious, such that “the unconscious is phallic” or what is the same thing for her,
“there is no unconscious psychical genitality” (98).11 This phase of phallic monism is
required for any child, male or female, to become a subject of the symbolic.
Kristeva moves on to present an innovation in the Oedipal narrative, however, one
that is especially important in the case of females. There are two differences between
Oedipus for boys and girls for Kristeva. First, because entrance into the symbolic is
provided by the centrality of the phallus as the central organizer of meaning, this
encounter between the sensory and the symbolic, between desire and meaning, an
encounter which Kristeva calls the kairos,12 is experienced differently by boys and girls.
For male children, their sensations of sexual excitation correspond with this entrance into
the (phallic) symbolic. Moreover, the male child tends to be the object of its parents’
(especially its father’s) narcissistic overinvestment. For female children, sensations of
sexual excitation fail to correspond with this entrance into the symbolic, and they are
often not the object of their parents’ narcissistic investment (at least not to the same

10

It is important for Kristeva that this is a fantasy and not a thought (Kristeva 2000, 73).

11

This equivalence is a point to which I will return in the next section.

12

In a footnote about her choice of this term, Kristeva notes that kairos had a variety of
meanings in (pre-modern) Greek: “the point that touches the end, suitability, appropriateness, the
dangerous and critical point, the advantage, the right moment.” She continues, “We can see the
etymology in ‘to encounter’ or ‘to cut.’ To encounter oneself is also to cut oneself, with the
reunification and possible loss that this supposes” (Kristeva 2000, 97n4). The word thus refers to
the dangerous, critical, yet appropriate encounter between the symbolic and the drives, between
meaning and desire. This encounter is also a cutting, a splitting into conscious and unconscious,
into desiring and speaking, a cut which remains and indeed makes possible an encounter.
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degree). Yet, Kristeva acknowledges that this is open to radical variation; girls, for
example, can be valorized by their fathers as much as sons may be, or even more so.
Indeed, Kristeva writes that a girl can both be more valorized and experience greater
genital excitations than a boy. However, she maintains that the structure of the kairos is
fundamentally different in girls and boys. This is because the source of her pleasure is not
visible, and thus cannot replace the penis/phallus as the “privileged signifier” (Kristeva
2000, 99). Thus, while the girl can enter the symbolic in the phallic phase, it is
experienced as illusory. In other words, the phallic symbolic is entered into by the girl
because it is indispensable for her; she could not become a subject (of language or law)
without doing so. And yet it is entered as a game, as pretend, as illusory. While the boy
can experience “I am what is”—that is, I am a subject as a possessor of the phallus—the
girl’s experience is of the form “I am, nevertheless, because of not”—that is, I am a
subject because of the phallus which I do not possess (100). Importantly, Kristeva says
that the female believes that the phallic is illusory, but what she means by this is not a
reflective belief, rather she means “conscious and unconscious adherence, without proof,
to an obvious fact” (100, emphasis added). In other words, the female enters into the
phallic symbolic and thus experiences signification as dissociated from her sensory
experiences, as contingent, not real or necessary as the male experiences it.
This experience of the phallic as illusory or extraneous has a variety of potential
results. First, it may lead the female to exist in the social world with “aloof efficiency,”
such that the subject navigates the symbolic without taking it too seriously (Kristeva
2000, 102). Second, it may lead the female to renounce the phallic symbolic in favor of
the semiotic, an “unnamable sensoriality” in which she becomes “sullen, silent, [or]
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suicidal,” isolated from symbolic articulation and sharing (102). Third, the female may
invest the extraneous phallic to become a “seductress,” one who knowingly plays on the
symbolic (102). Fourth, the female may on the contrary deny the illusory nature of the
phallus and instead identify with it, assuming as much as possible the man’s position in
the symbolic and thus becoming insensitive to or unaware of the phallus’s illusoriness.
Kristeva refers to this position as the “female paranoiac” and lists some archetypes: “the
boss, director, or virile lesbian, partisans of power in all its more or less dictatorial forms”
(102). Immediately after this list (which is hard to read as anything but derogatory),
Kristeva insists that these are all potential psychical structurings, each of which offers its
own benefits and disadvantages. While this indicates an attempt to move away from the
normalizing, pathologizing tendencies of prior instantiations of psychoanalytic theory and
practice, it does not go far enough and ends up, I fear, reifying forms of sexism that
should instead be resisted. I will return to this point in the next section.
The second innovation Kristeva presents is referred to as Oedipus2, the complex
process by which the girl changes the object of her sexual desire from her mother to her
father. The mother is originally the object for both the boy and the girl. Whereas the
heterosexual boy, with the threat of castration from the father, needs only find another
woman to replace his mother as his object, the heterosexual girl must make a double
move: she must change objects, from the mother to the father, and only then find male
replacements. To accomplish this, Kristeva argues, she first rejects the mother as the
object of her desire, but this allows her to identify with the mother. In identifying with the
mother, she is then able to identify with her desire, namely the desire for the father—or
more specifically, Kristeva says, “the girl wants the father to give her his own
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penis/phallus, in the form of children that the girl would have as if she were…the
mother” (2000, 103). This sets up an interminable Oedipus, in which the woman desires
the phallus, whether in the form of a masculine career or a child. Kristeva is especially
interested in the second possibility, the child, which for her is the “real presence of the
phallus” (103). The experience of maternity, then, reaffirms the bisexuality of the
woman, as the child is her real phallus, and yet, as a mother she is the other of man. And
thus, the experience of maternity is a conjunction of the woman’s “symbolic essence” in
acquiring the child/phallus, and her “carnal essence,” that is, her semiotic essence, that
which recovers her pre-symbolic relation to her own mother (104). Through maternity,
Kristeva writes, mothers are “guarantor[s] of both the social and the biological” (104).
This is because the mother guides the child into language (and in doing so reacquires
language herself and thus reconciles her relation to her own mother), and because she is
responsible for biological reproduction and providing the child sustenance (Kristeva
2012, 89-90). In other words, the mother’s experience of having the phallus in the form
of the child and guiding the child into the symbolic is also an experience (a) of being
given the child by the father, though she must separate from the child for it to develop
such that the child is only ever partially and temporarily the mother’s real phallus, and (b)
of guiding the child into language through semiotic echolalia, recalling her pre-symbolic
relationship to her own mother. This is why Kristeva refers to motherhood as bisexual.
Furthermore, it is why she refers to mothering as an interminable process of identifying
with one’s own mother; in being given the child and guiding the child into language, she
identifies with her mother and must therefore renegotiate her relationship to her own
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mother. In echolalia, she hears not just her child’s entrance into language, but also her
own entrance into language via her mother’s facilitation.
While Kristeva’s account is clearly an attempt to recover the unique experience of
females, especially those who become mothers, she also warns against possible
weaknesses that may arise out of these experiences. Here, she groups the four positions
discussed above into two groups based on the ways in which they renounce psychic
bisexuality. “[H]ysterical depressivity” is characterized by the withdrawal from the
phallic and retreat into the sensorial, while “hysterical indifference” is characterized by a
veneration of the phallic and cutting of ties with the maternal, sensorial, and semiotic
(Kristeva 2000, 105). What the renegotiation of Oedipus2 through the experience of
motherhood potentially allows is an embrace of psychic bisexuality that both accepts the
phallic as real (in the presence of the child) and illusory (as the child is always separating
from the mother), and recovers and revalues the semiotic, primary homosexual
relationship with the mother. The danger here is that the mother will only experience the
real presence of the phallus vicariously through the child, such that she is vulnerable to
all that the child is vulnerable to and experiences attacks upon the child as threats to
herself. Thus, Kristeva acknowledges that the ideal result of motherhood as a
renegotiation of psychic bisexuality is an unlikely and precarious one, and yet, one that is
“miraculously” at least partially achieved by most mothers (Kristeva 2012, 86).
Having reviewed Kristeva’s account of female psychosexual development, we
may now return to Kristeva’s account of feminine genius. In her three feminine geniuses,
Kristeva finds three resonances, qualities that they share and which thus characterize
feminine genius, at least in part. She roots these qualities in the female experience of
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psychosexual development discussed above, this time with some modifications and
shifted emphases. Here, she emphasizes the bisexuality of both girls and boys, as both are
subject to the penetration of the mother (and father) in feeding orally, having their
cavities cleaned, and so on. Thus, children of both sexes are originally passive (though
even at this age infants act and react, defecating, vomiting, flailing and gesturing, cooing
and crying). Kristeva calls this phase the “feminine position” (Kristeva 2004, 410). Still
in Oedipus1, however, girls begin a different path of development than boys, because
while boys move toward penile excitation, girls are dominated by “orificial excitation,”
the pleasures of the mouth, vagina, and anus, and this hollow excitation makes room for
the introjection of the mother (411).13 But the girl does not just represent the mother
within her in her fantasy, she also forms a projective identification with her, projecting
her dependence onto the mother, and identifying with her mother’s possession of the
daughter (412). This exposes the girl to a greater dependency, a “real need for
connection,” and yet positions the girl to be able to achieve “real relationship[s]” to a
greater degree than the boy, even though this structure is not completely absent in boys
given their bisexuality (412-13).
Then, as discussed above, the girl enters the symbolic though believing it to be
illusory. And in Oedipus2 she rejects and identifies with the mother, taking the father as
her object instead of her mother, and thus desires a child-phallus. If the dangers of this
complicated maneuver are avoided and the girl embraces her bisexual nature (rather than
denying the phallic or denying the feminine), the woman that she becomes may be
develop a unique maturity, one that is capable of acknowledging the real presence of the
13

Introjection is the process by which one brings another within oneself in fantasy
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 229).
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other. This is opposed to the overly phallic position of men who conceive of themselves
as autonomous, independent, or as she says “macho,” and the narcissistic position of men
who conceive of others as existing for them, a position Kristeva refers to as the
“impossible Mr. Baby” (Kristeva 2004, 418). The unique feminine maturity to which
Kristeva refers is best exemplified in the experience of motherhood, where the mother, in
the best case, views her child “not as a phallic or narcissistic prosthesis […] but as the
real presence of the other” (418). In other words, she can sublimate her libido, and in so
doing she can access “the cyclical time of generations, of new beginnings, of rebirths”
(418). It is in experiencing others as others, not as new manifestations of the Oedipal
drama, that one can recognize the wonder of natality, the potentials for starting anew, or
revolt.14 The woman who has achieved this, on Kristeva’s view, has achieved a psychic
depth called the feminine: a depth based on the subject’s relationships with real others,
resulting in the maturity and experience of cyclical temporality discussed above.15
These psychosexual developments, largely specific to females, are the source of
three characteristics Kristeva associates with feminine genius. First, feminine genius
This is importantly different from the “time of desire” or the “time of death,” for
Kristeva (2004, 418). In a much earlier essay, “Women’s Time,” Kristeva argues that female
subjectivity offers an experience of time as cyclical—the experience she is returning to in her
discussion of feminine genius—and of time as eternal—a time she calls “faultless and
impenetrable” (1995, 205). This is different from a teleological conception of time, one that
involves a break and then, eventually, an arrival or end. Thus, desire is experienced as a rupture,
beginning with a lack, and aims toward its fulfillment, even if this fulfillment is never achieved.
This is why this is also the time of history and the time of death, as both are conceived in terms of
a break (for example, the emergence of a new historical period, or the birth of a new subject) and
in terms of a finality (for example, the end of that historical period, or death). Missing from this
view are the circular movements of time (biological repetitions, the emergence of new
generations, or rebirths within a single subject) and the eternal, unbroken conception of time.
14

15

Femininity is distinct from the feminine, for Kristeva. The former is a phallic guise that
covers the feminine, a mask of seduction, competition, and performance (Kristeva 2004, 418-9).
One can see here the similarity to the phallic positions she develops in The Sense and Non-Sense
of Revolt discussed above.
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involves the “permanence of relationships and of the object” (Kristeva 2004, 424). This,
as we saw above, is a particularly likely potential for females as a result of their
relationships with their mothers and their navigation of Oedipus2 which embeds them in
real relationships, first with their mothers, then potentially with their children or others.
As Kristeva writes, “A woman is less isolated in erotic pleasure and more dependent on
the other” (420). Recall that the girl’s eroticism takes the form of introjecting and
identifying with the mother, redirecting her toward relationships rather than toward
centralized, phallic pleasures as often happens to boys. This leads, on Kristeva’s view, to
a cultivation of singularity within relationships, rather than a view of relationships as
limiting one’s individual pleasures.
Second, feminine geniuses are concerned to “safeguard the life of thought,
because thought is life” (Kristeva 2004, 424). This is particularly feminine on Kristeva’s
view because female psychosexuality does not isolate itself in abstract thought or
calculation, but retains meaning rooted in the sensory, the somatic, the semiotic. As we
saw in the discussion above, this is because of the prolonged relation to and identification
with the mother, with whom the girl shares a semiotic connection that is recovered in her
relationship with her own child. Thus, she is less prone to phallic abstraction in which
thought is separated (or distanced) from lived experience.
Third, “the time of flowering and rebirth” is emphasized by feminine geniuses,
rather than linear time. Again, on Kristeva’s view, it is the working of Oedipus2 that
makes this time characteristic of the feminine. She writes of the female:
She goes from the mother to the father [changing objects in Oedipus2], from the
sensory to the signifiable [though this is also a move that male children must
make given her developmental accounts explained in this and the previous
chapter], from the cloacal and the vaginal to the phallic [again, children of both
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sexes move from an original passivity emphasizing orificial pleasure into the
phallic monism that establishes language], from the internal object to the external
object [I take this to mean from the introjected mother to real relationships, first
with the mother and then with others], and back to that perpetual Oedipus, which
never seems completed in the female subject, never closed, but that is appeased
when love is stripped of its passion in motherhood, friendships, cosmic
relationships. (Kristeva 2004, 424)
Of the movements she notes here, it is the perpetual Oedipus that seems to be of most
importance, as the other characteristics also describe the development of male children,
even if they differ in degree between the sexes. The perpetual Oedipus to which she
refers is the experience of desiring the phallus (namely in the form of a child) and
reconciling herself with her mother (namely through relearning language with her child).
Appeasement, as she calls it, can occur on her view when the other is recognized as an
other, rather than as a phallic replacement. Because children grow and become distinct, a
child can only temporarily serve as a phallus for the mother, and thus her experience is
bound to begin again. In other relationships too, women will experience the pull between
the desire for the phallus, that is, a place in the symbolic, and a recovery of the presymbolic relationship with the mother.16 This is what situates female psychosexuality in a
unique position to emphasize cyclical time.
There is one final point on this topic that I should make clear. Kristeva insists that
genius in any form, including feminine genius, requires a certain “phallic assertiveness,”
without which the singular subject could not create a life or work worthy of the title
genius. The feminine genius, however, is not the same as the overly phallic woman
described in The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, one who denies the feminine, the
sensorial, in investing the phallic, the abstract, the symbolic. Rather, she reconciles
16

Kristeva only mentions friendship as an alternate possibility but does not give a parallel

story.
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phallic assertiveness with the feminine characteristics described above, embracing
psychic bisexuality rather than denying either of its poles and entering the symbolic
forcefully without disavowing the semiotic.
Feminine Genius without Oedipal Psychosexuality
Before discussing the alternative version of feminine genius I propose, I will
argue in this section that Kristeva’s derivation of feminine genius from her account of
female psychosexuality reifies certain sexist and dangerously normative assumptions.
While Kristeva is quick to reject any interpretations of psychoanalysis as a normalizing
practice,17 the Oedipal narrative she develops preserves first, the primacy of the penis as
the organizer of both the symbolic and the unconscious and second, the ideal of
heterosexual development for females. Let’s consider these in order. Tina Chanter
provides a helpful analysis of the Freudian Oedipal story in her essay “The Exoticization
and Universalization of the Fetish, and the Naturalization of the Phallus: Abject
Objections.” There she writes,
Girls are assumed to be wanting, given the evidence of the absence of a penis—a
lack, however, that is based on the disparity between what is seen and the
expectation that they should have a penis. The normative force of such an
expectation resides in an attachment to the following unstated assumption: the
basic similarity of all humans, where humanity is defined by default according to
male traits. (Chanter 2005, 154)
In other words, the phallic monism of the Freudian account, which Kristeva retains,
accepts the normative assumption that the archetype of humanity is the male, the human
with a penis. Indeed, it is revealing that she considers the assertion that “the unconscious

17

Indeed in New Maladies of the Soul she says, and we can sense her exasperation,
“Need I emphasize that in proposing that [allowing the drives to speak through language] be the
goal of analysis, I am in no way advocating the normalization of the patient?” (Kristeva 1995,
36).
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is phallic” and the assertion that “the unconscious has no genitality” to be equivalent. The
phallic is the default on this view.18
Moreover, Kristeva accepts arguments which claim that the penis is suited, given
its physical characteristics, to be the first symbol of both presence and absence, and thus
the first signifier of a symbolic based on presence and absence.19 She also finds that the
phallus, given its erotic investment, is the foundation for the co-presence of sexuality and
thought, desire and meaning.20 Note, however, that all this account requires is (a) the copresence of a symbol of presence and absence and (b) a site of erotic investment. Any
number of experiences could provide this co-presence. A child feeding, for example,
experiences an oral erotic investment and the presence and absence of that which
provides pleasure (the breast, the bottle, food, the thumb, and so on). Or, retaining the
privilege of the genitals, the clitoris, for a girl, could surely be threatened by detachment
in fantasy, and it is a site of pleasure for the girl. Indeed, Kristeva even broaches this
possibility only to reject it. She says that “individual variations in excitation or clitoral
pleasure […] considerably influence the modulations of feminine phallicism,” and yet,
“[i]nvisible and almost impossible to locate, the real and imaginary basis of phallic
pleasure in the girl (the clitoris) immediately dissociates the female subject from the
phallus in the sense of a privileged signifier in the logos/desire conjunction” (Kristeva
18

Indeed, given that the penis becomes the symbol of presence and absence, that is, of
lack, this may also be of concern for theorizing disability. In other words, perceiving the disabled
person as lacking depends upon the expectation of the presence of certain organs and functions.
Because I aim to ultimately reject this account, and because a similar line of criticism is followed
by Margrit Shildrick (2009) in reference to Lacan’s thought, I will not analyze this point in detail,
here.
19

See for example, Kristeva 2000, pp. 73 and 97.

I find Keltner’s explanation of this aspect of Kristeva’s work incredibly helpful. See
Keltner 2011, pp. 120-25.
20
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2000, 99). Importantly, this explanation depends on the primacy of sight over other
senses, specifically touch (or maybe just the absence of a mirror). Here we have an
ableist assumption coupled with a sexist one. To be clear, I am not arguing for an
abandonment of the body, but for an understanding of the body and its pleasures and
pains as mobile, not fixed by the genital consolidation prescribed by Kristeva.
In defending the thesis of phallic monism, Kristeva also acknowledges the
importance of familial and social influences, again only to reject them as variations which
do not disturb phallic monism. She writes that a “girl may be as […] valorized [by the
father] as a little boy in the phallic phase, if not more so,” and that this can alter the girl’s
experience of this phallic phase (Kristeva 2000, 99). And yet, she goes on to write,
“Lesser valorization of the girl by her father and mother, in comparison to the boy,
traditionally played out in families or as a result of specific psychosocial configurations,
contributes to consolidating this disappointment” of “being less visible and less
remarkable” (100, emphasis added). What is frustrating about this passage is that even
while she acknowledges the familial and social variability of the experiences of girls (and
boys) at this stage in their development, she is incapable of imagining alternatives. In
other words, besides the lack of visibility of the clitoris, the other reason that the (phallic)
symbolic is experienced as illusory by the girl is that her clitoral pleasure is less esteemed
by her parents. But what if this is not the case? Would this not only lead to the female to
experience the symbolic as real, rather than illusory, but also to fall outside phallic
monism altogether? Such a scenario is never discussed, for while Kristeva may
acknowledge that her theory depends on a particular social setting or “traditional” family,
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she is incapable of developing alternative models. She leaves us trapped in a theory that
reifies the female as a being of lack, and the male as the archetype of humanity.
Now we can turn to the normative assumptions of Kristeva’s Oedipus2. Recall
that this stage of a female’s psychosexual development is characterized by a change of
objects, from the mother to the father. It is this that leads women to a greater psychic
bisexuality because, on the one hand, they desire the phallus (and sometimes receive it in
the form of a child), and yet on the other hand, they remain tied to their relationships with
their own mothers (through a pre-oedipal, sensory link that is renegotiated in re-learning
language with their own children). This assumes a heterosexual development, however,
in which the girl takes the father for her object and thus later seeks sexual relationships
with males. Already in her early book, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-bind,
Kelly Oliver noted Kristeva’s discomfort with homosexuality (1993, 139).21 This appears
to continue into her later works. Kristeva does acknowledge that there are different
positions a woman could take in her psychosexual development in relation to the phallic
and the maternal. In The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt she writes, for example, “these
different articulations of the phallus offer privileges but also set traps, like every
psychical structuring” (Kristeva 2000, 102). But despite this qualification, it is clear that
she in fact values a very particular psychosexual trajectory over others, that of the

She cites the following passage from Tales of Love: “I have chanced to note that when
analysands of either sex made their love known to me, pretending to forget the expedient of the
analytical contract, it involved men or women who called themselves homosexual. […] Why
homosexuals? Could they have guessed an uneasiness on my part in dealing with their uneasiness
about a subjugating mother, precociously and encroachingly loving, abandoned or abiding, but
always underhandedly fascinating? Do they set up, in my place, instead of an object of love, my
own preciously lost love? Probably” (Kristeva 1987, 11-12). As Oliver notes, the passage
suggests both a discomfort with homosexuality, but also Kristeva’s own homosexual desire, her
longing for her lost mother.
21
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heterosexual mother, for it is here that we find the “assumption of the phallic and its
traverse in the real presence of the child and reconciliation with the unrepresentable
antephallic of the preoedipal maternal and prelanguage” (106). Similarly, in her
discussion of feminine genius, it is the (heterosexual) mother who “has metabolized the
[…] hypersensitive receptivity of Oedipus prime into a psychic depth,” namely the
feminine, though “she is not unfamiliar with femininity […] by excelling in seduction and
even in virile competition” (Kristeva 2004, 418-19).22 In other words, while Kristeva
claims not to normalize any particular psychosexual development, she clearly valorizes
the heterosexual mother who succeeds in reconciling the phallic and the maternal over
other female psychosexual positions. Moreover, Kristeva appears unable to imagine a
subject who navigates Oedipus2 by identifying with the father and retaining the mother as
her object. Even when she does discuss the example of the “virile lesbian,” it is a result of
identifying with the “male’s phallic position” and cutting, as far as possible, the “primary
semiotic link with the mother (which some call primary female homosexuality)”
(Kristeva 2000, 102). Her exemplary lesbian identifies with the phallic position, not the
father, and denies the link with the mother, rather than keeping the mother as her object.
Finally, while Kristeva is sometimes careful to put the word “normal” in quotation marks,
she writes that “normal evolution abandons [the mother-daughter link] in favor of the
22

I think I am justified in claiming that the mother Kristeva has in mind here is
heterosexual, because in her Oedipal logic, it is the desire to receive the father’s penis, and thus a
child, that is at the origin of the desire for the child as a phallic replacement, and it is this desire
for a phallic replacement that must be transformed into a relationship with the child as a genuine
other (Kristeva 2004, 417-18). One may wonder whether a woman who identifies with the father,
rather than the mother, could desire a child as an other from the beginning and thus avoid the
need to overcome her desire for the child as a phallic substitute. That is, could a lesbian mother
(on a certain revision of the Oedipal story) have greater facility with the maternal qualities
Kristeva valorizes than a heterosexual mother?
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daughter-father erotic choice,” presenting a normalizing developmental picture at the
same time that she presents primary homosexuality as a universal female phase (Kristeva
2000, 80). That is, she makes two normalizing movements in seeking a nuanced
developmental picture: the norm of following her account of Oedipus2 and the norm of a
mother (or at least a woman) as a primary care-giver.23
Finally, in defense of Kristeva one may reply that she specifies that feminine
qualities can also be found in men. She writes, for example, that she seeks to “define not
Woman or All Women, but a feminine specificity that is declined differently in each sex
(the feminine of woman, the feminine of man) and in a singular manner for each subject”
(Kristeva 2004, 408). Indeed, Birgit Schippers argues that “such an understanding of the
feminine as irreducible heterogeneity should put at ease critics” who worry that the
feminine, for Kristeva, is always reducible to motherhood (2011, 123).24 As we saw
above, male and female children alike go through a “feminine position,” in which their
pleasure is experienced passively or receptively; both must achieve a phallic kairos and
become subjects of the symbolic; and thus both must move beyond the sensory link with
the mother to enter the symbolic, a link that is never completely severed, however, as is
evident in the semiotic. Moreover, Kristeva tells us that the feminine characteristics that
are shared by feminine geniuses can also be found “in the works of a large number of
male authors” (2004, 424-25). The question I am left with, however, is why we should
23

Birgit Schippers helpfully ties together these two points. She notes that because
Kristeva remains tied to heterosexual parenting, women can be mothers and become maternal
geniuses, men can share in the experience of maternity if they “tap into their feminine
dispositions,” but “lesbian mothering, and with it, access to maternal genius [for lesbians]” is
denied (Schippers 2011, 124).
To be clear, Schippers’ claim is a limited one. As the previous footnote explains, she
develops a different criticism of Kristeva’s view of motherhood.
24
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refer to these phases or traits as “feminine” in the first place. There are two potential
answers to this question, it seems. On the one hand, it may be the case that they are
feminine because of their relation to female psychosexual development. On the other
hand, it may be the case that they are feminine because they are characteristics which
have been traditionally assigned to, socialized in, or performatively impressed upon those
identified as women. It is clear that Kristeva’s view is the former. She writes that the
characteristics of the feminine genius “can be linked to constants of female
psychosexuality,” and that if they are found in men it is because “psychic bisexuality is
shared by both sexes” (424-25, emphasis added). Thus, that which is described as
“feminine” references female psychosexuality, and yet subjects of either sex are
psychically bisexual. We may then ask, “What is it in female psychosexuality that makes
her form of psychic bisexuality ‘female’?” Her answer ultimately depends upon a certain
conservative biology, and thus it seems to me that it will inevitably fall into an
unacceptable essentialism.25 Not having a penis, and thus switching objects from the
mother to the father, are constitutive of female psychosexuality, for Kristeva, but as
discussed above, there is simply no good reason to limit a female’s psychosexual
development in these ways. Indeed, in doing so she reifies oppressive assumptions in her
attempt to revalue aspects of females’ experiences. Take, for example, the “feminine
position” which both male and female children occupy. If both occupy it, why is it called

25

Again, I do not want to excise the body from the theory here. As should become clear
in the next section, the somatic and semiotic forces that make their way into symbolic language
and thus transform the symbolic are key to understanding revolt and thus genius. But rather than
referencing the biological in her account of psychosexual development, Kristeva falls back on a
conservative biology that understands sex as an essential determinant, rather than culturally
formed itself.
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a feminine position? Because Kristeva is reading into this developmental phase the
oppressive assumption of female passivity.
Thus, I reject Kristeva’s view that the semiotic is necessarily maternal and that the
symbolic is necessarily phallic because it is founded upon classist, ableist, sexist, and
heteronormative assumptions about the family structure. Still, abjection, narcissism, and
the entrance into language via the symbolic do seem to provide shared structures through
which singular subjects share their unique histories. So, for example, regardless of one’s
own sex or the sex of one’s caretaker(s), all subjects experience abjection and this
provides a shared structure through which we can understand others’ experiences. I do
not want to reject Kristeva’s account of singularity entirely, then. Rather, my suggestion
is that we develop a more general account of singularity that acknowledges shared
structures beyond sexual differentiation.
Intimate Revolt and Feminine Genius
A second way to conceive of feminine genius is as a form of intimate revolt from
the margins. Though Kristeva does not directly draw this connection, it is clear that her
work on revolt (especially The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt and Intimate Revolt)
influenced the development of her thesis of feminine genius. In this section, I will make
this connection explicit and suggest in doing so that it provides an account of feminine
genius that is preferable to the Oedipal account discussed above.
First, then, what is “revolt” on Kristeva’s view? In beginning to answer this,
Kristeva, as she often does, begins by looking at the etymology of the word revolt
(Kristeva 2000, 1-4).26 The details are not essential, here, but the common theme that

26

In French the word is “révolte.”
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develops from her analysis is the sense of a “turning.” While Kristeva provides a history
of the word’s meanings through time in order to reveal its plasticity, and thus, to help her
free “revolt” from its current, solely political sense, she also finds in this history a turning
and returning that will influence her own notion of revolt. This notion encompasses three
figures: “revolt as the transgression of a prohibition;” “revolt as repetition, workingthrough, working-out;” and “revolt as displacement, combinatives, games” (Kristeva
2000, 16). Kristeva’s understanding of power in contemporary France (and perhaps the
contemporary West) leads her to downplay the first figure of revolt, at least as
transgression has traditionally been conceived. As she asks throughout The Sense and
Non-Sense of Revolt, “who can revolt, and against what?” (8). This is because Kristeva
sees contemporary manifestations of power as normalizing, rather than prohibitive, and
as falsifiable. A discussion of this problematic is beyond the scope of this work, though I
will briefly come back to this below when discussing marginality.27 The second figure,
best exemplified in the analytical space and in writing, is a form of revolt both because it
is a return to a past (of the unconscious) and because such returns are “softer forms of the
displacement of prohibition” (28). Since working-through accomplishes a displacement, I
will discuss the second and third figures together, here.
First, then, consider the case of working-through. Recall that for Freud, workingthrough follows the interpretation of a psychic resistance where this interpretation does
not suffice to overcome the resistance. This is because the interpretation may be
convincing at the level of conscious understanding, but there remain affective

27

There are helpful discussions of this in Keltner (2011) and Schippers (2011). And Sara
Beardsworth places this problematic in the scope of Kristeva’s oeuvre in her essay entitled “From
Revolution to Revolt Culture” (2005).
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investments which must be displaced.28 Working-through, then, is achieved by recalling
something from one’s unconscious, from one’s past, which is resisted. Thus, it is a return.
Moreover, this resistance is the result of the imposition of the symbolic which leads to the
formation of conscious/unconscious heterogeneity. Insofar as that which is recalled from
the unconscious is blocked or resisted from conscious awareness (by the supergo or ego
ideal), its recollection is a transgression or displacement of this prohibition. Second,
consider the case of writing. Importantly for Kristeva, writing can allow that which has
been denied meaning or access to the symbolic to be shared as meaningful. Through
certain forms of literature, especially poetic language, drives which remain unarticulated
and thus meaningless can become shared and meaningful. Again, this is a return to the
unconscious, and one which displaces the boundary between meaninglessness and
meaningfulness, sense and non-sense.
This form of revolt is expanded upon and called “intimate revolt” in her book of
that name. Importantly, “intimate” has a specific meaning for Kristeva. It does not mean
“private,” for example, nor does it mean “individual” understood in an isolated sense.
Rather, the “essence of the intimate” for Kristeva is “the heterogeneous continuity
between body-soul-mind,” the heterogeneity of the conscious and unconscious (Kristeva
2002, 51). And because the psyche’s heterogeneity is always in relation to others, an
intimate revolt will not be a private revolt. Rather, intimate revolt requires the
forgiveness of others, and this is exemplified by the analyst. Forgiveness (pardon) is
transference, a gift (don) given by another through interpretation or silence—importantly
28

Recall the example of disability discussed in the previous chapter. Someone may be
convinced by the interpretation that she rejects the disabled person because of her own
narcissistic investment in invulnerability, but this will not shift her affective investments in her
own invulnerability (at least not immediately).
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not through an imposition—which allows sense to be given to the senselessness of the
unconscious. It is only in relation to another that a subject can share the semiotic.
Through this sharing, the subject can exchange preverbal meanings with another, and
work with the interpretations and silences of the other to give conscious articulation to
the semiotic. And because sublimation, for Kristeva, is the placing of a drive into words,
sublimation occurs only through others.29 So in sum, transference (or forgiveness) is the
forging of a preverbal (semiotic, drive-based, affective) link with another which allows
the unconscious to be given conscious meaning. This is a form of revolt because it is a
return to the unconscious, the return of a lost past, which displaces a conscious (and
perhaps symbolic) prohibition. In other words, by bringing something unconscious into
consciousness, the consciousness is itself transformed; or, by bringing something
semiotic into symbolic language, the symbolic is itself transformed. These are not, of
course, large-scale, structural, or culture-wide revolts. But where is a contemporary revolt
to begin, Kristeva asks, if not at this level of the intimate?30
Furthermore, intimate revolt in Kristeva’s sense is also a rebirth or renewal,
because the subject is herself transformed in the process revolt. Intimate revolt is, she
writes, “a psychical restructuring” (Kristeva 2002, 8). What was unconscious has become
conscious; what was inexpressible has been given meaning; a lost past has been
reinterpreted. Indeed, in reinterpreting this past, a new present (and therefore future)

Kelly Oliver’s essay, “Revolt and Forgiveness” (2005) helpfully explains the
relationship of intimate revolt to Kristeva’s earlier work.
29

Indeed, given Kristeva’s concerns about the reductive consumerism of contemporary
life and the reduction of the social to the “society of the spectacle,” an intimate revolt which
questions, and which depends upon and fosters social links beyond production, consumption, and
exchange is quite radical.
30
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become possible. As Kristeva writes, “What makes sense today is not the future (as
communism and providential religions claimed) but revolt: that is, the questioning and
displacement of the past. The future, if it exists, depends on it” (5).31 Thus, the
sublimation enabled by intimate revolt, whether in transference or through poetic
language, is the source of the continuous renewal of the subject. I emphasize
“continuous,” here, because for Kristeva revolt is never complete. There will always be a
past to return to, an affect or drive to bring into meaning, and an unstable boundary
between the unconscious and conscious to be refigured. In this way the subject is capable
of continual rebirths.
One final qualification is in order before discussing feminine genius as a
privileged form or intimate revolt. Though never making explicit connections between
revolt and marginality, Kristeva is concerned with those on the margins in The Sense and
Non-Sense of Revolt.32 There are three instances I would like to briefly discuss because I
think they provide a starting point for her developments in the Feminine Genius Trilogy.
First, Kristeva writes:
[…] the normalizing order is far from perfect and fails to support the excluded:
jobless youth, the poor in the projects, the homeless, the unemployed, and
foreigners, among many others. When the excluded have no culture of revolt and
must content themselves with regressive ideologies, with shows and
This emphasis on birth, rebirth, or new beginnings is one of Kristeva’s most important
adoptions from the work of Hannah Arendt, and her reclaiming the intimate is one of her most
important revisions of Arendt’s work. In addition to Kristeva’s own views on this relationship in
the Hannah Arendt volume (2001), Keltner (2011) provides a helpful analysis of Arendt’s
influence on Kristeva. (See especially Chapter 3, “The Public Stakes of Intimacy.”)
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Schippers makes a similar claim. She writes that “it would be interesting to ask why
revolt emerges at the margins; in other words, whether marginality constitutes a privileged
position in the generation of change” (Schippers 2011, 65). By looking closely at the four
following passages, I hope to show that there is an affirmative answer in Kristeva’s work, even if
it is an oblique one.
32
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entertainments that far from satisfy the demand of pleasure, they become rioters.
(Kristeva 2000, 7)
Though Kristeva sounds rather like a conservative talk radio host in this passage, I want
to read her more charitably. I take her to be pointing out that those excluded by
normalizing power will be more likely to experience this order as problematic and
contingent (though not necessarily consciously). Insofar as they are not given the
resources necessary for revolt and therefore hindered in questioning and creating
meaning, other defensive responses will likely follow. These could be “regressive
ideologies” which give such persons a sense of meaning without providing resources for
self-criticism,33 immersion in superficial pleasures which do not provide meaning or the
opportunity for questioning, or rioting against an order which fails to give meaning to
excluded lives.34 Thus, while the excluded or marginalized may be in a privileged
position to expose or resist the normalizing order, without the resources necessary for
revolt there is a danger of harmful defensive responses.
A second moment I would like to discuss is Kristeva’s reading of Freud’s
explanation of religious sacrifice in Totem and Taboo. On her reading, early social links
were founded on the murder of a father by his sons. The sons’ sense of guilt for this
murder created a bond between them, and caused the father’s power of force to be
33

While it is easy to point to religious ideologies as examples of these regressive
tendencies, it seems to me that any ideology which fails to question itself or its history is an
example of a “regressive ideology.” Any political ideology which fails to question itself and in
which persons find an uncritical comfort, whether considered conservative or liberal, would in
this sense be regressive. Even the faith in science or technology (as seen in the push for STEM
education) could be a regressive ideology on this view.
34

Note that for rioting to be a defensive response, it must itself be an uncritical activity.
In this sense, political protests which contest normalizing orders, but in doing so question both
the order and the activity of protest itself should not be considered defensive responses. I am
extrapolating this from Kristeva’s words, but I would hold onto this distinction whether or not
Kristeva herself would make this distinction.
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transformed into a symbolic, religious, ancestral power. Sacrifice then became necessary
as a reminder of this original guilt and emergence of the social. But, Kristeva tells us,
sometimes the benefits of this social contract “threaten to disappear” as a result of
“unemployment, exclusion, lack of money, failure in work, dissatisfaction of every kind”
(Kristeva 2000, 14, emphasis added). When this occurs, the subject (Kristeva says the
“I”) no longer feels integrated in the social and thus must find new forms of revolt. This
explains, on Kristeva’s reading, new forms of ritual and sacrifice in which “an imaginary
power” emerges in order to “satisfy the need to confront an authority in [one’s]
imagination” (14). These imaginary confrontations, in the form of rituals or artistic
works, allow for the transgression of authority without physical violence. This account
has a significant influence on Kristeva’s own understanding of revolt. Again, it is in the
experience of being excluded or marginalized that new forms of revolt arise on this
account. What is important, for Kristeva, is that the confrontation with authority be
sublimated into works, or become the source of new meaning, rather than resulting in
aggression.
The third and final passage from The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt I would like
to consider is Kristeva’s discussion of the analytic setting as one of displacement of
trauma. She writes, “A patient goes to an analyst in order to remember his past, his
traumas, his feeling of exclusion. […] ‘I’ am unable to express myself, ‘I’ am inhibited,
‘I’ am depressed, ‘I’ am marginalized because ‘I’ have this or that sexuality” (Kristeva
2000, 29, emphases added).35 Marginalization, or exclusion, is a particularly important
cause of psychic suffering, and psychoanalysis is a privileged site for responding to this
Note the “I”s always in quotation marks, pointing to Kristeva’s insistence that the “I” is
always heterogeneous, becoming, and unstable through continual displacements.
35
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form of suffering. Through psychoanalytic transference, displacements are effected
which allow the possibility of working-through. “In the best cases,” Kristeva tells us,
“analysis is an invitation to become the narrator, the novelist, of one’s own story”
(Kristeva 2000, 29). This is because in narrating (and re-narrating) one’s life, one effects
a revolt, bringing meaning to drives, bringing a lost past to consciousness. Insofar as the
marginalized are more likely to experience this form of psychic suffering, or are more
likely to require such displacements to make meaning, they are in a privileged site for
revolt. Unlike the subject who fits norms, and is therefore provided with symbolic
meanings which are suited to her life, the subject excluded by the normalizing order will
be more likely to need to create new meanings through revolt.36
This brings us to the Trilogy, in which Kristeva discusses her three feminine
geniuses in terms of marginalization. Here she writes, adapting a question asked by
Simone de Beauvoir, “How, through the female condition, can a woman’s being be
fulfilled, that is, her individual opportunity in terms of freedom […]?” (Kristeva 2004,
407 original emphasis). Her answer is the “singular initiative” of feminine geniuses, that
“ultimate force on which the deconstruction of any ‘condition’ depends” (407). In other
words, Kristeva denies that an oppressive condition itself must be changed for women to
achieve freedom. Rather, she sees in feminine geniuses this “singular initiative,” intimate
revolts which challenge the oppressive condition through challenging norms, inscribing

To be sure, given Kristeva’s larger project, it is clear that there is no subject for whom
given norms or symbolic meanings can entirely suffice for her psychic life. Indeed, this would
mean the subject would be determined, a product of the symbolic, not a heterogeneous subject of
signifiance. Still, it is clear that subjects can be more or less excluded, more or less marginalized
by a normalizing, symbolic order.
36
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oneself into the symbolic, giving meaning to lives which are, previous to revolt, excluded
by the symbolic.
In sum, the margins constitute a privileged site of revolt, and marginalized
subjects who successfully revolt, and in doing so create a body of work, are geniuses
whose singular initiative contributes to the deconstruction of the margins themselves. It is
not surprising, then, that the three shared traits of Kristeva’s feminine geniuses are
closely tied to her understanding of intimate revolt. The first of the traits is the fostering
of singularity always within relationships. Recall that for Kristeva, intimate revolt is
always a sharing, enabled by another through transference (even if it is imaginary as in
writing as revolt). One may then ask what makes this trait particularly feminine. I would
like to suggest that rather than appealing to the psychosexual account discussed above,
we explain this relatedness through a tendency for females to be socialized as importantly
in relation to others (especially as care-givers), while males tend to be socialized to be
independent. Not only, then, will women be marginalized and thus experience a greater
need for revolt, but it is also likely that they will be less hindered by psychical
investments in independence and thus be more likely to achieve the transference
necessary for revolt. That is, they will be more likely to develop a singularity-in-relation.
The second of the traits is “the concern to safeguard the life of thought.” The
thought Kristeva has in mind here is not abstract thought, but thinking tied to one’s life,
namely signifiance. This is precisely what Kristeva calls intimate revolt: the return and
questioning of a lost past, giving words to the drives. It is a thinking that involves the
heterogeneity of the subject, not thinking that is dominated by the purely conscious, the
abstract and symbolic. Perhaps this would be a characteristic of feminine genius because
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men are often expected to be driven by abstract, calculative thinking, while females,
perhaps in part due to the previously mentioned relatedness, are socialized to think in
non-abstract terms,37 and to encourage the development of thought in those for whom
they care (in other words, to “forgive” the other through transference allowing meaning
to emerge for the other). It is not surprising that women, largely marginalized by
symbolic discourse, may be particularly likely to revolt, as the symbolic will not be
experienced as meaningful as it is likely to be experienced by men.38
Finally, “the insistence on the time of flowering and rebirth” is closely tied to
Kristeva’s understanding of revolt. Recall that each revolt is a rebirth or renewal of the
subject. This is because in revolt, the subject’s psyche is restructured, and this is possible
because of the forgiveness of the other. Thus, the subject in revolt is reborn into a social
link which allows for the possibility of revolt but is also itself modified through revolt.
Furthermore, the temporal character of this revolt is one of rebirth because revolt
accomplishes a return to a lost past, the timelessness39 of the unconscious, in order to reemerge in conscious, symbolic time. This cyclical temporality would be a characteristic
of feminine genius because it is in relationships that we see the births of generations, the
re-creations of ourselves and others, while men, who are socialized to be more
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This, at least, was a hypothesis of early care ethicists.

38

Note here that such an explanation may provide an alternative grounds for the
explanation of the illusoriness of symbolic discourse for many females without falling back on
the thesis of phallic monism.
39

In Intimate Revolt, Kristeva has an extended discussion of the Zeitlos, or timeless,
character of the unconscious which is important for her understanding of revolt and is present, she
thinks, in Freud’s understanding of the memory-trace, working-through, and transference. In
order to simplify Kristeva’s account without unnecessary digressions, I have largely avoided a
proper examination of this topic. Keltner (2011) devotes the fourth chapter of her book on
Kristeva to this topic.
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independent or perhaps goal-driven, are therefore socialized to live in terms of linear
temporality.
Importantly, the socio-historical setting which determines these traits to be
tendencies for women and not men is contingent.40 We can conceive of a social
organization in which caring labor is not divided along lines of sexual identity, for
example. However, because these are traits that are neglected or de-valued by the sexist
mainstream, there is value in theorizing them, revalorizing them, and thus arguing for the
importance of the marginalized lives from which they often arise. Moreover, these traits
are characteristics of feminine genius because they promote the flourishing of singular
lives which are productive of bodies of work. The relationship of thought to life, the
potential for re-creation, and their facilitation through relations of interdependence all
contribute to unique subjects who are capable of producing works which are challenging
and importantly rooted in the subjects’ lives.
The logic employed here can be expanded beyond what we are calling “feminine
genius.” Insofar as feminine genius is rooted in female psychosexuality, other forms of
genius cannot be developed by Kristeva. Indeed, her insistence on phallic monism and
the Oedipal story inevitably leads to the primacy of sexual differentiation over all other
forms of difference.41 Thus, while Kristeva’s aim of revaluing the experiences of women
40

Indeed, the foundation for all three characteristics of feminine genius is the primacy of
relationships. In relationships, singularities can flourish without isolation, thought can be
nourished but remains grounded in concrete relations and avoid abstraction, and through
biological births and deaths, and psychic births and rebirths, relationships reveal a cyclical
temporality distinct from linear time. Thus, the social norm which appears to be key to this
understanding of feminine genius is the socialization of women into the primacy of relationships,
as opposed to the ideal of independence for men.
This point is inspired by Tina Chanter’s criticism of Freudian and Lacanian Oedipal
theories for reinforcing this primacy of sexual difference (2005).
41
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is a worthwhile one, her means of achieving this revaluation not only reify oppressive
assumptions, but they also keep her from reclaiming other forms of marginalized
experience.
Disabled Genius
In freeing feminine genius of its Oedipal justification, my hope is to inspire the
development of alternative forms of genius found in marginalized lives. Recall that
genius, for Kristeva, is a form of singularity which challenges particular norms and which
results in a work that cannot be disconnected from the life of that singular subject. By
singularity, Kristeva signifies a unique psychosexual development that can be shared as a
result of psychic structures held in common.42 How, then, might we conceive of disabled
genius? If genius is a form of intimate revolt which results in a body of work, as I argued
above, then we should look for disabled genius in the works of singular, disabled
subjects.
I would like to consider two disabled subjects who, through revolt, have created
works which are reflective of their lives. Susan Wendell wrote The Rejected Body:
Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability, a philosophical yet personal work
inspired by her own experiences. Wendell, who was a professor in the Women’s Studies
department of Simon Fraser University, fell ill in 1985 with what was later diagnosed as
“chronic fatigue dysfunction syndrome” (also known as “myalgic encephalomyelitis”
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I hope it is clear given my arguments above that I reject shared psychic structures
which reify oppressive norms. For example, while I find abjection as a developmental necessity
convincing, I would hold that abjection is a process that occurs between a caretaker (not
necessarily a mother) and a child. Similarly, I find the existence of the unconscious convincing,
but reject its necessarily phallic determination.
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outside of the United States), an event which changed the course of her life and her
academic focus (Wendell 1996). As she writes in the book:
I have worked for more than twenty years in the area of feminist social and
political theory. The more I learned about other people’s experiences of disability
and reflected upon my own, the more connections I saw between feminist
analyses of gender as socially constructed from biological differences between
females and males, and my emerging understanding of disability as socially
constructed from biological differences between the disabled and non-disabled. In
addition, I was increasingly impressed by the knowledge people with disabilities
have about living with bodily suffering and limitation and about how their
cultures treat rejected aspects of bodily life. It was clear to me that this knowledge
did not inform theorizing about the body by non-disabled feminists and that
feminist theory of the body was consequently both incomplete and skewed toward
healthy, non-disabled experience. I began to do some feminist theorizing about
disability. (Wendell 1996, 5)
The result of this theorizing is a book which attempts to tackle a great variety of problems
in theorizing disability, from defining disability, to problems with the authority placed in
medicine, to the complex relationship of disability and feminism. But The Rejected Body,
is not simply a work of theory. The Introduction frames the work in terms of her own
experiences, and throughout the chapters, Wendell inserts personal experiences where
relevant, sometimes to give examples, sometimes to show where a particular argument
originated.
Consider, for example, the chapter entitled “Feminism, Disability, and the
Transcendence of the Body.” Here, she discusses her own experiences with chronic pain.
She writes, “When I became ill, I felt taken over and betrayed by a profound bodily
vulnerability. I was forced by my body to reconceptualize my relationship to it” (Wendell
1996, 169). The experience of chronic pain leads Wendell, on her own account, to rework
her relationship to her body. Specifically, Wendell describes her experience of learning,
from others, to “mak[e] friends with” her pain (171). To do so is to accept pain, to
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observe it, rather than resisting it or wishing to get rid of it, in order to “reduce the
suffering it actually causes” (171). Later, she refers to this as a process of relaxing “into”
the pain, through which the “pain is transformed into something else—sometimes a
mental image, sometimes a train of thought, sometimes a desire to do something, such as
lying down or getting warmer, sometimes sleep” (172). What is powerful about this
example is the transformation that occurs at all levels of the psyche. The experience of
pain is transformed into various other effects, the conscious and unconscious rejection of
pain is transformed into a relationship of acceptance, her unarticulated experience of the
pain is given words, first through an expression learned from others (“making friends
with their pain”), then through a poetic turn of phrase of her own (“to relax ‘into it’”).
Against a certain postmodern feminism prominent at the time of her book’s publication,
Wendell even dares to call for a certain “transcendence” of the body, by which she means
not a separation or mind-body dualism, but strategies of acceptance which “increase the
freedom of consciousness” (178). A final aspect of Wendell’s text I would like to draw
attention to is her set of acknowledgements. Here, she expresses gratitude not only to
those who helped her to theorize, but also those who listened to her. She thanks her
husband for listening to her “anger, depression, and despair in the middle of many
nights,” her friend and counselor for helping her “learn to live with long-term illness and
preserve [her] creativity,” and others who supported her transition to researching
disability (vii-viii).
What I am pointing to is an experience of revolt that, along with other intimate
revolts, results in the production of an innovative work in philosophy. Wendell returns to
a lost past, here, focusing conscious attention on unconscious responses to pain. This
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return is enabled by relationships to others, some intellectual (e.g., learning the concept
of making friends with pain),43 some intimate (e.g., experiencing transference in
relationships with others which allow her to give meaning to her experiences). This return
effects a rebirth in which her conscious, unconscious, and bodily experiences are
displaced, in which senseless experiences are inscribed into the symbolic with her
symbolic inventions (i.e., making friends with/relaxing into). Finally, the work, which
began in the marginal experience of being a woman with a chronic illness, and in a
theoretical space outside the norms of mainstream philosophy and even feminist
philosophy, challenges philosophy, medicine, and feminism among other fields to reckon
with these margins. In this way, Susan Wendell is a disabled genius.
I would like to move now to a second example of disabled genius. Whereas
Wendell is diagnosed with a chronic illness, the results of which were largely physical,44
Sesha Kittay is, according to her mother, severely cognitively disabled. This may appear
a strange example to draw from. After all, she could not speak and had “no measurable
I.Q.” at age twenty-seven (E. Kittay 1999, 151). If a return to the unconscious, the
semiotic, or the timeless is a necessary part of revolt, should we not conclude that she is
incapable of such a revolt? If creating a body of work is a necessary component of
genius, how could she be a genius? I am attempting to work out, here, a very challenging
43

Indeed, even these intellectual relationships seem to have an intimate component.
Throughout the book Wendell explains experiences of variously struggling with (see pages 26-27,
for example) and accepting (see page 177, for example) identifying with others who are disabled.
44

This distinction is less clear than we often acknowledge. One of the powerful aspects
of Wendell’s own work is her discussion of the psychological effects of and responses to physical
pain, including depression. This points both to the importance of rejecting mind-body dualism (to
account for the mutual influence of each) and the importance of rejecting a strict individual-social
dualism (again, to account for their mutual influence). Wendell details, for example, how the
mythical omnipotence of medicine can lead to both physical and psychological harm for those
with conditions that medicine does not (yet) understand (1996, Ch. 5).
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case. I think that Sesha is a genius in Kristeva’s sense of the word, but if my readers are
unconvinced, I hope that what I say here at least illuminates other cases of cognitively
disabled subjects whose limitations are less severe.
First, then, in what sense can Sesha be said to accomplish a return? Kittay writes
that “Sesha was almost twelve before she learned to kiss or hug” (1999, 151). In the last
chapter, I suggested that Sesha’s behaviors do not easily fall within Kristeva’s linguistic
categories of semiotic or symbolic. This means that if we are concerned to listen to the
other, we must listen to both. Sesha’s eyes following the falling leaf, for example,
communicates meaning without entering symbolic discourse, that is, it appears to be
semiotic. Learning to hug, however, comes closer to a symbolic articulation, in that it is a
socially sanctioned means for communicating and has a generally established meaning.
Learning to kiss or hug, then, would require Sesha to return to an affect or drive—
characterized, say, by affection—and, through the transference love of others, to
articulate this affect in this symbolic gesture. If such returns occur less frequently in
Sesha’s life than in others, this does not mean they are not in fact returns, nor does it
mean they are returns of a lesser degree.
Second, this return is enabled by relations with others. It is all too easy to imagine
a person with a severe cognitive disability being ignored, or having no person with whom
to share her affection, and thus never finding the means to articulate those affects in terms
of symbolic gestures. Sesha, however, did have care-takers who were patient, loved her,
and allowed her to love them back. That is, there were others in Sesha’s life who
“forgave” her in relationships of transference, who allowed her to articulate her drives in
symbolic gestures by sharing a semiotic link.
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Third, learning such a symbolic gesture is also a rebirth. An affect that remained
unarticulated is, through the hug, capable of being articulated according to some, even if
minimal, conscious choice. This also renews the link between Sesha and others. An
affection that might have been only assumed by her caretakers is then able to be directly
communicated. Such a gesture may also allow Sesha to make new links with others who
may have been less patient than her immediate caretakers with suppositions about her
meanings.
But it is the body of work that seems to remain the greatest challenge for this
case. Here I want to push Kristeva’s own words to their limits. Recall that Kristeva says a
genius is one who “force[s] us to discuss their story because it is so closely bound up
with their creations, in the innovations that support the development of thought and
beings, and in the onslaught of questions, discoveries, and pleasures that their creations
have inspired” (Kristeva 2001, xi). How could Sesha’s hugs be thought of as such a
creation? First, the hugs and kisses have encouraged the development of thinking for both
her mother, who wrestles with her own philosophical commitments as a result of her
daughter’s love and joy, and her caretakers. Kittay writes, “That which we believed we
valued, what we—I—thought was at the center of humanity, the capacity for thought, for
reason, was not it, not it at all” (Kittay 1999, 150). And Peggy, Sesha’s caretaker, learns
quickly that in working with Sesha, “Not my way. Your way. Slowly” (157). Second,
Sesha’s creations have doubtlessly inspired “questions, discoveries, and pleasures,” from
the questions of the family, friends, and caretakers who interact with her, to the
philosophical questioning she inspired in her mother and which her mother’s work
continues to inspire; from the discovery of how to nourish and love a person that defies
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myriad norms to the philosophical discoveries (concepts like the “doulia,” “connectionbased equality,” and “reciprocity-in-connection”45) she inspires in her mother’s work;
from the pleasures that her joy and hugs bring those who know her to the pleasures
inspired in others by her mother’s moving writing about Sesha.
One obvious criticism, here, would be to say that I am interested more in Eva
Kittay’s own works than I am in her daughter’s creations, but I think Kristeva provides an
explanation for this. She writes, “The way these works affect us depends ultimately on
the historical disturbances they bring about and on the way they influence other people
and their followers—in sum, their effect depend on the way we respond to them”
(Kristeva 2001, xi). In other words, a work itself is always dependent upon how it is
received, taken up, and responded to by others. The accomplishments of all of Kristeva’s
feminine geniuses, for example, were in part contingent upon their receptions. And
Sesha’s creations have inspired not only a book and many essays by her mother, but
myriad responses from others. What Sesha has created has certainly inspired more work
than many other lives ever will.
Finally, Kristeva writes that geniuses “make us look at ourselves in a way that is
just as ingenious as the way they locate their extraordinary character between their own
pleas and the unpredictable opinion of the human beings who respond to them and who
ordain them. At heart, they are geniuses for us—and for eternity, so much so that we
become geniuses ourselves” (Kristeva 2001, xii). Earlier she says, “my geniuses
displayed qualities that, while no doubt exceptional, can be found in most of us,” and that
genius is the result of “paradoxical occurrences, unique experiences, and remarkable
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These concepts are introduced in Chapter 2 of Love’s Labor.
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excesses that manage to pierce through an increasingly automated world” (x). In sum, a
genius is one who has qualities which are common yet exceptional, one who helps us find
singularity in a normalizing world, and one who inspires others to be geniuses through
her genius. When we read the description of Sesha’s joys, hugs, and laughter, it is clear
that there is something exceptional in her life, and yet joys, hugs, and laughter are
common to most human lives. Sesha’s life, and the work she inspires her mother to write,
pierces through the automated world, challenges all-too-common conceptions of worth as
“productivity,” “health,” or “independence,” and in so doing it inspires us to reconsider
ourselves, our relationships, and our own worth. Love’s Labor is not just about Sesha or
disability, even though Sesha’s life is surely its inspiration; it is an attempt to rework the
foundations of ethical relationships and political obligations. In other words, Sesha is a
(disabled) genius.
One final point to consider is the extent to which Sesha’s genius is related to her
marginalized social position. Unlike the revolts of Kristeva’s feminine geniuses or
Wendell, Sesha’s revolts are not the result of marginalization. It is not a failure of
symbolic resources, for example, which leads to Sesha articulating her affection in the
form of a hug or kiss. And yet, the influence Sesha has had on other works and authors is
clearly due to the marginalization of cognitively disabled persons in the medical
professions, academic philosophy, and so on. It is the struggle to put into philosophical
language what makes Sesha’s life meaningful that gives Kittay’s work such depth.
Kittay’s criticisms of our public policies are powerful because of the failure of social
institutions to provide a place for Sesha and others with similar disabilities that is neither
impersonally institutional nor isolated within the immediate family. Thus, part of what
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makes Sesha’s life a life of genius is the fact that she and others are marginalized, even if
that is not at the source of her own intimate revolt.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for two conclusions. First, I argued that Kristeva’s
account of feminine genius is better understood as a form of marginalized intimate revolt,
rather than as a result of a particular psychosexual development which remains
normalizing despite Kristeva’s attempts to go beyond the Freudian model. Second, I
argued that once we reject the psychosexual model which keeps Kristeva from
developing other forms of marginalized genius, we can develop such forms of genius,
including disabled genius. I argued that disabled genius may indeed be said to exist
through two examples, Susan Wendell and Sesha Kittay. By discussing examples rather
than solely theorizing, I aimed to follow Kristeva in emphasizing the singularity of
disabled geniuses. Furthermore, by discussing Sesha Kittay, I aimed to show that persons
diagnosed with even cognitive disabilities could be geniuses given Kriteva’s account. In
the conclusion following this chapter, I will synthesize the arguments of this chapter with
those of the previous two, specifically by discussing the import of the interpretations of
Kristeva I have developed for the epistemic concerns of the first chapter.
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Conclusion

In the chapters composing this dissertation I argued that the discourse of
epistemic injustice and Julia Kristeva’s oeuvre offer important insights into disability
oppression and exclusion. In the first chapter I argued that institutionalization,
medicalization, and cultural anxieties about mental disabilities constitute and cause
epistemic injustices suffered by disabled subjects. After identifying examples of
testimonial and hermeneutical injustices related to these processes, I argued that José
Medina’s recommendation for epistemic interaction resulting in beneficial epistemic
friction and, hopefully, meta-lucidity is particularly promising for resisting the epistemic
injustices to which disabled persons are subject. But there is a limit to the discourse of
epistemic injustice. Persons with severe mental disabilities who cannot provide testimony
or interpret their own shared social experiences appear unable to be subject to epistemic
injustices. I made three suggestions for responding in epistemically just ways to such
persons: treat persons as informants rather than sources of information as much as
possible, even if they are only able to communicate things like pleasure or pain; attribute
epistemic authority to those who are close to the severely mentally disabled person,
whether that is a care-taker or person with a similar condition or a person treated in the
same facility; and foster the epistemic capabilities of all persons as much as possible.
Still, these recommendations do not go very far, and they threaten to put severe mental
disability in a state of deferral such that meaning is not found in the lives of such persons
as they are, but instead they are thought of as they might be.
To avoid thinking disability only as tentative, I turned to Julia Kristeva’s recent
essays on disability, reading them through her previous works on language, abjection,
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and the uncanny. Doing so allowed me, first, to explain how Kristeva’s theory of
meaning as emerging from signifiance, the interaction of semiotic and symbolic, reveals
that meaning can be shared even in interactions with those who are severely mentally
disabled. I named the prejudicial neglect of this form of sharing “intimate hermeneutical
injustice” to distinguish it from the general form of hermeneutical injustice which focuses
on interpreting shared social experiences. I then argued that Kristeva offers a convincing
account of disability exclusion. On her view, this exclusion is founded in the narcissistic
threat posed to nondisabled persons by disabled persons who have been culturally figured
as abject. Finally, following but also expanding upon Kristeva’s work on uncanny
foreigners, I proposed a way to resist this exclusion and accomplish interaction by a
double movement of interpersonal relations, which allow nondisabled persons to workthrough their narcissistic defenses and thus share meaning with disabled persons, and
social relations, in which nondisabled persons and communities “move toward” disabled
persons and communities to alter the boundaries of each community and thus alter the
figures of abjection.
In the final chapter, I argued that disabled persons, including the severely
mentally disabled, are not just capable of making and sharing meaning, but they are
capable of achieving what Kristeva calls the highest form of subjectivity, genius. To do
so, however, I needed to articulate what genius means, for Kristeva. Arguing against an
interpretation that relies on her sexist, heteronormative, and ableist account of
psychosexual development, I proposed that feminine genius as she develops it in her
Feminine Genius Trilogy, should be understood as a form of intimate revolt from the
social margins that produces a work. Interpreted in this way, I argued, other forms of
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marginalized genius, particularly disabled genius, become conceivable. I then offered two
examples, Susan Wendell, a chronically ill and physically disabled feminist philosopher
who wrote The Rejected Body among other works, and Sesha Kittay, the severely
mentally disabled daughter of Eva Kittay who has inspired many of her mother’s and
others’ works, as disabled geniuses. In this conclusion, I draw out some similarities
between the epistemic injustice account and the Kristevan account of disability developed
in the previous chapters, similarities that I avoided developing earlier out of a desire to
remain faithful to the original sources and not offer superficial interpretations of either set
of texts. I then offer some potential future directions for research that could emerge from
this project.
Bringing the Accounts into Interaction
I want to bring the epistemic injustice and Kristevan accounts into interaction,
here, and I mean interaction in the rich sense proposed by Kristeva and Medina: there are
resonances or points of contact between these discourses, but they should be maintained
in their specificity, not neatly mapped on to one another or integrated. What, then, can
these accounts contribute to one another? And where do they diverge?
Recall that for Fricker there are two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. The paradigm case of a testimonial injustice, for
Fricker, is a credibility deficit suffered by an epistemic agent as a result of her
membership in a social group because a social imaginary prejudices others against
members of her group (2007, 28). Disabled persons do suffer credibility deficits on
Kristeva’s account. For example, John, the person diagnosed with schizophrenia in the
documentary Kristeva considers, is integrated into the economy of production, but his
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voice, his thoughts, and his feelings are neglected by the film. That is, he is not trusted to
speak for himself. Interaction, the sharing of meaning between (nondisabled and
disabled) subjects, rarely occurs. This is also part of Kristeva’s criticism of charity,
because charity tends to consider all disabled persons as the same “without taking into
consideration the specificity of their sufferings and exclusions” at the same time that it
imposes its own methods on disabled persons, infantilizing them rather than listening to
their own concerns (2012, 35-36). Her hope is that disabled persons will be listened to in
their singularity, and as she says of her son, be given the opportunity to participate “not
as I want it, but as he wants it and is able” (2013, 229). The obvious epistemic
implication is that disabled persons must be given epistemic credibility in order to
recognize their singularity, in order to address their concerns as they see them.
We can also see that this credibility deficit is the result of membership in a social
group subject to the negative prejudices of the social imagination. On my reading of
Kristeva, disabled persons constitute a social group in part because of the exclusions to
which they are subject.1 Moreover, we have seen that disability, as a figure of abjection in
contemporary Western culture, suffers from the negative prejudices of the social
imagination, or “shared imaginative conceptions” (Fricker 2007, 14). Disability,
according to Kristeva, presents a threat to the narcissistic identity of individuals and to
the boundaries of humanity itself, but only because of co-constitutive narcissistic subject
formations and a broadly accepted conception of humanity.

1

Siebers offers a more thorough consideration of disability as a group identity in
Disability Theory (2008). It is important to bear in mind that disabled people, like those in any
other social group, may exclude one another.
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Next, consider hermeneutical injustice. Recall that for Fricker this occurs when
one’s community lacks the interpretive framework for understanding the experiences of
an entire group of people, such that members of that group cannot make sense of their
lives in significant ways (2007, 158). This is perhaps the most clear in the case of the
parents Kristeva discusses who lack the hermeneutic resources to comprehend their
child’s disability and thus experience guilt, as if the only fulfilling life for their child is
one in which she is “cured” and as if it is solely the parents’ responsibility to effect this
cure. It is also clear, however, that Kristeva thinks we lack the hermeneutic resources,
generally, to understand any life that is not capable of “excellence, pleasure, and
achievement” as human (2012, 33). Moreover, because the development and sharing of
meaning by disabled subjects is largely barred, their ability to make sense of their own
lives or communicate about their lives with others will be hindered.2 Thus, Kristeva’s
analysis clearly also points to a hermeneutical injustice.
But clearly Kristeva does not just offer a recapitulation of arguments about
epistemic injustice in the context of disability. Her account, and my development of it
here, offers insights that go beyond the discourse of epistemic injustice. First, Kristeva
provides a warning that developing testimonial justice as an epistemic virtue in the
context of disability is not as simple as developing a habit of listening to disabled others
or compensating for credibility deficits. The very possibility of listening to disabled
subjects (and thus of assigning them a credibility deficit or not) is foreclosed by the
narcissistic threat nondisabled subjects experience in encounters with them and their
2

Publications like the Disability Rag, self-advocacy organizations like those discussed in
the first chapter, and the academic field of Disability Studies, for example, may be seen as
attempts to develop interpretive frameworks for the lives of disabled persons, in the face of a
broader social absence of such a framework.
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subsequent (usually unreflective, affective) exclusion. Thus, testimonial justice with
regard to disabled persons will require the (simultaneously reflective, affective, and
unconscious) working-through of this narcissistic self-image by nondisabled persons, in
large part through interactions with disabled others. Second, Kristeva’s analysis provides
a concrete example of the intimate and complex way in which testimonial and
hermeneutical injustices are related, which brings her closer to Medina’s analysis. The
nondisabled community lacks the hermeneutical resources to understand disabled lives
because nondisabled persons refuse disabled speakers’ expressions as a result of the
narcissistic threats they present, and nondisabled persons neglect disabled speakers’
testimony as a result of this narcissistic threat because they lack the interpretive
frameworks to understand disabled lives as human lives at all. Meliorating hermeneutical
injustices in this case will thus require not only opening oneself to the attempts at
communication made by disabled persons, but also the melioration of testimonial
injustices as described above (i.e., the vacillation between social interaction, or movingtoward, and working-through in interpersonal interactions). Medina is also skeptical of
any clear distinction between testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, but he explains
their relation in terms of intelligibility. Hermeneutical injustices, in which realms of
social experience are made unintelligible (at least in mainstream hermeneutic resources),
“are maintained and passed on through testimonial dynamics” that block new
interpretations from being heard as credible or even spoken, as in the case of preemptive
testimonial injustices. And testimonial justices are made “almost inescapable” when the
testimony of certain groups or about certain realms of experience are “systematically
regarded as nonsensical (and hence incredible)” (Medina 2013, 96). These accounts
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clearly differ because on the Kristevan account the relationship between what is made
intelligible or not and testimony is always mediated through narcissism and abjection.
Both agree, however, that resisting either form of injustice cannot succeed without
addressing both forms of injustice.
We can also see a great deal of overlap between Kristeva’s work and Medina’s
recommendations. First, they share a skepticism about the goal of integration because of
its tendency toward assimilation, that is, its failure to challenge the mainstream from the
point of view of those to be integrated. Kristeva’s stated concern is that integration fails
to acknowledge the singularity of those who are integrated by remaining uncritical of
those with whom they are integrated and by incorporating the integrated into production
and circulation rather than through the creation and sharing of meaning. Medina, on the
other hand, thinks that certain social spaces are needed for marginalized groups to form
group identifications in order to better understand themselves and to challenge the social
arrangements into which they may be integrated (2013, 7-8). My interpretation of
feminine genius may bring Kristeva closer to Medina on this point, however. Recall that
in the third chapter I argued that the margins constitute a privileged site of revolt, because
these are spaces that lack symbolic resources to articulate their experiences to a greater
extent than the center. Because revolt requires forgiveness, or the formation of a semiotic
link between subjects through which the semiotic can be articulated in the symbolic,
revolt may in fact be barred by integration when nondisabled people do not interact with
disabled people or reject them because of the narcissistic threat they pose. If this is the
case, then achieving Kristeva’s sense of interaction may in fact require spaces of
forgiveness for those in the margins (in this case, the disabled) in which symbolic
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transformations can gradually emerge and make possible the sharing of meaning between
disabled and nondisabled persons. In other words, these spaces of forgiveness may be
necessary to refigure the boundaries of the community formed by abjection and allow
social interaction between the disabled and nondisabled.
Second, their shared alternative to integration is interaction. Recall that the
Imperative of Epistemic Interaction states that we should develop habits of being
responsive to diverse others and sensibilities that are cognitively and affectively open to
diverse others. The ideal, here, is to consistently engage with beneficial epistemic
friction, or those forces which make us call into question our own beliefs. To do so,
Medina says we must acknowledge and engage cognitive forces we encounter, and not
allow any one cognitive influence to become unchecked at all times (2013, 50). Kristeva
similarly calls upon nondisabled readers to be open and responsive to disabled others, to
create and share meaning with them. Again, however, Kristeva warns readers against a
simplistic view of how this can be accomplished in the case of disabled persons. Any true
interaction will require that nondisabled subjects work through their narcissistic selfimages (which is, again, a process that is conscious and unconscious, affective, somatic,
and intellectual), and that they move toward disabled others. Achieving epistemic justice,
in other words, will require extra-epistemic methods and resources.
Finally, it is my contention that Kristeva’s theory of meaning broadens the realm
of the epistemic. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are discussed in terms of what
Kristeva would call the symbolic. We are interested in knowing, for example, whether
one’s testimony in (spoken, written, or sign) language is assigned a credibility deficit, or
whether the interpretive (linguistic or representational) resources of a community hinder
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the members of a group in making sense of their lives. It becomes a challenge in this
framework to discuss epistemic injustices suffered by persons with severe cognitive
disabilities. Unlike those with less severe cognitive disabilities discussed in the first
chapter who suffer epistemic injustices as a result of misinformation and unwarranted
generalizations (what Carlson calls “prototype effects”), those with severe cognitive
disabilities may be unable to share knowledge via linguistic communication. Because
Kittay offers such full and moving descriptions, I will return to the example of her
daughter, Sesha. Unable to speak, write, or sign, it is unclear that a standard discussion of
epistemic injustice would find any testimonial or hermeneutical injustices in others’
behavior toward her. What testimony, one may ask, is there to assign a credibility deficit
to? To what hermeneutical resources is she appealing in order to make sense of her life?
Recall that for Kristeva, however, meaning is constituted by both semiotic and symbolic
elements. Thus, Sesha’s claps and cries, her laughs and looks are capable of carrying
meaning and, I believe, of being received unjustly.
First, consider the case of testimonial injustice. As is often the case for those who
care for children, it is not uncommon to hear those who provide services for disabled
persons say things like “She doesn’t know what she wants.” Nor is it uncommon for
those in the surrounding community to ignore the severely cognitively disabled entirely.
And yet, Sesha and others with similar levels of ability have meanings to share. Rushing
such a person through a routine which with she or he is struggling, for instance, would be
to ignore the meaning expressed in the struggle (frustration, for example). Or take this
example that Eva Kittay recounts from the perspective of Sesha’s caregiver, Peggy:
I was working terribly hard trying to get Sesha to cooperate and do what I was
supposed to get her to do. […] I thought, how am I going to do this? How can I
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possibly do this job, when I looked down at Sesha and saw her little head pushed
back against her stroller moving first to one side and then to another. I couldn’t
figure out what she was doing. Until I traced what her eyes were fixed on. She
had spotted a lea[f] falling, and she was following its descent. I said “Thank you
for being my teacher, Sesha. I see now. Not my way. Your way. Slowly.” (1999,
157)
Wrapped up in her assignment of completing exercises with Sesha, Peggy was not
listening to her, she failed to open herself to Sesha’s shared meaning. Sesha did not say or
sign “I want to watch this beautiful leaf,” but her eyes, the semiotic movements of her
body contain a meaning no less: fascination, perhaps joy or curiosity. Because Peggy’s
initial failure involves the development and sharing of meaning or interpretations of
experience, rather than the exchange of information, I have called this intimate
hermeneutical injustice. It shares its interpersonal nature, however, with testimonial
injustice.
Indeed, ignoring the meanings of disabled persons can occur on more structural
levels as well. Martha Nussbaum’s argument about the voting rights of disabled persons
is relevant, here. She invites her readers to consider a case in which a “person’s disability
is so profound that he or she is unable to perform the function in question, even to the
extent of forming a view and communicating that view to a guardian” (Nussbaum 2010,
88). Her contention is that guardians should be able to vote (and serve on juries) on
behalf of such persons. Her justification is political and ethical. To deny voting on behalf
of such severely disabled persons is to undermine the “deep expressive and symbolic
meaning” of allowing each citizen one vote, and furthermore forces guardians to choose
between their own interests and the interests of the cognitively disabled in their charge
(2010, 91). With the above development from Kristeva, I would add an epistemic
justification. Insofar as an election reflects not just the values but also the knowledge of
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citizens, there are meanings expressed by the severely disabled which are, in the status
quo, ignored by the political process. For example, I may value providing optimal
resources and services for cognitively disabled persons, but if I have no knowledge of the
conditions in which such persons live, if I have not listened to the meanings of those who
are cognitively disabled, then the votes I cast will ignore the interests of disabled persons
despite the values I hold. Thus, if a group of severely cognitively disabled persons cannot
deliberate and form solutions to their problems independently, others must find ways to
listen to them and use these meanings to form solutions, even if it must be on their behalf.
I have offered two such modes of listening: in the first chapter I proposed extending
epistemic authority to those close to severely mentally disabled persons (i.e., their caretakers and those in similar conditions) as one way to listen to such persons; and in the
second chapter I proposed extending listening to the semiotic and more broadly
understood symbolic levels at which meaning emerges, a form of attentiveness I called
intimate hermeneutical justice.
What, then, of hermeneutical injustice? It is less clear to me, in this case, that a
hermeneutical injustice would prove harmful to the severely mentally disabled in an
epistemic way. I know of no evidence that facilitating interactions among the severely
mentally disabled results in greater self-understanding of the individual’s situation or
place in the social world, for example. It does seem to me, however, that the greater
epistemic community is robbed of interpretive resources when it does not listen to those
with severe mental disabilities. Consider, for example, what the doctor told Eva Kittay
about Sesha, “that we should consider having other children because ‘one rotten apple
doesn’t spoil the barrel’” (1999, 150). Or consider Jeff McMahan’s comparison of the
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“radically cognitively limited” to animals: “Yet no one has shown how the belief that
chimpanzees are sacrificable can be reconciled with the belief that human beings with
comparable psychological capacities and potential are not” (2010, 347). By virtue of our
failure to listen to those with mental disabilities, the resources in the United States
available for interpreting disabled lives are comparisons with fruits, vegetables, and nonhuman animals. We largely lack the ability to understand and discuss the lives of disabled
persons in themselves. Thus the hermeneutical harm resulting from the broader failure to
listen to the mentally disabled is an epistemic harm to others, to those who are not
severely mentally disabled. The terrifying result in such cases is likely to be (nonepistemic, that is, ethical and political) harm toward severely mentally disabled
individuals.
Future Directions
In this dissertation I focused mainly on the contemporary oppression of disabled
persons and non-intersectional analyses of disability experience and oppression. In future
work, it would be promising to incorporate history and intersections with other marginal
experiences into my developments here. There are two particular, and non-exclusive,
ways to go about this. First, following Kristeva’s histories of abjection and foreignness in
Powers of Horror and Strangers to Ourselves, respectively, I could draw out historical
manifestations of disability and show how those are related to our understandings of
disability today and to other historical and contemporary figures of abjection. One
particularly promising site of intersection would be the female body and mind, because it
has often been figured as lacking and in this way related to the disabled body and mind.
Tracing this history may help reveal that an understanding of disability must take into
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account an understanding of femininity and vice versa. Indeed, recent volumes on
disability, like Gendering Disability (2004), Feminist Disability Studies (2011),
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1997), and Licia Carlson’s The
Faces of Intellectual Disability (2010), have already undertaken this project in various
ways. As I discussed in the introduction, racialized bodies and minds would also be an
important site of intersection for understanding the history of disability.
A second potential direction of development would be to investigate inclusive
educational models as a form of resistance to the oppressions discussed in this
dissertation. The development of prejudices against disabled persons which contribute to
epistemic injustices and the narcissistic rejection of disabled persons surely result, at least
in part, from educational practices that discourage or even block interaction between
disabled and nondisabled students. What arguments could be developed from this
dissertation, then, for inclusive education?
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